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## Seleção de fornecedores de serviço de transporte utilizando leilão combinatório de compras: adaptação e aplicação do algoritmo Iterative Deepening Search A* (IDA*).; Supplier selection of transportation services using reverse combinatorial auction: adaptation and aplication of Iterative Deepening Search A* (IDA*).

Fonte: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
Publicador: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP

Tipo: Dissertação de Mestrado
Formato: application/pdf

Publicado em 15/12/2011
PT

Relevância na Pesquisa

66.37%

#Algoritmo otimizante#Combinatorial auction#Fornecedor#Leilão combinatório#Multi-criteria#Multiplos critérios#Optimizing algorithm#Supplier#Winner Determination Problem (WDP)#Winner Determination Problem (WDP)

A seleção de fornecedores de transporte é um desafio cada vez maior. O crescimento da rede de clientes a ser coberta demanda uma alocação eficiente em termos de custo não suprida por mecanismos tradicionais de negociação. Neste âmbito, o leilão combinatório torna-se uma alternativa de negociação ao permitir capturar sinergias entre os trajetos que devem ser atendidos. Em conseqüência disso, diminui-se o custo de transporte do fornecedor que se reflete nos menores preços de suas propostas e finalmente no custo total de compra do serviço. Por outro lado, esta decisão envolve fatores além do custo total; a mensuração destes torna-se importante para identificar fornecedores que melhor se ajustam aos requerimentos do comprador. No entanto, é fundamental escolher um método adequado para sua avaliação porque este influência a decisão final. Este problema de compra de serviços de transporte é conhecido na literatura como Winner Determination Problem (WDP) que, devido a sua complexidade, possui uma resolução limitada. Após revisão teórica, foi observado que os estudos relacionados à área de transporte focalizavam o desenvolvimento de modelos matemáticos que fossem representativos da realidade. Alguns destes modelos abordam a utilização de múltiplos critérios atribuindo um coeficiente que pondera cada critério. Evidenciou-se a necessidade do desenvolvimento de um algoritmo alternativo que além de facilitar sinergias entre trajetos...

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## Leilões combinados

Fonte: Instituto Politécnico de Lisboa
Publicador: Instituto Politécnico de Lisboa

Tipo: Dissertação de Mestrado

Publicado em /03/2014
POR

Relevância na Pesquisa

35.8%

#Leilões#Leilões combinatórios#Negócios#Otimização combinatória#Programação linear#Programação linear inteira#Auctions#Combinatorial auctions#Business#Combinatorial optimization#Linear programming

Mestrado em Controlo de Gestão e dos Negócios; O estudo dos leilões representa uma área importante nas ciências microeconómicas e na teoria dos jogos. A literatura da especialidade tem delineado diversas propriedades de grande utilidade no desenho dos leilões, tais como eficiência, maximização de rendibilidade ou minimização de custos, compatibilidade de incentivos, entre outras.
Os leilões combinatórios têm gerado recentemente um elevado interesse, por permitirem alocações mais eficientes do que nos leilões tradicionais, e pelo fato dos agentes poderem expressar preferências sobre combinações de itens. Estes leilões têm provado ser extremamente úteis em numerosas aplicações reais. A automação deste tipo de leilões constitui provavelmente o maior desafio, ao assegurar o tratamento computacional e retendo, em simultâneo, as propriedades económicas desejáveis.
Nesta dissertação descrevem-se primeiramente os conceitos fundamentais da teoria dos leilões, desde a sua origem até à era moderna, por forma a permitir um melhor enquadramento dos leilões combinatórios. Em particular, apresentam-se conceitos chave, propriedades essenciais no desenho dos seus mecanismos, linguagens de licitação, aplicações reais...

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## An Options-Based Solution to the Sequential Auction Problem

Fonte: Elsevier
Publicador: Elsevier

Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica

EN_US

Relevância na Pesquisa

35.92%

#coordination problems#preferences#dynamic auctions#proxy agents#options#strategyproofness#electronic markets

The sequential auction problem is commonplace in open, electronic marketplaces such as eBay. This is the problem where a buyer has no dominant strategy in bidding across multiple auctions when the buyer would have a simple, truth-revealing strategy if there was but a single auction event. Our model allows for multiple, distinct goods and market dynamics with buyers and sellers that arrive over time. Sellers each bring a single unit of a good to the market while buyers can have values on bundles of goods. We model each individual auction as a second-price (Vickrey) auction and propose an options-based, proxied solution to provide price and winner-determination coordination across auctions. While still allowing for temporally uncoordinated market participation, this options-based approach solves the sequential auction problem and provides truthful bidding as a weakly dominant strategy for buyers. An empirical study suggests that this coordination can enable a significant efficiency and revenue improvement over the current eBay market design, and highlights the effect on performance of complex buyer valuations (buyers with substitutes and complements valuations) and varying the market liquidity.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

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## Cryptographic Combinatorial Clock-Proxy Auctions

Fonte: Springer Verlag
Publicador: Springer Verlag

Tipo: Monograph or Book

EN_US

Relevância na Pesquisa

36.1%

We present a cryptographic protocol for conducting efficient, provably correct and secrecy-preserving combinatorial clock-proxy auctions. The "clock phase" functions as a trusted auction despite price discovery: bidders submit encrypted bids, and prove for themselves that they meet activity rules, and can compute total demand and thus verify price increases without revealing any information about individual demands. In the sealed-bid "proxy phase", all bids are revealed the auctioneer via time-lapse cryptography and a branch-and-bound algorithm is used to solve the winner-determination problem. Homomorphic encryption is used to prove the correctness of the solution, and establishes the correctness of the solution to any interested party. Still an NP-hard optimization problem, the use of homomorphic encryption imposes additional computational time on winner-determination that is linear in the size of the branch-and-bound search tree, and thus roughly linear in the original (search-based) computational time. The result is a solution that avoids, in the usual case, the exponential complexity of previous cryptographically-secure combinatorial auctions.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

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## On Expressing Value Externalities in Position Auctions

Fonte: American Association for Artificial Intelligence
Publicador: American Association for Artificial Intelligence

Tipo: Monograph or Book

EN_US

Relevância na Pesquisa

35.8%

We introduce a bidding language for expressing negative value externalities in position auctions for online advertising. The unit-bidder constraints (UBC) language allows a bidder to condition a bid on its allocated slot and on the slots allocated to other bidders. We introduce a natural extension of the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction, the expressive GSP (eGSP) auction, that induces truthful revelation of constraints for a rich subclass of unit-bidder types,namely downward-monotonic UBC. We establish the existence of envy-free Nash equilibrium in eGSP under a further restriction to a subclass of exclusion constraints, for which the standard GSP has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium results are obtained by reduction to equilibrium analysis for reserve price GSP (Even-Dar et al. 2008). In considering the winner determination problem, which is NPhard, we bound the approximation ratio for social welfare in eGSP and provide parameterized complexity results.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

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## Estratégias de participação em leilões combinatoriais aplicadas em um problema de transporte de derivados de petróleo

Fonte: Curitiba
Publicador: Curitiba

Tipo: Dissertação de Mestrado

POR

Relevância na Pesquisa

25.92%

#Petróleo - Derivados - Transporte#Leilões - Modelos matemáticos#Otimização combinatória#Logística empresarial#Métodos de simulação#Petroleum products - Transportation#Auctions - Mathematical models#Combinatorial optimization#Business logistics#Simulation methods

Recent researches have shown that approaches based on multi-agent systems (MAS) and market mechanisms like auctions are efficient on the resolution of planning problems in supply chains. This work uses the combinatorial auction-based MAS paradigm and participation strategies in auctions for solving the problem of transporting oil derivatives of PETROBRAS - Petroleo Brasileiro S/A, called Simplified Problem of Transporting Oil Derivatives (SPTOD), which is characterized as a planning problem in supply chains. In combinatorial auctions, the winner determination is a NP-Complete problem without approximation algorithms, whose computational cost increases with the number of bids received by the auctioneer. In this context, this work aims at enlarging the scope of application of combinatorial-auction mechanisms in planning problems by using a heuristic strategy for participation in auctions, besides serving as a support tool for decision-making process by specialists of industrial oil. The results were drawn from several scenarios where the MAS was used with the proposed strategy (global evaluation of needs) and with other strategies for comparison (general – all possible auctions – and greedy – only one auction). The results show that the use of the proposed strategy reduces the processing time when compared to the general strategy and that the quality of the solution is preserved in comparison with the general and greedy strategies. Other contributions of this work are the development of a MAS to realize the planning of transporting oil derivatives between producing and consuming basis having as negotiation model the combinatorial auction-based mechanism and a proposition of a decentralized model where several combinatorial auctions can be run simultaneously.; Pesquisas recentes mostram que abordagens baseadas em sistemas multiagentes (SMA) e mecanismos de mercado como leilões são eficazes para encontrar soluções factíveis para problemas de planejamento em cadeias de suprimento. Esta dissertação aborda a utilização do paradigma de SMA baseado em Leilões Combinatoriais e o uso de estratégias de participação em leilões na resolução do problema de transporte de derivados de petróleo em uma rede multimodal da PETROBRAS – Petróleo Brasileiro S/A...

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## Testing BOI and BOB algorithms for solving the Winner Determination

Fonte: IEEE
Publicador: IEEE

Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject; info:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart
Formato: application/pdf

Publicado em /09/2008
ENG

Relevância na Pesquisa

86.31%

Combinatorial auctions are a promising auction format for allocating radio spectrum, as well as other goods. An important handicap of combinatorial auctions is determining the winner bids among many options, that is, solving the winner determination problem (WDP). This paper tackles this computational problem using two approaches in a combinatorial first-price sealed bid auction. The first one, is an A* based on items (BOI). The second one, is an A* based on bids (BOB). These two techniques are tested in several scenarios for allocating radio spectrum licenses. The results obtained reveal that the search algorithm A* with the BOB formulation outperforms the other and always finds the optimal solution very quickly.; Eighth International Conference on Hybrid Intelligent Systems, 2008. HIS '08. Barcelona, 10-12 September 2008

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## Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers

Fonte: ACM Press
Publicador: ACM Press

Tipo: Conference Paper

EN_US

Relevância na Pesquisa

25.8%

In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex post regret, we are able to adapt statistical machine learning techniques to the design of payment rules. This computational approach to mechanism design is applicable to domains with multi-dimensional types and situations where computational efficiency is a concern. Specifically, given an outcome rule and access to a type distribution, we train a support vector machine with a special discriminant function structure such that it implicitly establishes a payment rule with desirable incentive properties. We discuss applications to a multi-minded combinatorial auction with a greedy winner-determination algorithm and to an assignment problem with egalitarian outcome rule. Experimental results demonstrate both that the construction produces payment rules with low ex post regret, and that penalizing classification errors is effective in preventing failures of ex post individual rationality.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

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## Incentives Design in the Presence of Externalities

Fonte: Harvard University
Publicador: Harvard University

Tipo: Thesis or Dissertation; text
Formato: application/pdf

EN

Relevância na Pesquisa

25.9%

The design of incentives becomes challenging when faced with externalities. In this thesis I resolve this difficulty in two settings: position auctions and software economies. The first part of the thesis studies value externalities in position auctions. I develop a constraint-based model that allows an advertiser to submit, along with its bid, additional constraints to state how its value for clicks depends on the positions of the other ads with which it is allocated. I establish complexity results for winner determination and prove the existence of Nash and envy-free equilibria under certain conditions.
A significant contribution of this thesis is that it proposes a foundation for software economies. I first study a setting in the private software economy consisting of a single task, a worker, and a manager. This is a combination of a repeated principal-agent problem and a prediction problem. I characterize a scoring system that elicits truthful information, leading to accurate predictions from both agents and best effort from the worker.
In the public software economy, I consider the problem of how to incentivize deep fixes to bugs from both computational as well as theoretical perspectives. In the computational work, I introduce a dynamic model of the software ecosystem and propose subsumption mechanisms as a solution. Next...

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## On the Computation of Fully Proportional Representation

Fonte: Universidade Cornell
Publicador: Universidade Cornell

Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica

Publicado em 03/02/2014

Relevância na Pesquisa

36.04%

We investigate two systems of fully proportional representation suggested by
Chamberlin Courant and Monroe. Both systems assign a representative to each
voter so that the "sum of misrepresentations" is minimized. The winner
determination problem for both systems is known to be NP-hard, hence this work
aims at investigating whether there are variants of the proposed rules and/or
specific electorates for which these problems can be solved efficiently. As a
variation of these rules, instead of minimizing the sum of misrepresentations,
we considered minimizing the maximal misrepresentation introducing effectively
two new rules. In the general case these "minimax" versions of classical rules
appeared to be still NP-hard. We investigated the parameterized complexity of
winner determination of the two classical and two new rules with respect to
several parameters. Here we have a mixture of positive and negative results:
e.g., we proved fixed-parameter tractability for the parameter the number of
candidates but fixed-parameter intractability for the number of winners. For
single-peaked electorates our results are overwhelmingly positive: we provide
polynomial-time algorithms for most of the considered problems. The only rule
that remains NP-hard for single-peaked electorates is the classical Monroe
rule.

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## Complexity of Judgment Aggregation

Fonte: Universidade Cornell
Publicador: Universidade Cornell

Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica

Publicado em 22/01/2014

Relevância na Pesquisa

35.9%

We analyse the computational complexity of three problems in judgment
aggregation: (1) computing a collective judgment from a profile of individual
judgments (the winner determination problem); (2) deciding whether a given
agent can influence the outcome of a judgment aggregation procedure in her
favour by reporting insincere judgments (the strategic manipulation problem);
and (3) deciding whether a given judgment aggregation scenario is guaranteed to
result in a logically consistent outcome, independently from what the judgments
supplied by the individuals are (the problem of the safety of the agenda). We
provide results both for specific aggregation procedures (the quota rules, the
premise-based procedure, and a distance-based procedure) and for classes of
aggregation procedures characterised in terms of fundamental axioms.

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## Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control

Fonte: Universidade Cornell
Publicador: Universidade Cornell

Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica

Relevância na Pesquisa

25.95%

#Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory#Computer Science - Computational Complexity#Computer Science - Multiagent Systems#I.2.11#F.2.2#F.1.3

We study sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV), a system
proposed by Brams and Sanver [Electoral Studies, 25(2):287-305, 2006], and here
adjusted so as to coerce admissibility of the votes (rather than excluding
inadmissible votes a priori), with respect to procedural control. In such
control scenarios, an external agent seeks to change the outcome of an election
via actions such as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters.
SP-AV combines the voters' preference rankings with their approvals of
candidates, where in elections with at least two candidates the voters'
approval strategies are adjusted--if needed--to approve of their most-preferred
candidate and to disapprove of their least-preferred candidate. This rule
coerces admissibility of the votes even in the presence of control actions, and
hybridizes, in effect, approval with pluralitiy voting.
We prove that this system is computationally resistant (i.e., the
corresponding control problems are NP-hard) to 19 out of 22 types of
constructive and destructive control. Thus, SP-AV has more resistances to
control than is currently known for any other natural voting system with a
polynomial-time winner problem. In particular, SP-AV is (after Copeland voting...

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## Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers

Fonte: Universidade Cornell
Publicador: Universidade Cornell

Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica

Publicado em 06/08/2012

Relevância na Pesquisa

25.8%

In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then
derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the
incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex
post regret, we are able to adapt statistical machine learning techniques to
the design of payment rules. This computational approach to mechanism design is
applicable to domains with multi-dimensional types and situations where
computational efficiency is a concern. Specifically, given an outcome rule and
access to a type distribution, we train a support vector machine with a special
discriminant function structure such that it implicitly establishes a payment
rule with desirable incentive properties. We discuss applications to a
multi-minded combinatorial auction with a greedy winner-determination algorithm
and to an assignment problem with egalitarian outcome rule. Experimental
results demonstrate both that the construction produces payment rules with low
ex post regret, and that penalizing classification errors is effective in
preventing failures of ex post individual rationality.

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## Virtualization of 5G Cellular Networks as a Hierarchical Combinatorial Auction

Fonte: Universidade Cornell
Publicador: Universidade Cornell

Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica

Publicado em 25/11/2015

Relevância na Pesquisa

25.8%

#Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory#Computer Science - Networking and Internet Architecture

Virtualization has been seen as one of the main evolution trends in the
forthcoming fifth generation (5G) cellular networks which enables the
decoupling of infrastructure from the services it provides. In this case, the
roles of infrastructure providers (InPs) and mobile virtual network operators
(MVNOs) can be logically separated and the resources (e.g., subchannels, power,
and antennas) of a base station owned by an InP can be transparently shared by
multiple MVNOs, while each MVNO virtually owns the entire BS. Naturally, the
issue of resource allocation arises. In particular, the InP is required to
abstract the physical resources into isolated slices for each MVNO who then
allocates the resources within the slice to its subscribed users. In this
paper, we aim to address this two-level hierarchical resource allocation
problem while satisfying the requirements of efficient resource allocation,
strict inter-slice isolation, and the ability of intra-slice customization. To
this end, we design a hierarchical combinatorial auction mechanism, based on
which a truthful and sub-efficient resource allocation framework is provided.
Specifically, winner determination problems (WDPs) are formulated for the InP
and MVNOs, and computationally tractable algorithms are proposed to solve these
WDPs. Also...

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## Fishing out Winners from Vote Streams

Fonte: Universidade Cornell
Publicador: Universidade Cornell

Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica

Relevância na Pesquisa

26.26%

#Computer Science - Computational Complexity#Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence#Computer Science - Discrete Mathematics#Computer Science - Data Structures and Algorithms#Computer Science - Multiagent Systems

We investigate the problem of winner determination from computational social
choice theory in the data stream model. Specifically, we consider the task of
summarizing an arbitrarily ordered stream of $n$ votes on $m$ candidates into a
small space data structure so as to be able to obtain the winner determined by
popular voting rules. As we show, finding the exact winner requires storing
essentially all the votes. So, we focus on the problem of finding an {\em
$\eps$-winner}, a candidate who could win by a change of at most $\eps$
fraction of the votes. We show non-trivial upper and lower bounds on the space
complexity of $\eps$-winner determination for several voting rules, including
$k$-approval, $k$-veto, scoring rules, approval, maximin, Bucklin, Copeland,
and plurality with run off.; Comment: Adding Acknowledgement

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## Rationalizations of Condorcet-Consistent Rules via Distances of Hamming Type

Fonte: Universidade Cornell
Publicador: Universidade Cornell

Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica

Publicado em 31/08/2010

Relevância na Pesquisa

35.95%

The main idea of the {\em distance rationalizability} approach to view the
voters' preferences as an imperfect approximation to some kind of consensus is
deeply rooted in social choice literature. It allows one to define
("rationalize") voting rules via a consensus class of elections and a distance:
a candidate is said to be an election winner if she is ranked first in one of
the nearest (with respect to the given distance) consensus elections. It is
known that many classic voting rules can be distance rationalized. In this
paper, we provide new results on distance rationalizability of several
Condorcet-consistent voting rules. In particular, we distance rationalize
Young's rule and Maximin rule using distances similar to the Hamming distance.
We show that the claim that Young's rule can be rationalized by the Condorcet
consensus class and the Hamming distance is incorrect; in fact, these consensus
class and distance yield a new rule which has not been studied before. We prove
that, similarly to Young's rule, this new rule has a computationally hard
winner determination problem.

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## A Pareto-metaheuristic for a bi-objective winner determination problem in a combinatorial reverse auction

Fonte: Universidade Cornell
Publicador: Universidade Cornell

Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica

Relevância na Pesquisa

66.1%

#Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory#Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence#Mathematics - Optimization and Control#90B50, 90C59, 68T20 (Primary), 90B06 (Secondary)#I.2.8#G.1.6#G.2.3

The bi-objective winner determination problem (2WDP-SC) of a combinatorial
procurement auction for transport contracts is characterized by a set B of
bundle bids, with each bundle bid b in B consisting of a bidding carrier c_b, a
bid price p_b, and a set tau_b transport contracts which is a subset of the set
T of tendered transport contracts. Additionally, the transport quality
q_{t,c_b} is given which is expected to be realized when a transport contract t
is executed by a carrier c_b. The task of the auctioneer is to find a set X of
winning bids (X subset B), such that each transport contract is part of at
least one winning bid, the total procurement costs are minimized, and the total
transport quality is maximized. This article presents a metaheuristic approach
for the 2WDP-SC which integrates the greedy randomized adaptive search
procedure with a two-stage candidate component selection procedure, large
neighborhood search, and self-adaptive parameter setting in order to find a
competitive set of non-dominated solutions. The heuristic outperforms all
existing approaches. For seven small benchmark instances, the heuristic is the
sole approach that finds all Pareto-optimal solutions. For 28 out of 30 large
instances, none of the existing approaches is able to compute a solution that
dominates a solution found by the proposed heuristic.; Comment: Accepted for publication in Computers & Operations Research...

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## The Complexity of Fully Proportional Representation for Single-Crossing Electorates

Fonte: Universidade Cornell
Publicador: Universidade Cornell

Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica

Publicado em 04/07/2013

Relevância na Pesquisa

26.04%

#Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory#Computer Science - Multiagent Systems#68Q17#I.2.11#F.2.2

We study the complexity of winner determination in single-crossing elections
under two classic fully proportional representation
rules---Chamberlin--Courant's rule and Monroe's rule. Winner determination for
these rules is known to be NP-hard for unrestricted preferences. We show that
for single-crossing preferences this problem admits a polynomial-time algorithm
for Chamberlin--Courant's rule, but remains NP-hard for Monroe's rule. Our
algorithm for Chamberlin--Courant's rule can be modified to work for elections
with bounded single-crossing width. To circumvent the hardness result for
Monroe's rule, we consider single-crossing elections that satisfy an additional
constraint, namely, ones where each candidate is ranked first by at least one
voter (such elections are called narcissistic). For single-crossing
narcissistic elections, we provide an efficient algorithm for the egalitarian
version of Monroe's rule.; Comment: 23 pages

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## Sample Complexity for Winner Prediction in Elections

Fonte: Universidade Cornell
Publicador: Universidade Cornell

Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica

Relevância na Pesquisa

46.35%

Predicting the winner of an election is a favorite problem both for news
media pundits and computational social choice theorists. Since it is often
infeasible to elicit the preferences of all the voters in a typical prediction
scenario, a common algorithm used for winner prediction is to run the election
on a small sample of randomly chosen votes and output the winner as the
prediction. We analyze the performance of this algorithm for many common voting
rules.
More formally, we introduce the $(\epsilon, \delta)$-winner determination
problem, where given an election on $n$ voters and $m$ candidates in which the
margin of victory is at least $\epsilon n$ votes, the goal is to determine the
winner with probability at least $1-\delta$. The margin of victory of an
election is the smallest number of votes that need to be modified in order to
change the election winner. We show interesting lower and upper bounds on the
number of samples needed to solve the $(\epsilon, \delta)$-winner determination
problem for many common voting rules, including scoring rules, approval,
maximin, Copeland, Bucklin, plurality with runoff, and single transferable
vote. Moreover, the lower and upper bounds match for many common voting rules
in a wide range of practically appealing scenarios.; Comment: Accepted in AAMAS 2015

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## Toward Expressive and Scalable Sponsored Search Auctions

Fonte: Universidade Cornell
Publicador: Universidade Cornell

Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica

Publicado em 31/08/2008

Relevância na Pesquisa

26.04%

Internet search results are a growing and highly profitable advertising
platform. Search providers auction advertising slots to advertisers on their
search result pages. Due to the high volume of searches and the users' low
tolerance for search result latency, it is imperative to resolve these auctions
fast. Current approaches restrict the expressiveness of bids in order to
achieve fast winner determination, which is the problem of allocating slots to
advertisers so as to maximize the expected revenue given the advertisers' bids.
The goal of our work is to permit more expressive bidding, thus allowing
advertisers to achieve complex advertising goals, while still providing fast
and scalable techniques for winner determination.; Comment: 10 pages, 13 figures, ICDE 2008

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