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The game to play: expanding the co-opetition proposal through the strategic games matrix

COSTA, Eliezer Arantes da; BOTTURA, Celso Pascoli; BOAVENTURA, João Mauricio Gama; FISCHMANN, Adalberto Americo
Fonte: EMERALD GROUP PUBLISHING LIMITED Publicador: EMERALD GROUP PUBLISHING LIMITED
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.3%
Purpose - Using Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s 1995 co-opetition model as a reference, the purpose of this paper is to seek to develop a tool that, based on the tenets of classical game theory, would enable scholars and managers to identify which games may be played in response to the different conflict of interest situations faced by companies in their business environments. Design/methodology/approach - The literature on game theory and business strategy are reviewed and a conceptual model, the strategic games matrix (SGM), is developed. Two novel games are described and modeled. Findings - The co-opetition model is not sufficient to realistically represent most of the conflict of interest situations faced by companies. It seeks to address this problem through development of the SGM, which expands upon Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s model by providing a broader perspective, through incorporation of an additional dimension (power ratio between players) and three novel, respectively, (rival, individualistic, and associative). Practical implications - This proposed model, based on the concepts of game theory, should be used to train decision- and policy-makers to better understand, interpret and formulate conflict management strategies. Originality/value - A practical and original tool to use game models in conflict of interest situations is generated. Basic classical games...

The game to play: expanding the co-opetition proposal through the strategic games matrix

COSTA, Eliezer Arantes da; BOTTURA, Celso Pascoli; BOAVENTURA, Joao Mauricio Gama; FISCHMANN, Adalberto Americo
Fonte: EMERALD GROUP PUBLISHING LIMITED Publicador: EMERALD GROUP PUBLISHING LIMITED
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.3%
Purpose - Using Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s 1995 co-opetition model as a reference, the purpose of this paper is to seek to develop a tool that, based on the tenets of classical game theory, would enable scholars and managers to identify which games may be played in response to the different conflict of interest situations faced by companies in their business environments. Design/methodology/approach - The literature on game theory and business strategy are reviewed and a conceptual model, the strategic games matrix (SGM), is developed. Two novel games are described and modeled. Findings - The co-opetition model is not sufficient to realistically represent most of the conflict of interest situations faced by companies. It seeks to address this problem through development of the SGM, which expands upon Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s model by providing a broader perspective, through incorporation of an additional dimension (power ratio between players) and three novel, respectively, (rival, individualistic, and associative). Practical implications - This proposed model, based on the concepts of game theory, should be used to train decision- and policy-makers to better understand, interpret and formulate conflict management strategies. Originality/value - A practical and original tool to use game models in conflict of interest situations is generated. Basic classical games...

Essays on Heterogeneity in Markets and Games

Jaffe, Sonia Patricia
Fonte: Harvard University Publicador: Harvard University
Tipo: Thesis or Dissertation; text Formato: application/pdf
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
25.92%
Many markets exhibit substantial heterogeneity -- e.g.~in ability, in preferences, in products, in strategies. Allowing for this (sometimes multi-dimensional) heterogeneity can change both the theoretical predictions of models and the results of empirical analyses. This dissertation consists of three essays on markets and games with different forms of heterogeneity. The first chapter introduces preference heterogeneity and multi-dimensional skill heterogeneity into the analysis of labor markets. In matching markets, agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners, so welfare depends on which agents are matched to each other in equilibrium. Taxes in matching markets can generate inefficiency by changing who is matched to whom, even if the number of workers at each firm is unaffected. This ``allocative distortion' is not evident in traditional models of income taxation that do not allow for workers to have multi-dimensional preference and productivity heterogeneity. For markets in which workers refuse to match without a positive wage, higher taxes decrease match efficiency. However, in more balanced matching markets where transfers may flow in either direction, such as the student--college market, lowering taxes may decrease match efficiency because an agent can transfer enough to ``buy' an inefficient partner (only to be ``bought back' when taxes are lowered further). Simulations show that...

Equilibrium equations and a computation method for matrix differential games (MDG)

Washburn, Alan R.; Shubert, Bruno O.
Fonte: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Relatório
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.03%
It is shown that Danskin's omega-value of a matrix-differential game can be obtained as a solution of a finite system of equations, each involving a single maximization of minimization. A computation method is proposed based on these equations.; Strategic Systems Project Office; http://archive.org/details/equilibriumequat00wash; This research was supported in part by Special Projects Office of the U.S. Navy.; NA

Matriz de jogos estrategicos : novo modelo para representação e estudo de conflito de interesses; Strategic games matrix : new model for conflict of interests' representation and study

Eliezer Arantes da Costa
Fonte: Biblioteca Digital da Unicamp Publicador: Biblioteca Digital da Unicamp
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 29/04/2008 PT
Relevância na Pesquisa
96.58%
O objetivo desta pesquisa é o desenvolvimento de um novo modelo conceitual para representação, de uma forma integrada, das mais diversas situações de conflito de interesses, como uma base para análise e projeto de controle de sistemas hierárquicos multiagentes, e para o aprimoramento da metodologia de capacitação de executivos para a administração estratégica desses conflitos. O método utilizado para esta pesquisa foi um investigação das condicionantes análogas presentes nos quatro jogos clássicos da Teoria dos Jogos ? Nash, Stackelberg, Pareto e Minimax ? buscando, entre eles, as características semelhantes e as peculiaridades que realmente os fazem semelhantes e distintos entre si. Desta investigação, foram identificadas duas dimensões diferenciadoras, que possibilitaram a concepção e a construção de uma matriz para representação desses jogos, de uma forma integrada. O modelo conceitual resultante desta pesquisa fornece um esquema analítico abrangente, inspirado na teoria dos jogos, e é usado para explicar, descrever, interpretar e prever os comportamentos dos diversos agentes autônomos envolvidos em situações de conflito de interesses e, em certos casos, prescrever decisões mais adequadas. A Matriz de Jogos Estratégicos (MJE)...

Autogenerator-Based Modelling Framework for Development of Strategic Games Simulations: Rational Pigs Game Extended

Fabac, Robert; Radošević, Danijel; Magdalenić, Ivan
Fonte: Hindawi Publishing Corporation Publicador: Hindawi Publishing Corporation
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.08%
When considering strategic games from the conceptual perspective that focuses on the questions of participants' decision-making rationality, the very issues of modelling and simulation are rarely discussed. The well-known Rational Pigs matrix game has been relatively intensively analyzed in terms of reassessment of the logic of two players involved in asymmetric situations as gluttons that differ significantly by their attributes. This paper presents a successful attempt of using autogenerator for creating the framework of the game, including the predefined scenarios and corresponding payoffs. Autogenerator offers flexibility concerning the specification of game parameters, which consist of variations in the number of simultaneous players and their features and game objects and their attributes as well as some general game characteristics. In the proposed approach the model of autogenerator was upgraded so as to enable program specification updates. For the purpose of treatment of more complex strategic scenarios, we created the Rational Pigs Game Extended (RPGE), in which the introduction of a third glutton entails significant structural changes. In addition, due to the existence of particular attributes of the new player, “the tramp...

Non-cooperative games with preplay negotiations

Goranko, Valentin; Turrini, Paolo
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.05%
We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase of negotiations before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other players after the play of the game, in order to provide additional incentives for each other to play designated strategies. Such offers are conditional on the recipients playing the specified strategies and they effect transformations of the payoff matrix of the game by accordingly transferring payoffs between players. We introduce and analyze solution concepts for 2-player normal form games with such preplay offers under various assumptions for the preplay negotiation phase and obtain results for existence of efficient negotiation strategies of the players. Then we extend the framework to coalitional preplay offers in N-player games, as well as to extensive form games with inter-play offers for side payments.; Comment: 40pages, under submission

Analysis of Equilibria and Strategic Interaction in Complex Networks

Preciado, Victor M.; Oh, Jaelynn; Jadbabaie, Ali
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
25.98%
This paper studies $n$-person simultaneous-move games with linear best response function, where individuals interact within a given network structure. This class of games have been used to model various settings, such as, public goods, belief formation, peer effects, and oligopoly. The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of the network structure on Nash equilibrium outcomes of this class of games. Bramoull\'{e} et al. derived conditions for uniqueness and stability of a Nash equilibrium in terms of the smallest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix representing the network of interactions. Motivated by this result, we study how local structural properties of the network of interactions affect this eigenvalue, influencing game equilibria. In particular, we use algebraic graph theory and convex optimization to derive new bounds on the smallest eigenvalue in terms of the distribution of degrees, cycles, and other relevant substructures. We illustrate our results with numerical simulations involving online social networks.; Comment: 7 pages, 3 figures. Related papers, data and software at http://alum.mit.edu/www/vmp

A Cartography for 2x2 Symmetric Games

Huertas-Rosero, Alvaro Francisco
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
25.98%
A bidimensional representation of the space of 2x2 Symmetric Games in the strategic representation is proposed. This representation provides a tool for the classification of 2x2 symmetric games, quantification of the fraction of them having a certain feature, and predictions of changes in the characteristics of a game when a change in done on the payoff matrix that defines it.; Comment: 13 pages, 7 figures This is a new version of the work, adapted to be presented in the III Colombian Congress and I Andean International Conference of Operational Research (Cartagena, Colombia, March 2004)

Collaborative Competitive filtering II: Optimal Recommendation and Collaborative Games

Yang, Shuang-Hong
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 10/12/2012
Relevância na Pesquisa
25.96%
Recommender systems have emerged as a new weapon to help online firms to realize many of their strategic goals (e.g., to improve sales, revenue, customer experience etc.). However, many existing techniques commonly approach these goals by seeking to recover preference (e.g., estimating ratings) in a matrix completion framework. This paper aims to bridge this significant gap between the clearly-defined strategic objectives and the not-so-well-justified proxy. We show it is advantageous to think of a recommender system as an analogy to a monopoly economic market with the system as the sole seller, users as the buyers and items as the goods. This new perspective motivates a game-theoretic formulation for recommendation that enables us to identify the optimal recommendation policy by explicit optimizing certain strategic goals. In this paper, we revisit and extend our prior work, the Collaborative-Competitive Filtering preference model, towards a game-theoretic framework. The proposed framework consists of two components. First, a conditional preference model that characterizes how a user would respond to a recommendation action; Second, knowing in advance how the user would respond, how a recommender system should act (i.e., recommend) strategically to maximize its goals. We show how objectives such as click-through rate...

Elements of Game Theory - Part I: Foundations, acts and mechanisms

Georgiou, Harris V.
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 16/06/2015
Relevância na Pesquisa
16.02%
In this paper, a gentle introduction to Game Theory is presented in the form of basic concepts and examples. Minimax and Nash's theorem are introduced as the formal definitions for optimal strategies and equilibria in zero-sum and nonzero-sum games. Several elements of cooperative gaming, coalitions, voting ensembles, voting power and collective efficiency are described in brief. Analytical (matrix) and extended (tree-graph) forms of game representation is illustrated as the basic tools for identifying optimal strategies and "solutions" in games of any kind. Next, a typology of four standard nonzero-sum games is investigated, analyzing the Nash equilibria and the optimal strategies in each case. Signaling, stance and third-party intermediates are described as very important properties when analyzing strategic moves, while credibility and reputation is described as crucial factors when signaling promises or threats. Utility is introduced as a generalization of typical cost/gain functions and it is used to explain the incentives of irrational players under the scope of "rational irrationality". Finally, a brief reference is presented for several other more advanced concepts of gaming, including emergence of cooperation, evolutionary stable strategies...

Two-player preplay negotiation games with conditional offers

Goranko, Valentin; Turrini, Paolo
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.13%
We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other players after the play of the game, contingent on the recipient playing the strategy indicated in the offer. Such offers transform the payoff matrix of the original game but preserve its non-cooperative nature. The type of offers we focus on here are conditional on a suggested 'matching offer' of the same kind made in return by the receiver. Players can exchange a series of such offers, thus engaging in a bargaining process before a strategic normal form game is played. In this paper we study and analyze solution concepts for two-player normal form games with such preplay negotiation phase, under several assumptions for the bargaining power of the players, such as the possibility of withdrawing previously made offers and opting out from the negotiation process, as well as the value of time for the players in such negotiations. We obtain results describing the possible solutions of such bargaining games and analyze the degrees of efficiency and fairness that can be achieved in such negotiation process.; Comment: Withdrawn. The paper is subsumed by arXiv:1208.1718

Iterated Regret Minimization in Game Graphs

Filiot, Emmanuel; Gall, Tristan Le; Raskin, Jean-François
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.02%
Iterated regret minimization has been introduced recently by J.Y. Halpern and R. Pass in classical strategic games. For many games of interest, this new solution concept provides solutions that are judged more reasonable than solutions offered by traditional game concepts -- such as Nash equilibrium --. Although computing iterated regret on explicit matrix game is conceptually and computationally easy, nothing is known about computing the iterated regret on games whose matrices are defined implicitly using game tree, game DAG or, more generally game graphs. In this paper, we investigate iterated regret minimization for infinite duration two-player quantitative non-zero sum games played on graphs. We consider reachability objectives that are not necessarily antagonist. Edges are weighted by integers -- one for each player --, and the payoffs are defined by the sum of the weights along the paths. Depending on the class of graphs, we give either polynomial or pseudo-polynomial time algorithms to compute a strategy that minimizes the regret for a fixed player. We finally give algorithms to compute the strategies of the two players that minimize the iterated regret for trees, and for graphs with strictly positive weights only.; Comment: 19 pages. Bug in introductive example fixed.

Optimal Linear Precoding Strategies for Wideband Non-Cooperative Systems based on Game Theory-Part II: Algorithms

Scutari, Gesualdo; Palomar, Daniel P.; Barbarossa, Sergio
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 05/07/2007
Relevância na Pesquisa
25.98%
In this two-part paper, we address the problem of finding the optimal precoding/multiplexing scheme for a set of non-cooperative links sharing the same physical resources, e.g., time and bandwidth. We consider two alternative optimization problems: P.1) the maximization of mutual information on each link, given constraints on the transmit power and spectral mask; and P.2) the maximization of the transmission rate on each link, using finite order constellations, under the same constraints as in P.1, plus a constraint on the maximum average error probability on each link. Aiming at finding decentralized strategies, we adopted as optimality criterion the achievement of a Nash equilibrium and thus we formulated both problems P.1 and P.2 as strategic noncooperative (matrix-valued) games. In Part I of this two-part paper, after deriving the optimal structure of the linear transceivers for both games, we provided a unified set of sufficient conditions that guarantee the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. In this Part II, we focus on the achievement of the equilibrium and propose alternative distributed iterative algorithms that solve both games. Specifically, the new proposed algorithms are the following: 1) the sequential and simultaneous iterative waterfilling based algorithms...

Behavioral Game Theory: Thinking, Learning and Teaching

Camerer, Colin F.; Ho, Teck-Hua; Chong, Juin Kuan
Fonte: California Institute of Technology Publicador: California Institute of Technology
Tipo: Report or Paper; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 13/11/2001
Relevância na Pesquisa
16.17%
This paper describes a parametric approach to weakening rationality assumptions in game theory to fit empirical data better. The central features of game theory are: The concept of a game (players, strategies, information, timing, outcomes); strategic thinking; mutual consistency of beliefs and strategies; and strategic foresight and Bayesian updating of unobserved "types" in repeated games. This paper describes a general four-parameter behavioral approach which relaxes the mutual consistency and foresight properties, while retaining much of the structure and hence the precision of game theory. One parameter measures the number of steps of iterated thinking that the average player does. This "thinking steps" model generates predictions about one-shot games and provides initial conditions for a theory of learning in repeated games. The learning theory adds one parameter (to measure response sensitivity) and adjusts learning parameters for environmental change (e.g., old experience is rapidly decayed when other players' moves are changing). It predicts behavior in new games more accurately than comparable models like fictitious play and reinforcement learning. The teaching theory assumes some fraction of players realize the impact of their current choices on future behavior of other players who learn...

A cognitive hierarchy theory of one-shot games: Some preliminary results

Camerer, Colin F.; Ho, Teck-Hua; Chong, Juin Kuan
Fonte: Instituto de Tecnologia da Califórnia Publicador: Instituto de Tecnologia da Califórnia
Tipo: Report or Paper; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf; application/pdf; application/pdf; application/zip; application/pdf
Publicado em 06/12/2002
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.09%
Strategic thinking, best-response, and mutual consistency (equilibrium) are three key modelling principles in noncooperative game theory. This paper relaxes mutual consistency to predict how players are likely to behave in in one-shot games before they can learn to equilibrate. We introduce a one-parameter cognitive hierarchy (CH) model to predict behavior in one-shot games, and initial conditions in repeated games. The CH approach assumes that players use k steps of reasoning with frequency f (k). Zero-step players randomize. Players using k (≥ 1) steps best respond given partially rational expectations about what players doing 0 through k - 1 steps actually choose. A simple axiom which expresses the intuition that steps of thinking are increasingly constrained by working memory, implies that f (k) has a Poisson distribution (characterized by a mean number of thinking steps τ ). The CH model converges to dominance-solvable equilibria when τ is large, predicts monotonic entry in binary entry games for τ < 1:25, and predicts effects of group size which are not predicted by Nash equilibrium. Best-fitting values of τ have an interquartile range of (.98,2.40) and a median of 1.65 across 80 experimental samples of matrix games...

Gamification, elements of games and strategy: a reference matrix; Gamificação, elementos de jogos e estratégia: uma matriz de referência

Costa, Amanda Cristina Santos; Marchiori, Patrícia Zeni
Fonte: Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Filosofia, Ciências e Letras de Ribeirão Preto Publicador: Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Filosofia, Ciências e Letras de Ribeirão Preto
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion; ; Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 02/10/2015 POR
Relevância na Pesquisa
25.94%
Investigations about gamification - understood as the use of game design elements in no game contexts – could be suitable to the issue of information architecture as far as the engagement aspect is concerned. The study presents a reference matrix for gamification applications based on a framework of game elements (dynamics, mechanics and components) seeking relations with segments/application areas that could make use of the gamification process. Besides the bibliographical research, some Grounded Theory techniques were used to gather, prepare and analyze data. Intermediate matrices allowed the discussion about aspects related to components, mechanics and game dynamics and the different segments/areas identified. The main matrix may serve as a reference model for gamification applications bearing in mind that different sets of elements may be combined in various ways; and that each segment/area has a potential set of combinations that depend on the clarity of business objectives. For example, the use of the "narratives" dynamics in the Education and Training segment could help not only the players, but also the developers regarding the stimulus, motivation and engagement needed to promote a teaching/learning process. Within the context of information architecture...

Aplicação da Matriz de Jogos Estratégicos na modelagem de estratégias cooperativas e competitivas para empresas de um pólo têxtil e de confecções; An application of the Strategic Games Matrix for competitive and cooperative strategies modeling for the firms of a textile and apparel business cluster; An application of the Strategic Games Matrix for competitive and cooperative strategies modeling for the firms of a textile and apparel business cluster

Da Costa, Eliezer Arantes; UNICAMP; Bottura, Celso Pascoli; UNICAMP
Fonte: Universidade Federal Fluminense - LATEC Publicador: Universidade Federal Fluminense - LATEC
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion; ; ; ; Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 29/05/2009 POR
Relevância na Pesquisa
96.51%
Apesar do ambiente de colaboração generalizado necessário para se implementar qualquercluster empresarial bem sucedido, a inevitável autonomia decisória e a livre iniciativa entreas suas empresas, operando, muitas vezes, como múltiplas e complexas cadeias desuprimento, fazem com que eles acabem buscando seus próprios interesses, ignorando osinteresses dos demais agentes envolvidos. Tais empresas, competindo e/ou cooperandoentre si, dão origem, naturalmente, a diversas situações de conflitos de interesses entreelas, conflitos esses que precisam ser modelados, tratados, conciliados e administrados.Apresentamos, neste trabalho, uma modelagem de estratégias cooperativas e competitivasdos mútuos relacionamentos entre as firmas ‘clusterizadas’, com base em conceitos daTeoria dos Jogos. Propõe-se a aplicação de uma metodologia de análise desses complexosempresariais utilizando a Matriz de Jogos Estratégicos, MJE, como o quadro de referênciaconceitual. Mostramos que a MJE se constitui numa útil ferramenta de suporte analítico egerencial para o tratamento dos múltiplos conflitos de interesses entre os diversos agentesde um cluster, tanto para propósitos descritivos como prescritivos. Esta metodologia éaplicada ao assim chamado Pólo-Tec-Tex...

A Matriz de Jogos Estratégicos (MJE) como uma nova ferramenta para gestão estratégica via teoria dos jogos; The Strategic Games Matrix (SGM) as a new tool for strategic management via game theory; The Strategic Games Matrix (SGM) as a new tool for strategic management via game theory

Da Costa, Eliezer Arantes; Unicamp; Bottura, Celso Pascoli; Unicamp
Fonte: Universidade Federal Fluminense - LATEC Publicador: Universidade Federal Fluminense - LATEC
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion; ; ; ; Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 26/05/2009 POR
Relevância na Pesquisa
96.59%
Novas utilizações de alguns conceitos da teoria dos jogos para formulação de estratégias cooperativas e competitivas em gestão empresarial são aqui elaboradas e apresentadas, tendo como base a Matriz de Jogos Estratégicos (MJE). Aplicam-se os conceitos e resultados da MJE na análise e formulação de estratégias empresariais, como instrumento de apoio à gestão estratégica em complexas estruturas empresariais–hierárquicas ou não – tanto competitivas como cooperativas. É proposta uma nova tipologia para jogos estratégicos empresariais, derivada da análise e interpretação da MJE: Quatro jogos estratégicos clássicos da teoria dos jogos – Nash, Minimax, e Pareto, como jogos não-hierárquicos, e Stackelberg, como jogo hierárquico – são interpretados e aplicados a situações de conflito de interesses competitivas e cooperativas; dois novos jogos estratégicos hierárquicos, aplicáveis a situações de casos-limite, também derivados da análise da MJE – Dominante-Marginal e Paternalista-Solidário–, são também descritos e aplicados. Uma nova metodologia para análise e formulação de estratégias competitivas e cooperativas para gestão estratégica em complexas estruturas hierárquicas, construída com base na MJE...

Abordagem Sistêmica numa Organização com Produção do Tipo Job Shop Personalizada: Um estudo de Caso; The Strategic Games Matrix (SGM) as a new tool for strategic management via game theory; The Strategic Games Matrix (SGM) as a new tool for strategic management via game theory

Ruthes, Sidarta; CEFET-PR; Ceretta, Paulo Sérgio; UFSM
Fonte: Universidade Federal Fluminense - LATEC Publicador: Universidade Federal Fluminense - LATEC
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion; ; ; Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 25/05/2009 POR
Relevância na Pesquisa
96.61%
Novas utilizações de alguns conceitos da teoria dos jogos para formulação de estratégias cooperativas e competitivas em gestão empresarial são aqui elaboradas e apresentadas, tendo como base a Matriz de Jogos Estratégicos (MJE). Aplicam-se os conceitos e resultados da MJE na análise e formulação de estratégias empresariais, como instrumento de apoio à gestão estratégica em complexas estruturas empresariais–hierárquicas ou não – tanto competitivas como cooperativas. É proposta uma nova tipologia para jogos estratégicos empresariais, derivada da análise e interpretação da MJE: Quatro jogos estratégicos clássicos da teoria dos jogos – Nash, Minimax, e Pareto, como jogos nãohierárquicos, e Stackelberg, como jogo hierárquico – são interpretados e aplicados a situações de conflito de interesses competitivas e cooperativas; dois novos jogos estratégicos hierárquicos, aplicáveis a situações de casos-limite, também derivados da análise da MJE – Dominante-Marginal e Paternalista-Solidário–, são também descritos e aplicados. Uma nova metodologia para análise e formulação de estratégias competitivas e cooperativas para gestão estratégica em complexas estruturas hierárquicas...