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Strong Activity Rules for Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

Harsha, Pavithra; Barnhart, Cynthia; Parkes, David C.; Zhang, Haoqi
Fonte: Elsevier Publicador: Elsevier
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.91%
Activity rules have emerged in recent years as an important aspect of practical auction design. The role of an activity rule in an iterative auction is to suppress strategic behavior by bidders and promote simple, continual, meaningful bidding and thus, price discovery. These rules find application in the design of iterative combinatorial auctions for real world scenarios, for example in spectrum auctions, in airline landing slot auctions, and in procurement auctions. We introduce the notion of strong activity rules, which allow simple, consistent bidding strategies while precluding all behaviors that cannot be rationalized in this way. We design such a rule for auctions with budget-constrained bidders, i.e., bidders with valuations for resources that are greater than their ability to pay. Such bidders are of practical importance in many market environments, and hindered from bidding in a simple and consistent way by the commonly used revealed-preference activity rule, which is too strong in such an environment. We consider issues of complexity, and provide two useful forms of information feedback to guide bidders in meeting strong activity rules. As a special case, we derive a strong activity rule for non-budget-constrained bidders. The ultimate choice of activity rule must depend...

Republic of Bulgaria : Institutional Fiduciary Assessment (IFA) of Road Executive Agency

World Bank
Fonte: Washington, DC Publicador: Washington, DC
Tipo: Economic & Sector Work :: Other Public Sector Study; Economic & Sector Work
ENGLISH; EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.35%
This Institutional Fiduciary Assessment (IFA) of the Road Executive Agency (REA) was commissioned by the World Bank (WB) country and infrastructure sector management in connection with the government's request to provide the World Bank financing for a new Road Infrastructure Project (project). The IFA was used as a tool to assess the performance of the REA in regard to the financial management and procurement systems in order identify the areas in REA's public finance management that can be further strengthened to improve utilization of public funds irrespective of the source of financing. The Government wants to improve the condition of class two and three roads so as to enhance the population's access to markets and enterprises in small towns and rural areas and enhance business opportunities in rural areas expected after the EU accession. Second, REA wants to improve its road management system in order to be able to prepare multiyear road maintenance programs under a constrained budget environment. Third, the Government wants REA to strengthen its technical and managerial capacity to efficiently implement ongoing and future road projects, especially those to be partly financed with EU grants. This section presents a summary table of fiduciary issues and risks attached to the financial management and procurement arrangements in connection with REA's re-organization into an extra-budgetary fund responsible for the national road network...

Croatia Health System Quality and Efficiency Improvement : Fiduciary System Assessment

World Bank
Fonte: Washington, DC Publicador: Washington, DC
Tipo: Economic & Sector Work :: Other Financial Accountability Study
ENGLISH; EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
16.34%
A Fiduciary System Assessment (FSA) was carried out in accordance with OP/BP 9.0 that evaluated the fiduciary systems pertaining to the Health System Quality and Efficiency Improvement Program for Results. The integrated fiduciary assessment comprised separate assessments of the fiduciary risks relating to the programs: (i) procurement; (ii) financial management; and iii) governance. The objective of the assessment was to provide reference that could be used to monitor fiduciary system performance during the implementation of the above referenced operation, as well as to identify actions, as relevant, to enhance the performance of the systems. Findings from the assessment, as well as a review of existing analytical and diagnostic work , conclude that the overall fiduciary and governance framework is adequate to support the implementation of Croatia's Health System Quality and Efficiency Improvement Program for Results and includes summary table of the key risks and the corresponding mitigation actions identified. This report is organized along the following lines: presentation of institutional arrangements and national framework; review and assessment of Program fiduciary systems and...

Budget Constrained Auctions with Heterogeneous Items

Bhattacharya, Sayan; Goel, Gagan; Gollapudi, Sreenivas; Munagala, Kamesh
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.17%
In this paper, we present the first approximation algorithms for the problem of designing revenue optimal Bayesian incentive compatible auctions when there are multiple (heterogeneous) items and when bidders can have arbitrary demand and budget constraints. Our mechanisms are surprisingly simple: We show that a sequential all-pay mechanism is a 4 approximation to the revenue of the optimal ex-interim truthful mechanism with discrete correlated type space for each bidder. We also show that a sequential posted price mechanism is a O(1) approximation to the revenue of the optimal ex-post truthful mechanism when the type space of each bidder is a product distribution that satisfies the standard hazard rate condition. We further show a logarithmic approximation when the hazard rate condition is removed, and complete the picture by showing that achieving a sub-logarithmic approximation, even for regular distributions and one bidder, requires pricing bundles of items. Our results are based on formulating novel LP relaxations for these problems, and developing generic rounding schemes from first principles. We believe this approach will be useful in other Bayesian mechanism design contexts.; Comment: Final version accepted to STOC '10. Incorporates significant reviewer comments

Monotonicity, Revenue Equivalence and Budgets

Mualem, Ahuva
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 30/04/2014
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.05%
We study multidimensional mechanism design in a common scenario where players have private information about their willingness to pay and their ability to pay. We provide a complete characterization of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible direct mechanisms where over-reporting the budget is not possible. In several settings, reporting larger budgets can be made suboptimal with a small randomized modification to the payments. We then derive a closely related partial characterization for the general case where players can arbitrarily misreport their private budgets. Immediate applications of these results include simple characterizations for mechanisms with publicly-known budgets and for mechanisms without monetary transfers. The celebrated revenue equivalence theorem states that the seller"s revenue for a broad class of standard auction formats and settings will be the same in equilibrium. Our main application is a revenue equivalence theorem for financially constrained bidders.

Sequential Auctions of Identical Items with Budget-Constrained Bidders

Huang, Zhiyi; Devanur, Nikhil R.; Malec, David
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 08/09/2012
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.6%
In this paper, we study sequential auctions with two budget constrained bidders and any number of identical items. All prior results on such auctions consider only two items. We construct a canonical outcome of the auction that is the only natural equilibrium and is unique under a refinement of subgame perfect equilibria. We show certain interesting properties of this equilibrium; for instance, we show that the prices decrease as the auction progresses. This phenomenon has been observed in many experiments and previous theoretic work attributed it to features such as uncertainty in the supply or risk averse bidders. We show that such features are not needed for this phenomenon and that it arises purely from the most essential features: budget constraints and the sequential nature of the auction. A little surprisingly we also show that in this equilibrium one agent wins all his items in the beginning and then the other agent wins the rest. The major difficulty in analyzing such sequential auctions has been in understanding how the selling prices of the first few rounds affect the utilities of the agents in the later rounds. We tackle this difficulty by identifying certain key properties of the auction and the proof is via a joint induction on all of them.