- Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
- Universidade Carlos III de Madrid
- Elsevier
- Universidade Rice
- World Bank, Washington, DC
- Quens University
- MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- Universidade do Chile
- Universidade Cornell
- Universidade de Cambridge
- Universidade Duke
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## Auctions with options for re-auction

## How to sell to buyers with crossholdings

## Optimal takeover contests with toeholds

## Auctions with asymmetric common-values: the first-price format

## Information disclosure in optimal auctions

## Auctions with heterogeneous entry costs

## Essays in Structural Econometrics of Auctions

## Court Auctions : Effective Processes and Enforcement Agents

## Three Essays in Auctions and Contests

## Optimal Bidding in Online Auctions

## Forward-looking bidders in sequential auctions

## Optimal Takeover Contests with Toeholds

## Optimal Auctions via the Multiplicative Weight Method

## The Pseudo-Dimension of Near-Optimal Auctions

## Efficiency Loss in Revenue Optimal Auctions

## Polyhedral Clinching Auctions and the Adwords Polytope

## The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions

## Use of Long-term Auctions for Network Investment

## Auctions, Equilibria, and Budgets

We design algorithms for markets consisting of multiple items, and agents with budget constraints on the maximum amount of money they can afford to spend. This problem can be considered under two broad frameworks. (a) From the standpoint of Auction Theory, the agents valuation functions over the items are private knowledge. Here, a "truthful auction" computes the subset of items received by every agent and her payment, and ensures that no agent can manipulate the scheme to her advantage by misreporting her valuation function. The question is to design a truthful auction whose outcome can be computed in polynomial time. (b) A different, but equally

important, question is to investigate if and when the market is in "equilibrium",

meaning that every item is assigned a price, every agent gets her utility-maximizing subset of items under the current prices, and every unallocated item is priced at zero.

First, we consider the setting of multiple heterogeneous items and present approximation algorithms for revenue-optimal truthful auctions. When the items are homogeneous, we give an efficient algorithm whose outcome defines a truthful and Pareto-optimal auction. Finally, we focus on the notion of "competitive equilibrium"...