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Ensaios sobre plataformas, agentes heterogêneos e discriminação de preços; Essays on platforms, heterogeneous agents and price discrimination

Garber, Gabriel
Fonte: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP Publicador: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 02/12/2014 PT
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.31%
Apresentamos três estudos sobre os assuntos mencionados no título. O primeiro, econométrico, avalia os impactos da quebra de exclusividade no lado credenciador da indústria de cartões de pagamentos no Brasil que ocorreu em 2010. Por um lado, tentamos a construção de um grupo de controle e, por outro, fazemos a decomposição dos preços em markup e custo marginal. As estimações, que empregam um banco de dados com informações individuais para os maiores lojistas de cada setor, apontam para o sucesso dessa intervenção na promoção da concorrência. No segundo artigo, propomos que cobranças indevidas feitas por instituições financeiras podem ser uma forma de discriminação de preços, já que sua devolução demanda esforço dos consumidores. Nesse caso, tendo em vista que as cobranças indevidas ótimas dependem do perfil do consumidor, construímos um teste baseado numa função de verossimilhança para mostrar como a informação de reclamações poderia ser utilizada para detectar esse tipo de comportamento, mesmo quando a autoridade interessada nesse monitoramento sabe menos sobre os clientes que a instituição financeira. O terceiro artigo, teórico aplicado, estuda o comportamento de plataformas comerciais em mercados de dois lados nos quais os papéis de compradores e vendedores são bem definidos e há heterogeneidade dentro de cada um desses grupos de agentes. Diferentemente do que ocorre no caso em que os interesses são simétricos...

Price discrimination and targeted advertising : a welfare analysis

Esteves, Rosa Branca; Guimarães, Paulo
Fonte: Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Microeconomia Aplicada (NIMA) Publicador: Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Microeconomia Aplicada (NIMA)
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento
Publicado em /11/2000 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.31%
We present a monopolistic model of price discrimination by means of targeted informative advertising. Targeting is defined as the ability of the monopolist to direct messages with differentiated contents to groups of buyers with different valuations for the good. We show that only if targeting is perfect will the monopolist behave in a socially desirable way.; Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT)

Competitive targeted advertising with price discrimination

Esteves, Rosa Branca; Resende, Joana
Fonte: Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas Publicador: Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento
Publicado em /03/2011 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.62%
This paper investigates the effects of price discrimination by means of targeted advertising in a duopolistic market where the distribution of consumers’ preferences is discrete and where advertising plays two major roles. It is used by firms as a way to transmit relevant information to otherwise uninformed consumers and it is used as a price discrimination device. We compare the firms’ optimal marketing mix (advertising and pricing) when they adopt mass advertising/non-discrimination strategies and targeted advertising/price discrimination strategies. If firms are able to adopt targeted advertising strategies, we find that the symmetric price equilibrium is in mixed strategies, while the advertising is chosen deterministically. Our results also unveil that as long as we allow for imperfect substitutability between the goods, firms do not necessarily target more ads to their own market. In particular, firms’ optimal marketing mix leads to higher advertising reach in the rival’s market than in the firms’ own market, provided that advertising costs are sufficiently low in relation to the consumer’s reservation value. The comparison of the optimal marketing-mix under mass advertising strategies and targeted advertising strategies reveals that targeted advertising might constitute a tool to dampen price competition. In particular...

The economic effects of advertising and price discrimination in a product differentiation market

Cerqueira, Sofia Feliciano
Fonte: Universidade do Minho Publicador: Universidade do Minho
Tipo: Dissertação de Mestrado
Publicado em //2010 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.58%
Dissertação de mestrado em Matemática Económica e Financeira; The main contribution of this thesis is to develop an original model of competitive behaviour-based price discrimination (BBPD) through targeted advertising in a product differentiated market. It also provides a review of the economic literature on informative advertising and on oligopoly price discrimination, particularly on BBPD. The competitive and welfare e¤ects of both marketing strategies-i.e., BBPD and advertising-is already not well understood as there are few works in the field. One exception is Esteves (2009) who offers a first look at the dynamic effects of BBPD in homogeneous product markets, where firms need to invest in advertising to generate awareness. Broadly, this thesis extends her study to a product differentiated duopoly market. Thus, we consider a dynamic two-period model where two firms offer products that are differentiated à la Hotelling and it is assumed that through informative advertising consumers become imperfectly informed. In the first period price discrimination is not feasible. In the second period, based on consumers’ purchase history firms can employ BBPD. This dissertation investigates the competitive and welfare effects of firms being able to price discriminate between their old and new costumers in a product differentiated market where through informative advertising consumers become imperfectly informed. We show that moving from no discrimination to BBPD decreases second period prices but increases first period prices. An important finding of this thesis is that BBPD boosts industry profits at the expense of consumer surplus and welfare. A common finding in the existing literature is that when the two firms can price discriminate BBPD leads firms to a prisoner’s dilemma situation. This thesis shows that the existence of imperfect informed consumers through informative advertising can help firms to benefit from BBPD.; O principal objectivo desta tese é desenvolver um modelo para aprofundar o conhecimento sobre as consequências a nível económico que derivam da capacidade das empresas praticarem preços diferentes para consumidores que revelam histórias de compra diferentes...

Behaviour-based price discrimination with retention strategies

Amorim, Andreia Emanuela Guerra de
Fonte: Universidade do Minho Publicador: Universidade do Minho
Tipo: Dissertação de Mestrado
Publicado em //2011 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.44%
Dissertação de mestrado em Economia; In imperfect competitive markets rms have some market power, thus the practice of price discrimination is possible. In oligopolistic models, behaviour-based price discrimination is analyzed following two different approaches: the switching costs ap- proach and the brand preferences approach. A recent Ofcom s report makes a reminder to the practice of rms implementing retention strategies, as a way to discourage cus- tomers to change the current supplier offering to all customers who show an intention to switch a special price discount. The main objective of this Master Dissertation is to develop a theoretical model that analyzes the effects of retention strategies under the switching costs approach. After consumers have made their first-period consumption decisions and decide to change supplier in the second-period, they have to incur switching costs. It is a model that extends Chen (1997) by allowing rms to employ retention strategies. It is also a model based on Esteves and Rey (2010), that consider retention activity but under the brand preferences approach. The results, when compared to those obtained without retention strategies, suggest (i) a lower deadweight loss due the less inefficient switching; (ii) a lower firms profits; and (iii) a higher consumers surplus.; Em mercados de concorrência imperfeita...

Price discrimination with private and imperfect information

Esteves, Rosa Branca
Fonte: Universidade do Minho Publicador: Universidade do Minho
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento
Publicado em //2012 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.42%
This paper investigates the competitive and welfare effects of information accuracy improvements in markets where firms can price discriminate after observing a private and noisy signal about a consumer’s brand preference. It shows that firms charge more to customers they believe have a brand preference for them, and that this price has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the signal’s accuracy. In contrast, the price charged after a disloyal signal has been observed falls as the signal’s accuracy rises. While industry profit and overall welfare fall monotonically as price discrimination is based on increasingly more accurate information, the reverse happens to consumer surplus.; COMPETE; QREN; FEDER; Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT)

Behaviour-based price discrimination with elastic demand

Esteves, Rosa Branca; Reggiani, Carlo
Fonte: Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas - Universidade do Minho Publicador: Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas - Universidade do Minho
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento
Publicado em //2012 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.48%
Behaviour-based price discrimination is typically analysed in a framework characterised by inelastic demand. This paper provides a first assessment of the role of elastic demand on the competitive effects of behaviour-based price discrimination. Our results show that if demand is elastic enough, behaviour-based price discrimination leads to demand expansion which has a positive effect on overall welfare.; COMPETE; QREN; FEDER; Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT)

Limit pricing under third-degree price discrimination

Pires, Cesaltina; Jorge, Sílvia
Fonte: Springer Publicador: Springer
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
56.23%
This paper shows how a multimarket incumbent can use low pre-entry prices for entry deterrence. We consider an incumbent who operates in two independent markets and has private information about his production cost. In one of the markets, there is a potential entrant offering a differentiated product. The most reasonable perfect Bayesian equilibrium is either the least-cost separating equilibrium or the pooling equilibrium where both types of incumbents set the low-cost monopoly prices. This equilibrium may involve a downward distortion in the pre-entry prices of both markets. Our model has interesting implications for antitrust regulation as well as for international trade policy. First, predatory tests based on a single market are inadequate for a multimarket incumbent. Second, a lower price in a foreign market is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the existence of entry deterrence in a foreign market.

Price discrimination and patent policy

Hausman, Jerry A.; MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.
Fonte: MIT Energy Lab Publicador: MIT Energy Lab
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: 1603207 bytes; application/pdf
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
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Patent and antitrust policy are often presumed to be in conflict. As an important example, there is ongoing controversy about whether price discrimination by a patent holder is an illegal or socially undesirable exploitation of monopoly power. In this article. we show that no conflict exists in many price discrimination cases. Even ignoring the (dynamic) effects on incentives for innovation, third-degree price discrimination by patent holders can raise (static) social welfare. In fact, Pareto improvements may well occur. Welfare gains occur because price discrimination allows patent holders: (a) to open new markets and (b) to achieve economies of scale or learning. Further, even in cases where discrimination incurs static welfare losses, it may be efficient relative to other mechanisms, such as length of patent life, for rewarding innovators with profits.; Center for Energy Policy Research of the MIT Energy Laboratory

Price Structure and Network Externalities in the Telecommunications Industry : Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa

Iimi, Atsushi
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Relevância na Pesquisa
56.42%
Many developing countries have experienced significant developments in their telecommunications network. Countries in Africa are no exception to this. The paper examines what factor facilitates most network expansion using micro data from 45 fixed-line and mobile telephone operators in 18 African countries. In theory the telecommunications sector has two sector-specific characteristics: network externalities and discriminatory pricing. It finds that many telephone operators in the region use peak and off-peak prices and termination-based price discrimination, but are less likely to rely on strategic fee schedules such as tie-in arrangements. The estimated demand function based on a discreet consumer choice model indicates that termination-based discriminatory pricing can facilitate network expansion. It also shows that the implied price-cost margins are significantly high. Thus, price liberalization could be conducive to development of the telecommunications network led by the private sector. Some countries in Africa are still imposing certain price restrictions. But more important...

Canada-Wheat : Discrimination, Non-Commercial Considerations, and State Trading Enterprises

Hoekman, Bernard; Trachtman, Joel
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Relevância na Pesquisa
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Statutory marketing boards that have exclusive authority to purchase domestic production, sell for export, and set purchase and sales prices of commodities are a type of state trading enterprise that is subject to World Trade Organization disciplines. This paper assesses a recent dispute brought by the United States against Canada, alleging that WTO rules require state trading enterprises to operate solely in accordance with commercial considerations and that the Canadian government did not require the Canadian Wheat Board to do so. The panel and Appellate Body found that the primary discipline of the WTO regarding state trading enterprises was nondiscrimination, and that operating on the basis of "commercial considerations" was not an independent obligation. Instead, WTO disciplines regarding the pricing behavior of state trading enterprises use a "commercial considerations" test as a possible indicator of discrimination. Although a significant degree of price discrimination is observed in the case of Canadian wheat exports...

Trade and Linked Exchange; Price Discrimination Through Transaction Bundling

Dassiou, Xeni; Choi, Chong Ju; Maldoom, Dan
Fonte: bepress Publicador: bepress
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: 32961 bytes; 369 bytes; 351 bytes; 100 bytes; text/html; application/octet-stream; application/octet-stream; application/octet-stream
EN_AU
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.41%
In this paper we try to explain how price discrimination can cause bilateral trade patterns of the type seen under countertrade agreements. We interpret countertrade as a form of transaction bundling, which can discriminate between potential trading partners, and we combine characteristics from two explanations as to the existence of countertrade: Price discrimination through transaction bundling, and adverse selection arising from the uncertainty in the quality of the goods produced by trading partners in a less developed country (LDC) leading to a partner preference from the side of the Western (DC) firm. Our paper shows that the trade volume prospects of a firm in a LDC can be considerably enhanced if a countertrade transaction is bundled, and that such gains in trade become greater (relative to the case of no bundling), the greater the degree of quality uncertainty in the good it sells. It is also shown that it is profit maximising for a firm in a DC to offer mixed bundling for the exchange transaction, and that the profits derived from such bundling are a decreasing function of both the degree of uncertainty in the good sold by the firm in the LDC, and the marginal cost of the good sold by firm in the DC.; yes

The Impact of Price Discrimination on Revenue: Evidence from the Concert Industry

COURTY, Pascal; PAGLIERO, Mario
Fonte: European University Institute Publicador: European University Institute
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf; digital
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.56%
Concert tickets can either be sold at a single price or at multiple prices corresponding to different seating categories. We study the relationship between price discrimination and revenue by examining variations in the number of seating categories across concert, tour, artist, location, and time. Offering multiple seating categories leads to revenues that are approximately 5 percent higher than with single price ticketing. The return to price discrimination is higher in markets with more heterogeneous demand, for musical groups that appeal to a more fragmented audience, in smaller venues and in more competitive markets. The return of increasing from three to four categories of seating is about half that of increasing from one to two.

Price Discrimination in the Concert Industry

COURTY, Pascal; PAGLIERO, Mario
Fonte: European University Institute Publicador: European University Institute
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf; digital
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.52%
Concert tickets can either be sold at a single price or at different prices to reflect the various levels of seating categories available. Here we consider how two product characteristics (the artist’s age and venue capacity) influence the likelihood that pop music concert tickets will be sold at different prices. We argue that valuation heterogeneity, and thus the returns to using price discrimination, are higher for older artists and in larger venues. We test this hypothesis in a large dataset of concerts. By singling out variations in the two characteristics that are exogenous to the decision to price discriminate, we show that these characteristics have a large and significant impact on the use of price discrimination.

Essays in economics of information

Gendron-Saulnier, Catherine
Fonte: Université de Montréal Publicador: Université de Montréal
Tipo: Thèse ou Mémoire numérique / Electronic Thesis or Dissertation
EN
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46.6%
Cette thèse est une collection de trois articles en économie de l'information. Le premier chapitre sert d'introduction et les Chapitres 2 à 4 constituent le coeur de l'ouvrage. Le Chapitre 2 porte sur l’acquisition d’information sur l’Internet par le biais d'avis de consommateurs. En particulier, je détermine si les avis laissés par les acheteurs peuvent tout de même transmettre de l’information à d’autres consommateurs, lorsqu’il est connu que les vendeurs peuvent publier de faux avis à propos de leurs produits. Afin de comprendre si cette manipulation des avis est problématique, je démontre que la plateforme sur laquelle les avis sont publiés (e.g. TripAdvisor, Yelp) est un tiers important à considérer, autant que les vendeurs tentant de falsifier les avis. En effet, le design adopté par la plateforme a un effet indirect sur le niveau de manipulation des vendeurs. En particulier, je démontre que la plateforme, en cachant une partie du contenu qu'elle détient sur les avis, peut parfois améliorer la qualité de l'information obtenue par les consommateurs. Finalement, le design qui est choisi par la plateforme peut être lié à la façon dont elle génère ses revenus. Je montre qu'une plateforme générant des revenus par le biais de commissions sur les ventes peut être plus tolérante à la manipulation qu'une plateforme qui génère des revenus par le biais de publicité. Le Chapitre 3 est écrit en collaboration avec Marc Santugini. Dans ce chapitre...

Inter-temporal Price Discrimination when Imports are Restricted by Quotas

HOLLANDER, Abraham; MACDISSI, Charbel
Fonte: Université de Montréal Publicador: Université de Montréal
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: 114295 bytes; application/pdf
Relevância na Pesquisa
56.23%
A dominant firm holding import quota engages in inter-temporal price discrimination when facing a competitive fringe engaged in seasonal production. This causes a welfare loss that comes in addition the loss attributable to limitation of imports below the free trade level.

Price discrimination with private and imperfect information

Esteves, Rosa Branca
Fonte: Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas Publicador: Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento
Publicado em //2010 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.42%
This paper investigates the competitive and welfare effects of information accuracy improvements in markets where firms can price discriminate after observing a private and noisy signal about a consumer's brand preference. I show that firms charge more to customers they believe have a brand preference for them, and that this price has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the signal's accuracy. In contrast, the price charged after a disloyal signal has been observed falls as the signal's accuracy rises. While industry profit and overall welfare fall monotonically as price discrimination is based on increasingly more accurate information, the reverse happens to consumer surplus. The model is also extended to a public information setting. For any level of the signal's accuracy, moving from public to private information boosts industry profit and welfare at the expense of consumer surplus.; Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT) - Programa Operacional Ciência e Inovação 2010 (POCI 2010); Fundo Europeu de Desenvolvimento Regional (FEDER)

Competitive targeted advertising with price discrimination

Esteves, Rosa Branca; Resende, Joana
Fonte: Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE) Publicador: Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE)
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento
Publicado em //2013 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.58%
This paper investigates the effects of price discrimination by means of targeted advertising in a duopolistic market in which advertising plays two major roles. It transmits relevant information to otherwise uninformed consumers and it acts as a price discrimination device. We look at the firms' optimal advertising and pricing decisions in two settings, namely mass advertising/non-discrimination strategies and targeted advertising/price discrimination strategies. In the case of targeted advertising, we show that firms advertise more in its weak market than in its strong market. The analysis highlights that targeted advertising might constitute a tool to dampen price competition. We show that average prices with mass advertising/non-discrimination can be below those with targeted advertising/price discrimination (regardless of the market segment). We also fi nd that, when advertising costs are not too high, price discrimination by means of targeted advertising can boost industry pro fits at the expense of consumer and overall welfare. Finally, we show that overall welfare and consumer surplus falls when firms use targeted advertising instead of mass advertising.; COMPETE; QREN; FEDER; Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT)

Price Discrimination, Copyright Law, and Technological Innovation: Evidence From The Introduction of DVDs

Mortimer, Julie Holland
Fonte: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press Publicador: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.53%
U. S. copyright law effectively prevents direct price discrimination for copyright holders that sell to different markets. In response, these firms can engage in indirect price discrimination. I derive theoretical predictions about the use of indirect price discrimination, and I analyze how optimal pricing strategies differ for different products. Using data on VHS and DVD movie distribution, I find that firms' pricing choices are consistent with the predictions of theory and that firms' use of indirect price discrimination benefits consumers (but harms ancillary retailers). Finally, I examine what optimal pricing strategies might look like in a legal environment that permits direct price discrimination.; Economics

Price discrimination and bargaining power in the global vaccine market

Li, Linda
Fonte: Universidade Duke Publicador: Universidade Duke
Publicado em 26/04/2013 EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.5%
Since the 1980s, the market structure of vaccines has become increasingly oligopolistic, and in some cases, monopolistic. Alongside these supply trends, we see the emergence and growth of group procurement schemes on the demand side of the market. National governments and international organizations procure vaccines on behalf of end users. Two such organizations include the UNICEF Supply Division and the PAHO EPI Revolving Fund, for which participation is based on income or geography. Consistent with one of the main goals of group procurement, these groups obtain price discounts on vaccines relative to the private sector. This paper seeks to disentangle two possible explanations for this observed price dispersion using vaccine price data over the years 2002-2012 from UNICEF, PAHO, and the U.S. The two explanations are that of price discrimination and bargaining power. Using proxy variables in a fixed eff ects model, I find that price discrimination does have a signifi cant impact on price discount. I also fi nd support for a bargaining power e ffect, however, with less certainty, and the existence of supply constraints. These fi ndings have important policy implications for national governments, as well as procurement groups.; Honors thesis