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Prova, argumento e decisão: critérios de suficiência para orientação dos juízos de fato no direito processual brasileiro; Evidence, reasoning and decision: standards of proof as a guide to judgments about facts in Brazilians procedural law

Silveira, Daniel Coutinho da
Fonte: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP Publicador: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
Tipo: Dissertação de Mestrado Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 06/06/2011 PT
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26.43%
A noção de livre convencimento estipula ao julgamento de processos judiciais uma investigação sobre fatos amparada em avaliação epistemológica. Essa estratégia, entretanto, apresenta dificuldades insuperáveis nas diversas formulações desse tipo de raciocínio por não oferecer respostas definitivas para solucionar problemas práticos, como aqueles envolvidos na concretização do direito, levando a graus diferentes de dúvida. Diante desse quadro surge a pergunta sobre qual nível de confirmação será aceito para respaldar uma decisão. Esse trabalho propõe como solução a tal aporia uma aproximação dos argumentos utilizados para a decisão em matéria de fato à estrutura dos argumentos práticos. Assim, além das reflexões epistemológicas, incorporam-se elementos morais e políticos em seu esquema central. Por meio dessa conclusão são introduzidos obrigatoriamente ao raciocínio judicial o que se denomina critérios de suficiência, orientações sobre o grau de comprovação das versões levantadas num caso concreto. Esse instituto, além de imprescindível para viabilizar a racionalidade dos juízos de fato, assume ainda a função de distribuir o risco de decisões equivocadas entre os litigantes. Trata-se de elemento de legitimação das decisões em matéria de fato...

O caminho crítico da Grundlegung à Crítica da Razão Prática; The critical path from Grundlegung to the critique of practical reason

Chagas, Flávia Carvalho
Fonte: Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul Publicador: Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: application/pdf
POR
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36.61%
Este trabalho pretende investigar como Kant resolve o problema da fundamentação de um princípio moral universalmente válido baseado na hipótese de que o ser racional humano tem consciência do mesmo de um modo necessário ou a priori. Para tanto, é preciso, num primeiro momento, deixar claro que esta tese se sustenta melhor se nós fizermos um outro tipo de leitura - não muito comum - dos textos nos quais Kant aborda este problema, a saber, a KpV e a Grundlegung. Com esta mudança na estratégia de leitura, a qual consiste em partir da tese exposta na KpV da realidade e da necessidade prática da consciência moral para a tematização da III Seção da GMS, o objetivo do primeiro capítulo consiste em mostrar como Kant consegue assegurar um lugar sistemático possível e coerente para o conceito de liberdade transcendental. Com base na exposição da possibilidade teórica da idéia da liberdade transcendental, no segundo Capítulo pretende-se mostrar como Kant estabelece propriamente a fundamentação de um princípio transcendental para a moralidade baseada na figura do único fato a priori da razão. Nesta parte do trabalho o objetivo central é mostrar como deve ser entendida esta figura do fato da razão. Assim, parecenos que a consciência da lei moral não deve ser entendida 1) como um conhecimento da razão teórica-especulativa...

Convergences et divergences dans les conceptions de la morale de Ronald Dworkin et Alasdair MacIntyre

Lemay, Jacques
Fonte: Université de Montréal Publicador: Université de Montréal
Tipo: Thèse ou Mémoire numérique / Electronic Thesis or Dissertation
FR
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Ce mémoire porte sur l’articulation de la morale en droit. Il soulève la question de l’objectivité de la morale dans la théorie du droit de Ronald Dworkin. Celui-ci doit pouvoir établir les critères de justification de la morale pour asseoir son autorité en droit. Il conteste la validité de la règle de reconnaissance de Hart qui exclue la morale comme source et comme justification inhérente au droit. Dans son dernier livre, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), Dworkin présente sa thèse de l’unité de valeur entre le droit, la morale personnelle et la morale politique. Pour réussir à intégrer la morale au droit, il doit en défendre l’objectivité. Il développe une conception de la rationalité pratique et de la vérité propre à la morale. Sa conception de la rationalité pratique est rapprochée de celle d’Alasdair MacIntyre. Celui-ci rejette la prétention issue des Lumières d’une rationalité pratique universelle et neutre. Il développe une conception de la rationalité pratique fondée sur le concept de tradition d’investigation. Il fait l’histoire des principales traditions d’investigation depuis l’antiquité jusqu’à aujourd’hui. Il considère la tradition aristotélicienne supérieure, celle-ci réussissant mieux à donner objectivité et intelligibilité à la morale. Des points de convergence ou de divergence sont identifiés dans les conceptions de la morale de Dworkin et de MacIntyre. Ce rapprochement porte sur leurs positions respectives face aux principaux fondements théoriques en philosophie morale...

Intention & practical reasoning

Jardine, Brian Sinclair
Fonte: Universidade Nacional da Austrália Publicador: Universidade Nacional da Austrália
Tipo: Thesis (PhD); Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
EN_AU
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Introduction- problems of interpreting ordinary language. Anscombe and Aristotle. I. INTENTIQN & PRACTICAL REASONING What is he doing? In any given case there are many possible answers to this question. There are many possible descriptions of any action and none "the" simple or obvious answer. Did he do it intentionally? The answer to this question will end on which description is substituted for x. Someone may intentionally do something whi.ch is something else, and yet not do that other thing intentionally (though is something he does). External indications may help us answer the question in practice but do not explain why the answer should be what it is. There must be something which can tell us not only whether an action is intentional, but also under what description it is so. Knowing what one is doing: Knowledge seems likely to be involved in what performs this role…; This thesis has been made available through exception 200AB to the Copyright Act.; Yes

Defeasibility in Legal Reasoning

SARTOR, Giovanni
Fonte: European University Institute Publicador: European University Institute
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf; digital
EN
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I shall first introduce the idea of reasoning, and of defeasible reasoning in particular. I shall then argue that cognitive agents need to engage in defeasible reasoning for coping with a complex and changing environment. Consequently, defeasibility is needed in practical reasoning, and in particular in legal reasoning

Relating to Reasons

LANGLOIS, CHRISTOPHER
Fonte: Quens University Publicador: Quens University
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
EN; EN
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While each of us has an intuitive sense of what a reason is, when considered more carefully the concept is not so clear. There are a number of questions to which any successful account of reasons will provide some answer. For example, on some accounts reasons may appear to be metaphysically odd entities, unlike other sorts of facts in our world. From here there are very serious questions which spring up regarding the motivational efficacy of reasons: given the nature of reasons, as respective accounts describe them, how is it that reasons get a grip in an agent? Further, whatever reasons are, and in whichever relation agents stand to reasons, how is it that agents get in touch with truths about reasons? How in theory – and importantly, in practice – do agents figure out which reasons apply to them? I will be defending a view of reasons in which reasons are primitive. This is what T.M. Scanlon calls 'Reasons Fundamentalism'. In particular, I will defend this view against charges which claim that an account of reasons as primitive or fundamental fails us in the following three respects: 1) it cannot provide us with an adequate account of what sorts of facts reasons are, and how they intermingle with other sorts of facts; 2) it cannot provide us with adequate account of how a consideration can count as a reason for an agent even if that agent fails to be gripped by the consideration...

Neoconstitutionalism and Practical Reasonableness (Theoretical Framework for a Proposed Master in Constitutional Law); Neoconstitucionalismo y razonabilidad práctica (Marco teórico para una propuesta de Maestría en Derecho Constitucional)

Mora-Restrepo, Gabriel; Universidad de La Sabana
Fonte: Universidade La Sabana Publicador: Universidade La Sabana
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
SPA
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This article presents the transformations experienced by Colombian law due to the socalled neoconstitutionalism, from a perspective that seeks to draw both its positive and problematic aspects. In essence they are four: first, an order of values projected on the entire legal system and that, somehow, “materialize” social life and the objective requirements of human dignity. Second, an innovative legal and institutional strength of the Constitution, with direct application of its rules. Third, a revitalization of juridical interpretation, which requires further rational coordinates. Finally, the emergence of new problems related with the legitimacy of the arguments of constitutional decisions. Within this context, it attempts to show the essential guidelines to support a proposal for a graduate academic education in Constitutional Law, highlighting the importance of organizing such proposal from the coordinates of practical reasoning and interpretation. In this sense, the text is part of the theoretical justification for a Master in Constitutional Law, vis a vis the legal and political situation in Colombia.; En este artículo de reflexión se exponen las transformaciones que ha sufrido el Derecho colombiano a causa del denominado “neoconstitucionalismo”...

La determinatio en el proceso de adjudicación: una visión prudencial del razonamiento jurídico; Determinatio in the Process of Adjudication: A Prudential View of Legal Reasoning

Suárez-Rodríguez, José Julián; Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de La Sabana
Fonte: Universidade La Sabana Publicador: Universidade La Sabana
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
SPA
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Este trabajo centra su atención en un problema concreto: la naturaleza del proceso de determinación del Derecho en los casos concretos. Para resolverlo se exploran, en primer lugar, las diferentes corrientes de la teoría del derecho que han intentado una descripción de este procedimiento, y en las que quedan al descubierto los principales interrogantes que dejan abiertos a la teoría de la adjudicación judicial. La necesidad de una justificación racional adecuada a la naturaleza práctica de la realidad jurídica es el hilo conductor del resto de trabajo, y la deliberación prácticoprudencial es la respuesta a la pregunta por la naturaleza del proceso de determinación concreta del Derecho. Una deliberación que indaga por los medios más adecuados, según las circunstancias concretas, para alcanzar el fin de la labor del jurista: la concreción del Derecho en los casos particulares.; This article focuses on a concrete problem: the nature of the process of the determination of law in specific cases. To solve said problem, different schools in the Theory of Law, which have attempted to describe the determination process and in which the main questions on the theory of judicial adjudication are evident, are explored. The need for a proper rational justification of the practical nature of legal reality is the cohesive line for the rest of this work...

Notes on Natural Law from the Perspective of Classical Realism; Apuntes sobre la ley natural desde la perspectiva del realismo clásico

Herrera-Pardo, Camila; Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de La Sabana
Fonte: Universidade La Sabana Publicador: Universidade La Sabana
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
SPA
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This article pretends to provide an insight of the classical conception of Natural Law, as a rule derived from the ontological constitution of man. While the core of the natural normativity (the basic principles of natural law) is known by intuition, its concretions are object of scientific and prudential reasoning. These concretions are not a body of hieratically preset rules, but historical and flexible determinations of general principles that may have components of volitive election. The afore mentioned theory of natural law is, consequently, very different and almost contrary to the rationalist conception of natural law as a set of a priori rules, object of a unique, necessary and algebraic concretion. In addition, this article aims to deepen in the understanding of the juridical dimension of natural law as principle of legal reasoning, main ground of the global law and as a constitutional norm.; El presente artículo pretende dar cuenta de la concepción clásica de la ley natural, en tanto norma emanada de la constitución ontológica del hombre, conocida en sus principios por intuición, y susceptible de conocimiento prudencial y científico en sus concreciones que, por otra parte, son variables históricamente y abiertas a la elección. Se busca con ello distinguir la teoría clásica de la ley natural de desarrollos ulteriores (como el de los movimientos racionalistas) que definen a la ley natural como un conjunto de principios a priori...

Formación del carácter y razonamiento práctico.; Formation of character and practical reasoning. [Spanish]

Julián Fernando Trujillo Amaya; Universidad del Valle.; Ximena Vallejo Álvarez; Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.
Fonte: Universidad del Norte Publicador: Universidad del Norte
Tipo: article; publishedVersion Formato: application/pdf
SPA
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En este artículo se sostiene que existe una primacía de la práctica y la acción sobre el conocimiento intelectual y la contemplación. Si esta tesis fuese falsa, no resulta comprensible por qué la prudencia y el hombre prudente son la virtud suprema y el modelo de la vida buena en Aristóteles. La cuestión inicial es 1) ¿Cómo entender la racionalidad del deseo o qué significa deseo razonado?, y esto implica dos cuestiones adicionales: 2) ¿Qué es el silogismo práctico y qué relación tiene con la recta razón? y 3) ¿cuál es la relación entre el razonamiento práctico, la prudencia y el hombre prudente? Estas cuestiones son analizadas para establecer algunas de las semejanzas y diferencias entre el silogismo práctico, los diversos tipos de inferencias prácticas y otros tipos de razonamientos, tratando de mostrar la relación que existe entre la formación del carácter o modo de ser, la recta razón y el silogismo práctico.; This article states that practice and action are more important than intellectual knowledge and contemplation. If this thesis were false, one cannot understand why prudence and the prudent person are the supreme virtue and the model of the good life in Aristotle. The initial question is: (1) how should the rationality of desire be understood...

The Power of a Practical Conclusion and Essays in the Economic Analysis of Legal Systems

Fernandez, Patricio A
Fonte: Harvard University Publicador: Harvard University
Tipo: Thesis or Dissertation
EN_US
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Part One defends the thesis, first advanced by Aristotle, that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, and argues for its philosophical significance. Opposition to the thesis rests on a contestable way of distinguishing between acts and contents of reasoning and on a picture of normative principles as external to the actions that fall under them. The resulting view forces us to choose between the efficacious, world-changing character of practical thought and its subjection to objective rational standards. This is a false choice. Aristotle's own understanding of the thesis points the way to an alternative conception of practical reason on which it is at once a power to effect changes in the world and to get things right. Practical reasoning endows the action performed on its basis with a principle that is not imposed on it from outside: instead, it makes the action what it is. Properly understood in terms of the relevant acts of a rational subject, the thesis is defensible and philosophically attractive. Furthermore, it helps us understand the continuity and discontinuity that exists between the motions of human beings and those of other animals, as Aristotle showed.; Philosophy

Foundations for Everyday Practical Reasoning

Lin, Han-Ti
Fonte: Kluwer Academic Publishers Publicador: Kluwer Academic Publishers
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
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"Since today is Saturday, the grocery store is open today and will be closed tomorrow; so let's go today". That is an example of everyday practical reasoning-reasoning directly with the propositions that one believes but may not be fully certain of. Every

O raciocínio prático em Aristóteles; The practical reasoning in Aristotle

D'OCA, Fernando Rodrigues Montes
Fonte: Universidade Federal de Pelotas; Filosofia; Progama de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia; UFPel; BR Publicador: Universidade Federal de Pelotas; Filosofia; Progama de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia; UFPel; BR
Tipo: Dissertação Formato: application/pdf
POR
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The objective of this work is to explain how practical reasoning takes place in Aristotle. This is a delicate and controversial issue of the Aristotelian practical philosophy, since he did not dedicate any moment of his work the Stagirite to closely analyze the practical reasoning. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle deals with deliberation, prudence, and practical syllogism, but we do not see him coordinate these themes as a concluded whole in a theory of the practical reasoning. This research aims to do so in order to precisely determine how the practical reasoning of a moral agent works, since its beginning, in the apprehension of a conception of the good, until its conclusion, in the imminence of an action. To do so this work undertakes an analysis of important conceptions about the theory of practical reasoning. Initially, two preliminary themes are dealt with: happiness and moral virtue, and right in sequence it goes deeper in the theme of practical reasoning analyzing the concepts of deliberate choice, of deliberation, and, most of all, of prudential reason, seeing that its operation covers a considerable part of the practical reasoning of the moral agent. But practical reasoning is not completely explained only by understanding such themes neither can it be limited to the operation of prudential reason. The theory of practical syllogism also appears as an important element in the explanation of how practical reasoning works. As a result of this...

Quantum Logic of Semantic Space: An Exploratory Investigation of Context Effects in Practical Reasoning

Bruza, P. D.; Cole, R. J.
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 20/12/2006
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46.33%
This article is an exploratory account of the the non-monotonic behaviour of conceptual associations in the light of context. Computational approximations of conceptual space are furnished by semantic space models which are emerging from the fields of cognition and computational linguistics. Semantic space models not only provide a cognitively motivated basis to underpin human practical reasoning, but from a mathematical perspective, they are real-valued Hilbert spaces. This introduces the highly speculative prospect of formalizing aspects of human practical reasoning via quantum mechanics. This account focuses on how to formalize context effects in relation to concepts as well as keeping an eye on operational issues.; Comment: 23 pages, Invited chapter

Anthropoid Rights and Paternalism

Peña, Lorenzo
Fonte: Conselho Superior de Investigações Científicas Publicador: Conselho Superior de Investigações Científicas
Tipo: Artículo Formato: 78191 bytes; application/pdf
SPA
Relevância na Pesquisa
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Anti-animalists allege that, since humans alone are capable of engaging in some sort of higher-order practical reasoning and of being led in their behaviour by moral values, non-human animals may not be treated as persons. I argue that such a view is wrong. The difference is just one of degree. Freedom is just one value among others, not the supreme one; the differences of treatment humans and other anthropoids are entitled to do not hinge upon the question of paternalism, since humans, too, have to be treated paternalistically sometimes, at least in certain respects. Admittedly, every paternalistic action impinges on the concerned agent's freedom, thus clashing with the value of liberty. Hence, either it is unjustified or else a conflict of values arises. But there are many such conflicts, or dilemmas. One of the good things of being good or fair to our cousins the apes is that we gain a deeper insight into ourselves. We are apes after all. What is the end of their lives is also the end or goal of ours: to live, and to live well; to secure such a life both for ourselves and others. I am not erasing or obliterating differences of degree. Nor am I denying that they may be important when confronted with moral dilemmas. How much important are they? After recent research we now know that in most relevant respects the discrepancy between humans and other apes is small. They are much more human-like than we were used to think. And we are much more ape-like than we had fancied to imagine.; Peer reviewed

La obligación de aplicar las normas jurídicas vigentes

Peña, Lorenzo
Fonte: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (España) Publicador: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (España)
Tipo: Artículo Formato: 21567 bytes; application/pdf
SPA
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35.98%
[ES] Es tarea de todos aplicar una ley, o sea realizar y ejecutar aquellos actos jurídicos y hechos prácticos que desembocan en su cumplimiento o lo constituyen. Se aplica una norma de carácter implicativo cuando, ante la existencia de un supuesto de hecho previsto en ella, se concluye la obligación (o licitud) contenida en su consecuencia jurídica, actuándose de conformidad con ello. Eso es incompatible con la separación de lo normativo y lo fáctico, propia del normativismo de Kelsen. Y es que hay situaciones jurídicas que es imposible que se den cuando suceden ciertos hechos. El cambio de paradigma requerido para entender el hecho jurídico pasa por adoptar una lógica jurídica totalmente diferente de la lógica deóntica estándar.; [EN] To apply a law is a task incumbent on everybody, since it consists in accomplishing such juridical acts as ensue from the norm when certain factual situations are encountered and in fulfilling the apposite material facts. A norm-application is nothing else but drawing practical consequences from the norm plus the existence of such facts as constitute the norm’s antecedent. That operation in incompatible with Kelsen’s normativism, which pronounces norms to be completely separated from facts. Thus...

The Politics of Incommensurability: A Value Pluralist Approach to Liberalism and Democracy

Bourke, James Ethan
Fonte: Universidade Duke Publicador: Universidade Duke
Tipo: Dissertação
Publicado em //2011
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36.1%

In this dissertation, I advance a new interpretation of the meaning and political implications of Isaiah Berlin's theory of value pluralism. My argument focuses on two puzzles within the literature on value pluralism: first, value pluralist political theorists advance a variety of differing political views on an ostensibly value pluralist basis; second, and more deeply, their writings betray significant ambiguity on what value pluralism means in the first place. I identify two central sources of these problems. First, two distinct sets of ideas in Berlin's work, which I label the "moral-practical" and "societal groupings" versions of value pluralism, are persistently conflated by both Berlin and more recent value pluralist theorists. Second, attempts to justify a political view on the basis of value pluralism run aground on a "priority problem" stemming from the central value pluralist concept of incommensurability. In my approach, I maintain the distinction between the moral-practical and societal groupings theories, focusing on the moral-practical version as a more original and less well-understood contribution of Berlin's thought. I also develop a strategy, which I call "giving incommensurability its due," that avoids the priority problem by focusing on metaethical (or second-order)...

Rational valuations

Spielthenner, Georg
Fonte: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina Publicador: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion; ; ; Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 01/01/2007 POR
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Valuations are ubiquitous. We may be for or against genetically modified food; we find some politicians irresponsible; we prefer Beethoven to rock ‘n’ roll or vice versa; some enjoy bird-watching while others find it boring; and we may think that we have to tighten up on green-house gas emissions. Valuing is pervasive and often we are not even aware that we are valuing. However, many of ourvaluations are ill grounded and rationally defective. They are frequently based on misinformation, sloppy thinking, prejudice, and are biased in many ways as psychological research shows. For this reason there is widespread agreement among phi-losophers that we need an account of substantive valuational rationality, both for the theory of practical reasoning and for ethics as well. My main objectin this paper is to outline such an account and to present a principle that allows a non-technical rational criticism of valuations

Book review: identity as reasoned choice: a South Asian perspective on the reach and resources of public and practical reasoning in shaping individual identities

Coolidge Toker, Emily
Fonte: Blog post from London School of Economics & Political Science Publicador: Blog post from London School of Economics & Political Science
Tipo: Website; NonPeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 27/09/2012 EN; EN
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In an increasingly multi-religious and multi-ethnic world, identity has become something actively chosen rather than merely acquired at birth. This book essentially analyzes the resources available to make such a choice. Looking into the world of intellectual India, Emily Coolidge Toker finds that this unique comparative survey focuses on the identity resources offered by India’s traditions of reasoning and public debate. This groundbreaking work by Jonardon Ganeri builds on themes developed by Amartya Sen to provide a creative pursuit of Indian reasoning that will appeal to anyone studying politics, philosophy, and Asian political thought.

Law and Reasons: Comments on Rodriguez-Blanco

Bix,Brian H.
Fonte: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas Publicador: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: text/html
Publicado em 01/12/2013 EN
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In Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco's thoughtful and important article, "Reasons in Action v Triggering Reasons: A Reply to Enoch on Reason-Giving and Legal Normativity, " she explores with great care the nature of reason-giving, in connection with challenging David Enoch's influential recent work on reason-giving and the law. While Rodriguez-Blanco's article makes an important contribution to the literature on the best understanding of reason-giving and practical reasoning, it is not clear that an approach to reasons for action reformed along the lines Rodriguez-Blanco suggests would change or clarify the ultimate question on which she focuses: the way in which legal systems in general or individual legal norms do (or do not) give citizens reasons for action. The question of whether we have a general (presumptive) moral obligation to act (or refrain from acting) as legal norms direct us depends to a significant degree on whether there are good arguments against an individualistic, case by case, approach to responding to such norms.