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Monadismo e fisicismo: um ensaio sobre as relações mente-corpo; Monadism and physicalism: an essay about mind-body relations

Ribeiro, Henrique de Morais
Fonte: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP Publicador: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 25/05/2012 PT
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Nesta tese, desenvolve-se um argumento explicativo da relação mente-corpo fundamentada na noção de mônada, ou substância simples, como elemento ontológico estruturante de um enfoque contemporâneo da mencionada relação. Na primeira parte da tese, de natureza crítica, analisam-se as teorias fisicistas contemporâneas da mencionada relação, a saber, a teoria de superveniência da mente, da emergência e da causação mental, com vistas a justificar a proposta de assunção de uma premissa dualista que visa, principalmente, propor, em contraste com o cenário epifenomenalista do fisicismo contemporâneo, uma ontologia da mente que seja compatível com as intuições realistas do senso comum e da psicológica popular sobre a força causal da mente no universo físico. Na segunda parte, de natureza positiva, propõe-se um argumento explicativo da relação mente-corpo partindo-se, para tanto, de uma assunção e duas premissas. A assunção afirma que a mente tem o mesmo importe ontológico da matéria física, sendo estes considerados como elementos composicionais, afirmação a qual se denomina dualismo elementar. No que se refere às premissas, propõe-se duas, a saber, a tese composicional holística, que afirma que a mente e a matéria são partes constitutivas de um todo chamado substância simples...

Consciousness regained? Philosophical arguments for and against reductive physicalism

Sturm, Thomas
Fonte: Les Laboratoires Servier Publicador: Les Laboratoires Servier
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em /03/2012 EN
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This paper is an overview of recent discussions concerning the mind-body problem, which is being addressed at the interface between philosophy and neuroscience. It focuses on phenomenal features of consciousness or “qualia,” which are distinguished from various related issues. Then follows a discussion of various influential skeptical arguments that question the possibility of reductive explanations of qualia in physicalist terms: knowledge arguments, conceivability arguments, the argument of multiple realizability, and the explanatory gap argument. None of the arguments is found to be very convincing. It does not necessarily follow that reductive physicalism is the only option, but it is defensible. However, constant conceptual and methodological reflection is required, alongside ongoing research, to keep such a view free from dogmatism and naivety.

Physicalism, Supervenience and the Fundamental Level

Brown, Robin; Ladyman, James
Fonte: Oxford University Press Publicador: Oxford University Press
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: text/html
EN
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We provide a formulation of physicalism, and show that this is to be favoured over alternative formulations. Much of the literature on physicalism assumes without argument that there is a fundamental level to reality, and we show that a consideration of the levels problem and its implications for physicalism tells in favour of the form of physicalism proposed here. Its key elements are, first, that the empirical and substantive part of physicalism amounts to a prediction that physics will not posit new entities solely for the purpose of accounting for mental phenomena, nor new entities with essentially mental characteristics such as propositional attitudes or intentions; secondly, that physicalism can safely make do with no more than a weak global formulation of supervenience.

Physicalism, Emergence and Downward Causation

Campbell, Richard; Bickhard, Mark H
Fonte: Universidade Nacional da Austrália Publicador: Universidade Nacional da Austrália
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: 85751 bytes; application/pdf
EN_AU
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no abstract available

Níveis da ciência, níveis da realidade: evitando o dilema holismo/reducionismo no ensino de ciências e biologia; Levels of science, levels of reality: avoiding the holism/reductionism dilemma in science and biology teaching

El-Hani, Charbel Niño
Fonte: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP Publicador: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 07/07/2000 PT
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Um dos debates mais importantes na Filosofia da Ciência é aquele sobre as relações entre os níveis de explicação dos fenômenos e, portanto, os níveis da ciência. Esta controvérsia, intimamente relacionada ao problema metafísico dos níveis da realidade, tem sido marcada por uma polarização entre os reducionistas e seus críticos, geralmente caracterizados como holistas. O primeiro capítulo deste trabalho tem como objetivo a proposição de uma tipologia das posições metodológicas sobre a explicação na qual esta polarização entre holismo e reducionismo seja evitada. Argumenta-se que esta polarização resulta em uma série de mal-entendidos, que contribuem para que as explicações reducionistas sejam vistas, inclusive no ensino de ciências, como as únicas explicações científicas, sendo qualquer posição alternativa considerada contrária aos cânones da ciência. Uma tipologia proposta por Levine e colaboradores em 1987 é tomada como ponto de partida. Esta tipologia evita a polarização comentada acima, incluindo as seguintes posições: individualismo metodológico (reducionismo), holismo, antireducionismo e atomismo. Tendo-se em vista alguns problemas na proposta de Levine e colaboradores, sustenta-se a necessidade da construção de uma nova tipologia. São examinadas algumas tendências...

Physicalism and Phenomenal Consciousness

REID, ADAM CURRAN
Fonte: Quens University Publicador: Quens University
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
EN; EN
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The following thesis is concerned with the contemporary debate in the philosophy of mind surrounding the nature of phenomenal consciousness (viz. subjective experience, or qualia). My primary aim is to adjudicate the ongoing dialectic between dualists and physicalists regarding the ontological status of phenomenal consciousness — physical or nonphysical — by examining the two major arguments most commonly deployed against physicalism: namely, the zombie argument (Chalmers), and the knowledge argument (Jackson). I conclude by showing that once physicalism has been shorn of the various doctrines that it need not and ought not accept — that is, once we are clear about what, precisely, the fundamental doctrine of physicalism actually is — it becomes clear that these arguments do not go through, and that the case for dualism has not been made. I also argue that the task of actually disarming these arguments (in the right way) is potentially critically instructive to contemporary physicalists, as this helps to nourish a clearer overall understanding of what physicalism (properly understood) is, and is not, committed to. In Chapter One I lay the groundwork for the aforementioned anti-physicalist arguments by explaining precisely what is meant by the phrase “phenomenal consciousness” and its various synonyms. I then briefly summarize the mind-body problem and articulate the so-called “explanatory gap” therein. Chapter Two looks at the zombie argument (as articulated by David Chalmers...

Conservation of Energy is Relevant to Physicalism

Koksvik, Ole
Fonte: L'Academie Suisse des Sciences Humanies Publicador: L'Academie Suisse des Sciences Humanies
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
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I argue against Barbara Montero's claim that Conservation of Energy (CoE) has nothing to do with physicalism. I reject her reconstruction of the argument for physicalism from CoE, and offer an alternative reconstruction that better captures the intuitions

Quantum Humeanism,or: physicalism without properties

Esfeld, Michael
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 22/03/2014
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In recent literature, it has become clear that quantum physics does not refute Humeanism. This point has so far been made with respect to Bohms quantum theory. Against this background, this paper seeks to achieve the following four results: to generalize the option of quantum Humeanism from Bohmian mechanics to primitive ontology theories in general, to show that this option applies also to classical mechanics, to establish that it requires a commitment to matter as primitive stuff, but no commitment to natural properties (physicalism without properties, to point out that by removing the commitment to properties, the stock metaphysical objections against Humeanism from quidditism and humility no longer apply. In that way, quantum physics strengthens Humeanism instead of refuting it.

Physicalism versus quantum mechanics

Stapp, Henry P.
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 11/03/2008
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In the context of theories of the connection between mind and brain, physicalism is the demand that all is basically purely physical. But the concept of "physical" embodied in this demand is characterized essentially by the properties of the physical that hold in classical physical theories. Certain of these properties contradict the character of the physical in quantum mechanics, which provides a better, more comprehensive, and more fundamental account of phenomena. It is argued that the difficulties that have plaged physicalists for half a century, and that continue to do so, dissolve when the classical idea of the physical is replaced by its quantum successor. The argument is concretized in a way that makes it accessible to non-physicists by exploiting the recent evidence connecting our conscious experiences to macroscopic measurable synchronous oscillations occurring in well-separated parts of the brain. A specific new model of the mind-brain connection that is fundamentally quantum mechanical but that ties conscious experiences to these macroscopic synchronous oscillations is used to illustrate the essential disparities between the classical and quantum notions of the physical, and in particular to demonstrate the failure in the quantum world of the principle of the causal closure of the physical...

Review of Christopher Hookway: Quine: Language, Experience

Peña, Lorenzo
Fonte: Canadian Philosophical Association Publicador: Canadian Philosophical Association
Tipo: Artículo Formato: 15985 bytes; application/pdf
ENG
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Reseña en inglés del libro de Hookway sobre la filosofía de Quine; Quine's philosophical development would run from his early essays supporting holism and leaning towards pragmatism to his later writings where pragmatism seems to be more or less waived while empiricism and holism are kept and physicalism becomes more and more emphasized. Hookway regards such an evolution more as an increasing clearness on Quine's part than as a real change of mind. The book attempts a comparative study of Quine's thought as against nowadays widely accepted Davidsonian doctrines and finally a short, cautious critical assessment. The most regrettable limitation of this book is that it all but ignores that for Quine most philosophical questions are matters of degree. Is Quine's view compatible with his adherence to classical logic?; Peer reviewed

Could consciousness be physically realised?

Boutel, Adrian
Fonte: University of Cambridge; Faculty of Philosophy Publicador: University of Cambridge; Faculty of Philosophy
Tipo: Thesis; doctoral; PhD
EN
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I defend physicalism about phenomenal consciousness against recent epistemic arguments for dualism. First I argue (as against Kripke) that psychophysical identities can be a posteriori (and apparently contingent, and conceivably false). Their epistemic status is due to the analytic independence of phenomenal and physical-functional terms. Unlike Kripke?s own explanation of a posteriori necessity, analytic independence is consistent with?indeed explained by?the direct reference of phenomenal terms, so Kripke?s argument against psychophysical identities fails. I then argue (as against White and Chalmers) that direct reference does not itself make identities a priori. Next I endorse the ?a priori entailment thesis?: if physicalism is true, phenomenal truths follow a priori from a complete statement of the facts of physics. I argue that physicalists must accept a priori entailment if we are to avoid brute or ?strong? a posteriori necessities. I show that a priori entailment is consistent with analytic independence, and so make room for what Chalmers calls ?type-C? physicalism. Jackson?s ?Mary?, who knows all the physical facts, would be able to deduce the physical-functional reference of phenomenal terms, and so the truth of psychophysical identities...

Physicalism and Evidence

Motsinger, Kyle
Fonte: Universidade Duke Publicador: Universidade Duke
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
Publicado em //2012
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One popular characterization of physicalism is as an empirical prediction about the theoretical objects and properties of future science. It is argued that physicalism so characterized cannot be justified unless an individual has idiosyncratic standards of inductive evidence. An alternative to this characterization of physicalism is a project that justifies physicalism according to the current science: all theoretical objects and properties can either be reduced to or eliminated in favor of the objects and properties of the current physical sciences. The extent to which this type of physicalism can be justified depends on an individual's epistemic rules and prioritization thereof.

; Thesis

Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts

Stoljar, Daniel
Fonte: Blackwell Publishing Ltd Publicador: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
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A phenomenal concept is the concept of a particular type of sensory or perceptual experience, where the notion of experience is understood phenomenologically. A recent and increasingly influential idea in philosophy of mind suggests that reflection on these concepts will play a major role in the debate about conscious experience, and in particular in the defense of physicalism, the thesis that psychological truths supervene on physical truths. According to this idea-I call it the phenomenal concept strategy-phenomenal concepts are importantly different from other concepts, and arguments against physicalism fatally neglect to take this difference into account. This paper divides the phenomenal concept strategy into a number of different versions, and argues that no version of the strategy is successful. The paper ends by contrasting the phenomenal concept strategy with a rival strategy-I call it the missing concept strategy. I suggest that the missing concept strategy presents a more plausible response to the issues about physicalism and experience.

How the Discovery of Brain Correlates of Consciousness Supports Non-Reductive Physicalism

Alfredo Pereira Jr
Fonte: Nature Preceedings Publicador: Nature Preceedings
Tipo: Manuscript
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In this work I attempt to justify the claim that the discovery of statistically relevant brain correlates of consciousness supports Non-Reductive Physicalism. First I distinguish the main varieties of Reductive and Non-Reductive Physicalism, selecting the right one that is benefited by progress in brain sciences. Second, I discuss epistemological problems in the search of brain correlates of consciousness, focusing on the simultaneous occurrence of conscious activity, known by means of subjective report, and the corresponding brain activity, registered with the help of technology. Finally, I argue – using Salmon´s concept of Statistical Explanation - that statistics affords a distinction of causal (physical) from casual (illusory) correlations.

The scientific method in philosophy: Assessing the physicalist hypothesis

Fuhrman, André; Goethe Universität Frankfurt am Main (Uni-Frankfurt); Menezes, Júlia Telles de; Doutoranda na Goethe Universität Frankfurt am Main (Uni-Frankfurt)
Fonte: SFL – Seminário Filosofia da Linguagem Publicador: SFL – Seminário Filosofia da Linguagem
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion; Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 12/09/2015 ENG
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A filosofia contemporânea é predominantemente guiada pela hipótese de que o nosso mundo é fundamentalmente físico: Uma vez que todas as variáveis físicas são determinadas, as leis físicas fundamentais determinam a distribuição de todas as propriedades (ou determinam suas probabilidades). Propriedades de níveis superior são "macros", eventualmente compostas por propriedades físicas básicas. Esta é a hipótese característica de uma perspectiva variavelmente chamada de naturalismo, fisicalismo ou materialismo. Esta hipótese é amplamente aceita no cenário atual da filosofia contemporânea, pois é favorecida suficientemente por uma abordagem plausível frente ao problema da escolha de uma teoria. Tal abordagem é basicamente a mesma em cada campo investigativo, seja ele o da física, da biologia, da psicologia ou da filosofia. Os termos centrais aqui são: simplicidade, poder explanatório e adequação empírica. A escolha de uma teoria é afinal um problema de decisão. Nós ilustraremos este ponto mobilizando um debate central na filosofia da mente. No decorrer do presente trabalho pretendemos expor e argumentar a favor de certas teses meta-filosóficas que podem por si só estar sujeitas a um debate filosófico. AbstractMuch of contemporary philosophy is guided by the hypothesis that our world is fundamentally a physical world: Given that all fundamental physical variable are determined...

Phenomenalism in epistemology and physicalism in aesthetics; Phenomenalism in Epistemology and Physicalism in Aesthetics

Morizot, Jacques; Université d’Aix-Marseille
Fonte: Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC Publicador: Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion; ; Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 17/07/2012 POR
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O ponto de partida deste artigo é a observação intrigante de que Goodman defendeu um ponto de vista fenomenalista em suas obras epistemológicas, e fenomenalista em suas obras sobre estética. Na verdade, seria certamente mais preciso dizer que seu foco era antifisicalista em epistemologia e antifenomenalista na estética. De qualquer maneira, a maioria dos interpretadores teria, espontaneamente, esperado a escolha oposta, de fato mais consistente com as posições tomadas pelos representantes dessas áreas. Contudo, a estratégia de Goodman não é arbitrária, tendo raízes profundas no contexto geral da filosofia no século XX e, em compensação, contribui para esclareces algumas de suas características e motivação.doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n3p439 ; The starting point of this paper is the intriguing observation that Goodman has defended a phenomenalist point of view in his epistemological works and a physicalist one in aesthetics. In fact, it would certainly be more accurate to say that his focus was anti-physicalist in epistemology and anti phenomenalist in aesthetics. In any case a majority of interpreters would spontaneously have waited for a diametrically opposite choice, more consistent indeed with the positions taken by the representatives in these fields. Yet Goodman’s strategy is not arbitrary...

Strong Emergence as a Defese of Non-Reductive Physicalism

Gillett, Carl; Illinois Wesleyan University
Fonte: Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC Publicador: Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion; ; Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 01/01/2002 POR
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Jaegwon Kim, and others, have recently posed a powerful challenge to both emergentism and non-reductive physicalism by providing arguments that these positons are committed to an untenabie combination of both 'upward' and 'dounward'  determination. In section 1, I illuminate how the nature of the realization relation underlies such skeptical arguments However, in section 2, I suggest that such conclusions involve a confusion between the implications of physicalism and those of a related thesis in 'Completeness of Physics' (CoP). I show tht the truth of CoP poses a very serious obstacle to realized properties being efficacious in a physicalist universe and suggest that abandoning CoP offers hope for defending non-reductive physicalism. I then fornulate a schema for a physicalist metaphysics, in section 3, which rejects CoP. This scenario is one where microphysical properties have a few conditional powers that they contribute to individuals when they realize certain properties. In such a situation, I argue, though physicalism holds true there is still plausibly both `upward' and 'downward' determination, where the latter is crucially an underappreciated form of determmation I term 'non- causal'. Ultimately, I conclude that this metaphysical schema offers a coherent account of Strongly ernergent properties that preserves the truth of NRP...

É o naturalismo biológico uma concepção fisicalista?; É o naturalismo biológico uma concepção fisicalista?

de Athayde Prata, Tárik; Universidade Federal de Pernambuco Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas (15o andar) Departamento de Filosofia Av. Prof. Morais Rego, s/n. Cidade Universitária. 50.740-550 Recife, PE BRASIL
Fonte: Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC Publicador: Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion; ; Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 18/02/2013 POR
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http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p255 This paper is concerned with the question as to whether biological naturalism (John Searle’s solution for the mind-body problem) can be construed as a physicalist account of the mind. Despite defending physicalism in connection with particulars (section 2), Searle accepts the dualists’ basic argument for the irreducibility of mental properties (section 3). However, Searle is unable to substantiate his claim that such irreducibility is compatible with physicalism (section 4). This being the case, his theory about the mind is shown to be a variety of property dualism.; http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p255 O artigo investiga se o naturalismo biológico (a solução de John Searle para o problema mente-corpo) pode ser considerado uma concepção fisicalista acerca da mente. Apesar de defender um fisicalismo a respeito dos particulares (seção 2), Searle adere ao argumento básico dos dualistas para a irredutibilidade das propriedades mentais (seção 3), e não consegue fundamentar sua alegação de que tal irredutibilidade é compatível com o fisicalismo (seção 4). Desse modo, sua teoria da mente se revela como um dualismo de propriedades.

Non-reductive physicalism and the limits of the exclusion principle

List, Christian; Menzies, Peter
Fonte: Government Department, London School of Economics and Political Science Publicador: Government Department, London School of Economics and Political Science
Tipo: Monograph; NonPeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /01/2008 EN; EN
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It is often argued that higher-level special-science properties cannot be causally efficacious since the lower-level physical properties on which they supervene are doing all the causal work. This claim is usually derived from an exclusion principle stating that if a higherlevel property F supervenes on a physical property F* that is causally sufficient for a property G, then F cannot cause G. We employ an account of causation as differencemaking to show that the truth or falsity of this principle is a contingent matter and derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which a version of it holds. We argue that one important instance of the principle, far from undermining non-reductive physicalism, actually supports the causal autonomy of certain higher-level properties.

Nonreductive physicalism and the limits of the exclusion principle

List, Christian; Menzies, Peter
Fonte: Columbia University Publicador: Columbia University
Tipo: Article; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /09/2009 EN; EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
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It is often argued that higher-level special-science properties cannot be causally efficacious since the lower-level physical properties on which they supervene are doing all the causal work. This claim is usually derived from an exclusion principle stating that if a higher-level property F supervenes on a physical property F* that is causally sufficient for a property G, then F cannot cause G. We employ an account of causation as difference-making to show that the truth or falsity of this principle is a contingent matter and derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which a version of it holds. We argue that one important instance of the principle, far from undermining non-reductive physicalism, actually supports the causal autonomy of certain higher-level properties.