Página 1 dos resultados de 273 itens digitais encontrados em 0.007 segundos

Auctions with options for re-auction

Menezes, Flavio Marques
Fonte: Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV Publicador: Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
Tipo: Relatório
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.43%
We examine the role of seller bidding and reserve prices in an infinitely repeated independent-private-value (IPV) ascending-price auction. The seller has a single object that she values at zero. At the end of any auction round, she may either sell to the highest bidder or pass-in the object and hold a new auction next period. New bidders are drawn randomly in each round. The ability to re-auction motivates a notion of reserve price as the option value of retaining the object for re-auctioning. Even in the absence of a mechanism with which to commit to a reserve price, the optimal “secret” reserve is shown to exceed zero. However, despite the infinite repetition, there may be significant value to the seller from a binding reserve price commitment: the optimal binding reserve is higher than the optimal “secret” reserve, and may be substantially so, even with very patient players. Furthermore, reserve price commitments may even be socially preferable at high discount factors. We also show that the optimal “phantom” bidding strategy for the seller is revenue-equivalent to a commitment to an optimal public reserve price.

How to sell to buyers with crossholdings

Loyola, Gino
Fonte: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid Publicador: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 30/04/2007 ENG; ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.42%
This paper characterizes the optimal selling mechanism in the presence of horizontal crossholdings. We find that this mechanism imposes a discrimination policy against the stronger bidders so that the seller´s expected revenue is increasing in both the common crossholding and the degree of asymmetry in crossholdings. Furthermore, it can be implemented by a sequential procedure that includes a price-preferences scheme and the possibility of an exclusive deal with the weakest bidder. We also show that a simple sequential negotiation mechanism, although suboptimal, yields a larger seller´s expected revenue than both the first-price and the second-price auctions.

Optimal takeover contests with toeholds

Loyola, Gino
Fonte: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid Publicador: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper; info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /02/2008 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.52%
This paper characterizes how a target firm should be sold when the possible buyers (bidders) have prior stakes in its ownership (toeholds). We find that the optimal mechanism needs to be implemented by a non-standard auction which imposes a bias against bidders with high toeholds. This discriminatory procedure is such that the target´s average sale price is increasing in both the size of the common toehold and the degree of asymmetry in these stakes. It is also shown that a simple mechanism of sequential negotiation replicates the main properties of the optimal procedure and yields a higher average selling price than the standard auctions commonly used in takeover battles.

Auctions with asymmetric common-values: the first-price format

Frutos, María Ángeles de; Jarque, X.
Fonte: Elsevier Publicador: Elsevier
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion; info:eu-repo/semantics/article Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 08/04/2007 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.58%
We study the performance of the first-price format in auctions with asymmetric common-values. We show that, contrary to the result for second-price auctions, a small advantage for one player translates only to small changes in bidders’ strategies, and the equilibrium remains close to the first-price equilibrium of the original game. We characterize the equilibrium bidding strategies and their behavior as the degree of asymmetry increases. Finally, we compare the revenues at the optimal auction, the first-price auction and the second-price auction.

Information disclosure in optimal auctions

Ganuza, Juan-José; Penalva, José
Fonte: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid Publicador: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/draft; info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
Publicado em /03/2014 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.36%
A celebrated result in auction theory is that the optimal reserve price in the standard private value setting does not depend on the number of bidders. We modify the framework by considering that the seller controls the accuracy with which bidders learn their valuations, and show that in such a case, the greater the number of bidders the more restrictive the reserve price. We also show that the auctioneer provides more information when using an optimal auction mechanism than when the object is always sold.; Juan-José Ganuza gratefully acknowledges the support of the Barcelona GSE Research, the government of Catalonia, and the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science Through Project ECO 2011-28965. Jose Penalva acknowledges the support of the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science Through Project ECO 2012-36559.

Auctions with heterogeneous entry costs

Moreno, Diego; Wooders, John
Fonte: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid Publicador: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper; info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /01/2006 ENG; ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.52%
We study the impact of public and secret reserve prices in auctions where buyers have independent private values and heterogeneous entry costs. We find that in a standard auction the optimal (i.e., revenue maximizing) public reserve price is typically above the seller's value. Moreover, an appropriate entry fee together with a public reserve price equal to the seller's value generates greater revenue. Secret reserve prices, however, differ across auction formats. In a second-price sealed-bid auction the secret reserve price is above the optimal public reserve price; hence there is less entry, a smaller probability of sale, and both the seller revenue and the bidders' utility are less than with an optimal public reserve price. In contrast, in a first-price sealed-bid auction the secret reserve is equal to the seller's value, and the bidders' expected utility (seller revenue) is greater (less) than with an optimal public reserve price.

Essays in Structural Econometrics of Auctions

Bulbul Toklu, Seda
Fonte: Universidade Rice Publicador: Universidade Rice
Tipo: Thesis; Text Formato: application/pdf
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.65%
The first chapter of this thesis gives a detailed picture of commonly used structural estimation techniques for several types of auction models. Next chapters consist of essays in which these techniques are utilized for empirical analysis of auction environments. In the second chapter we discuss the identification and estimation of the distribution of private signals in a common value auction model with an asymmetric information environment. We argue that the private information of the informed bidders are identifiable due to the asymmetric information structure. Then, we propose a two stage estimation method, which follows the identification strategy. We show, with Monte-Carlo experiments, that the estimator performs well. Third chapter studies Outer Continental Shelf drainage auctions, where oil and gas extraction leases are sold. Informational asymmetry across bidders and collusive behavior of informed firms make this environment very unique. We apply the technique proposed in the second chapter to data from the OCS drainage auctions. We estimate the parameters of a structural model and then run counterfactual simulations to see the effects of the informational asymmetry on the government's auction revenue. We find that the probability that information symmetry brings higher revenue to the government increases with the value of the auctioned tract. In the fourth chapter...

Court Auctions : Effective Processes and Enforcement Agents

Gramckow, Heike
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Working Paper; Publications & Research
ENGLISH; EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.42%
This paper considers the historical origins and efficacy of enforcement of civil court judgments, with a special focus on court auctions. It reviews the procedural and practical options available to courts and associated agencies for the identification of assets that may be used to satisfy a judgment debt and the processes for court-supervised asset seizure and sale by public auction. The efficiencies of public court auction processes are considered, including the elements of enforcement systems that can produce sub-optimal returns on sold assets and higher incentives for corrupt practices. Also considered is the trend in some systems for greater use of private agents as a means by which the cost of court enforcement processes can be reduced and for overcoming sometimes lengthy delays in enforcement. The paper concludes by identifying alternatives to public auction that in some cases can offer better prospects of assuring full payment of a judgment debt.

Three Essays in Auctions and Contests

Zhang, JUN
Fonte: Quens University Publicador: Quens University
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
EN; EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.56%
This thesis studies issues in auctions and contests. The seller of an object and the organizer of a contest have many instruments to improve the revenue of the auction or the efficiency of the contest. The three essays in this dissertation shed light on these issues. Chapter 2 investigates how a refund policy affects a buyer's strategic behavior by characterizing the equilibria of a second-price auction with a linear refund policy. I find that a generous refund policy induces buyers to bid aggressively. I also examine the optimal mechanism design problem when buyers only have private initial estimates of their valuations and may privately learn of shocks that affect their valuations later. When all buyers are \emph{ex-ante} symmetric, this optimal selling mechanism can be implemented by a first-price or second-price auction with a refund policy. Chapter 3 investigates how information revelation rules affect the existence and the efficiency of equilibria in two-round elimination contests. I establish that there exists no symmetric separating equilibrium under the full revelation rule and find that the non-existence result is very robust. I then characterize a partially efficient separating equilibrium under the partial revelation rule when players' valuations are uniformly distributed. I finally investigate the no revelation rule and find that it is both most efficient and optimal in maximizing the total efforts from the contestants. Within my framework...

Optimal Bidding in Online Auctions

Bertsimas, Dimitris J.; Hawkins, Jeff; Perakis, Georgia
Fonte: MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology Publicador: MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: 508996 bytes; application/pdf
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.73%
Online auctions are arguably one of the most important and distinctly new applications of the internet. The predominant player in online auctions, eBay, has over 18.9 milllion users, and it was the host of over $5 billion worth of goods sold in the year 2000. Using methods from approximate dynamic programming and integer programming, we design algorithms for optimally bidding for a single item online auction, and simultaneous or overlapping multiple online auctions. We report computational evidence using data from eBay's web site from 1772 completed auctions for personal digital assistants and from 4208 completed auctions for stamp collections that show that (a) the optimal dynamic strategy outperforms simple but widely used static heuristic rules for a single auction, and (b) a new approach combining the value functions of single auctions found by dynamic programming using an integer programming framework produces high quality solutions fast and reliably.; Singapore-MIT Alliance (SMA)

Forward-looking bidders in sequential auctions

Zeithammer, Robert, 1975-
Fonte: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Publicador: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: 97 leaves; 4273697 bytes; 4273505 bytes; application/pdf; application/pdf
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.46%
At Internet auction sites like eBay, similar goods are often sold in a sequence of auctions. Buyers can therefore benefit from forward-looking bidding strategies that take into account the available information about future auctions. This dissertation develops a model of such bidding, provides both experimental and econometric evidence of the model's relevance to behavior, and explores the impact of forward-looking bidding on the seller's optimal selling strategy as well as on the overall market equilibrium. Extending prior sequential-auction theories, the proposed model assumes that bidders know their private valuations of objects auctioned in the near future. Rational bidders "bargain-hunt" in that they bid less than they would otherwise, and early bids decrease with the private values of later objects. The model's predictions are tested in two laboratory experiments, both involving a sequence of two auctions. Both experiments show that first-auction bids decrease with the private values of the future object, but the second experiment suggests that the average decrease is smaller than predicted by the theory. An econometric analysis of eBay data finds that buyers seem to look ahead, and on average adjust their bids down as a function of their private preferences for the objects sold in the near future. They also bid less when the same item they are bidding on is available within the next few auctions. To explore the supply-side of a sequential auction marketplace...

Optimal Takeover Contests with Toeholds

Loyola, Gino
Fonte: Universidade do Chile Publicador: Universidade do Chile
Tipo: Artículo de revista
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.4%
This paper characterizes how a target rm should be sold when raiders have prior stakes in its ownership (toeholds). We nd that the optimal mechanism needs to be implemented by a non-standard auction which imposes a bias against buyers with high toeholds. This discriminatory procedure is so that the target s average sale price is increasing in both the size of the common toehold and the asymmetry in these stakes. Furthermore, a simple negotiation-based mechanism replicates the main properties of the optimal procedure and outperforms, in terms of average selling price, the standard auctions commonly used in takeover battles.

Optimal Auctions via the Multiplicative Weight Method

Bhalgat, Anand; Gollapudi, Sreenivas; Munagala, Kamesh
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.71%
We show that the multiplicative weight update method provides a simple recipe for designing and analyzing optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) auctions, and reduces the time complexity of the problem to pseudo-polynomial in parameters that depend on single agent instead of depending on the size of the joint type space. We use this framework to design computationally efficient optimal auctions that satisfy ex-post Individual Rationality in the presence of constraints such as (hard, private) budgets and envy-freeness. We also design optimal auctions when buyers and a seller's utility functions are non-linear. Scenarios with such functions include (a) auctions with "quitting rights", (b) cost to borrow money beyond budget, (c) a seller's and buyers' risk aversion. Finally, we show how our framework also yields optimal auctions for variety of auction settings considered in Cai et al, Alaei et al, albeit with pseudo-polynomial running times.

The Pseudo-Dimension of Near-Optimal Auctions

Morgenstern, Jamie; Roughgarden, Tim
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 11/06/2015
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.69%
This paper develops a general approach, rooted in statistical learning theory, to learning an approximately revenue-maximizing auction from data. We introduce $t$-level auctions to interpolate between simple auctions, such as welfare maximization with reserve prices, and optimal auctions, thereby balancing the competing demands of expressivity and simplicity. We prove that such auctions have small representation error, in the sense that for every product distribution $F$ over bidders' valuations, there exists a $t$-level auction with small $t$ and expected revenue close to optimal. We show that the set of $t$-level auctions has modest pseudo-dimension (for polynomial $t$) and therefore leads to small learning error. One consequence of our results is that, in arbitrary single-parameter settings, one can learn a mechanism with expected revenue arbitrarily close to optimal from a polynomial number of samples.

Efficiency Loss in Revenue Optimal Auctions

Abhishek, Vineet; Hajek, Bruce
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.49%
We study efficiency loss in Bayesian revenue optimal auctions. We quantify this as the worst case ratio of loss in the realized social welfare to the social welfare that can be realized by an efficient auction. Our focus is on auctions with single-parameter buyers and where buyers' valuation sets are finite. For binary valued single-parameter buyers with independent (not necessarily identically distributed) private valuations, we show that the worst case efficiency loss ratio (ELR) is no worse than it is with only one buyer; moreover, it is at most 1/2. Moving beyond the case of binary valuations but restricting to single item auctions, where buyers' private valuations are independent and identically distributed, we obtain bounds on the worst case ELR as a function of number of buyers, cardinality of buyers' valuation set, and ratio of maximum to minimum possible values that buyers can have for the item.; Comment: 25 pages and 1 figure. A short version of this will appear in the 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2010

Polyhedral Clinching Auctions and the Adwords Polytope

Goel, Gagan; Mirrokni, Vahab; Leme, Renato Paes
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.46%
A central issue in applying auction theory in practice is the problem of dealing with budget-constrained agents. A desirable goal in practice is to design incentive compatible, individually rational, and Pareto optimal auctions while respecting the budget constraints. Achieving this goal is particularly challenging in the presence of nontrivial combinatorial constraints over the set of feasible allocations. Toward this goal and motivated by AdWords auctions, we present an auction for {\em polymatroidal} environments satisfying the above properties. Our auction employs a novel clinching technique with a clean geometric description and only needs an oracle access to the submodular function defining the polymatroid. As a result, this auction not only simplifies and generalizes all previous results, it applies to several new applications including AdWords Auctions, bandwidth markets, and video on demand. In particular, our characterization of the AdWords auction as polymatroidal constraints might be of independent interest. This allows us to design the first mechanism for Ad Auctions taking into account simultaneously budgets, multiple keywords and multiple slots. We show that it is impossible to extend this result to generic polyhedral constraints. This also implies an impossibility result for multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginal utilities in the presence of budget constraints.; Comment: Accepted to STOC'12

The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions

Alaei, Saeed; Fu, Hu; Haghpanah, Nima; Hartline, Jason
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.47%
The intuition that profit is optimized by maximizing marginal revenue is a guiding principle in microeconomics. In the classical auction theory for agents with linear utility and single-dimensional preferences, Bulow and Roberts (1989) show that the optimal auction of Myerson (1981) is in fact optimizing marginal revenue. In particular Myerson's virtual values are exactly the derivative of an appropriate revenue curve. This paper considers mechanism design in environments where the agents have multi-dimensional and non-linear preferences. Understanding good auctions for these environments is considered to be the main challenge in Bayesian optimal mechanism design. In these environments maximizing marginal revenue may not be optimal and there is sometimes no direct way to implement the marginal revenue maximization. Our contributions are three fold: we characterize the settings for which marginal revenue maximization is optimal (by identifying an important condition that we call revenue linearity), we give simple procedures for implementing marginal revenue maximization in general, and we show that marginal revenue maximization is approximately optimal. Our approximation factor smoothly degrades in a term that quantifies how far the environment is from ideal (where marginal revenue maximization is optimal). Because the marginal revenue mechanism is optimal for single-dimensional agents...

Use of Long-term Auctions for Network Investment

McDaniel, Tanga; Neuhoff, Karsten
Fonte: Universidade de Cambridge Publicador: Universidade de Cambridge
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: 673824 bytes; application/pdf; application/pdf
EN_GB
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.42%
Short-term auctions for access to entry terminals of the British gas-network appear to successfully allocate scarce resources and capture scarcity rent. Now long-term auctions are being introduced to guide future capacity expansion decisions. In our model the fraction of rights issued in the long-term auction turns out to be a crucial design parameter. Even a `hypothetically` optimal parameter choice can in general only satisfy one of three aims: Unbiased provision of capacity, full revelation of private information and minimisation of distortions from network effects. The results suggest that long-term auctions for transmission capacity are not necessarily preferable to regulatory approved capacity expansion.

Auctions, Equilibria, and Budgets

Bhattacharya, Sayan
Fonte: Universidade Duke Publicador: Universidade Duke
Tipo: Dissertação
Publicado em //2012
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.42%

We design algorithms for markets consisting of multiple items, and agents with budget constraints on the maximum amount of money they can afford to spend. This problem can be considered under two broad frameworks. (a) From the standpoint of Auction Theory, the agents valuation functions over the items are private knowledge. Here, a "truthful auction" computes the subset of items received by every agent and her payment, and ensures that no agent can manipulate the scheme to her advantage by misreporting her valuation function. The question is to design a truthful auction whose outcome can be computed in polynomial time. (b) A different, but equally

important, question is to investigate if and when the market is in "equilibrium",

meaning that every item is assigned a price, every agent gets her utility-maximizing subset of items under the current prices, and every unallocated item is priced at zero.

First, we consider the setting of multiple heterogeneous items and present approximation algorithms for revenue-optimal truthful auctions. When the items are homogeneous, we give an efficient algorithm whose outcome defines a truthful and Pareto-optimal auction. Finally, we focus on the notion of "competitive equilibrium"...

Auctions with endogenous participation

Menezes, Flavio; Monteiro, Paulo K
Fonte: Elsevier Publicador: Elsevier
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.74%
We study endogenous-participation auctions where bidders only know the number of potential participants. After seeing their values for the object, potential participants decide whether or not to enter the auction. They may not want to enter the auction since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize equilibrium bidding strategies and entry decisions for both first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions when participation is endogenous. We show that there is a pure strategy entry equilibrium where only bidders with values greater than a certain cut-off point actually bid. In this context, both types of auctions generate the same expected revenue. We also show that, contrary to the predictions of the fixed number of bidders literature, the seller's expected revenue may decrease when the number of potential participants increases. In addition, we show that it is optimal for the seller to charge an entry fee, which contrasts with results from the existing literature on auctions with entry. As in the fixed-n literature, we show that first-price auctions generate more expected revenue than second-price auctions when buyers are risk-averse. Finally, we characterize the optimal auction -the auction that maximizes the seller's expected revenue -by using a direct revelation mechanism. The optimal auction involves a reserve price larger than the optimal reserve price in the fixed-n literature. The winner's payment is the second highest bid less the participation cost and losers receive a subsidy equal to the participation cost.