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Seleção de fornecedores de serviço de transporte utilizando leilão combinatório de compras: adaptação e aplicação do algoritmo Iterative Deepening Search A* (IDA*).; Supplier selection of transportation services using reverse combinatorial auction: adaptation and aplication of Iterative Deepening Search A* (IDA*).

Higuita Salazar, Catalina
Fonte: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP Publicador: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
Tipo: Dissertação de Mestrado Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 15/12/2011 PT
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.34%
A seleção de fornecedores de transporte é um desafio cada vez maior. O crescimento da rede de clientes a ser coberta demanda uma alocação eficiente em termos de custo não suprida por mecanismos tradicionais de negociação. Neste âmbito, o leilão combinatório torna-se uma alternativa de negociação ao permitir capturar sinergias entre os trajetos que devem ser atendidos. Em conseqüência disso, diminui-se o custo de transporte do fornecedor que se reflete nos menores preços de suas propostas e finalmente no custo total de compra do serviço. Por outro lado, esta decisão envolve fatores além do custo total; a mensuração destes torna-se importante para identificar fornecedores que melhor se ajustam aos requerimentos do comprador. No entanto, é fundamental escolher um método adequado para sua avaliação porque este influência a decisão final. Este problema de compra de serviços de transporte é conhecido na literatura como Winner Determination Problem (WDP) que, devido a sua complexidade, possui uma resolução limitada. Após revisão teórica, foi observado que os estudos relacionados à área de transporte focalizavam o desenvolvimento de modelos matemáticos que fossem representativos da realidade. Alguns destes modelos abordam a utilização de múltiplos critérios atribuindo um coeficiente que pondera cada critério. Evidenciou-se a necessidade do desenvolvimento de um algoritmo alternativo que além de facilitar sinergias entre trajetos...

Representando o vendedor e a sociedade : mecanismos com dois critérios para leilões combinatórios com demandas unitárias; On Behalf the Seller and Society: a bicriteria mechanism for unit demand combinatorial auctions

Laber, Eduardo Sany
Fonte: Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV Publicador: Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento
EN_US
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46.03%
This work focuses on obtaining truthful mechanisms that aim at maximizing both the revenue and the economic efficiency (social welfare) for the unitdemand combinatorial auction problem (UDCAP), in which a set of k items is auctioned to a set of n consumers. Although each consumer bids on all items, no consumer can purchase more than one item in the UDCAP. We present a framework for devising poly-time randomized competitive truthful mechanisms that can be used to either favor economic efficiency or revenue.

A Combinatorial Auction for Collaborative Planning

Hunsberger, Luke; Grosz, Barbara
Fonte: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Publicador: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
EN_US
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When rational, utility-maximizing agents encounter an opportunity to collaborate on a group activity they must determine whether to commit to that activity. We refer to this problem as the initial-commitment decision problem (ICDP). The paper describes a mechanism that agents may use to solve the ICDP. The mechanism is based on a combinatorial auction in which agents bid on sets of roles in the group activity, each role comprising constituent subtasks that must be done by the same agent. Each bid may specify constraints on the execution times of the subtasks it covers. This mechanism permits agents to keep most details of their individual schedules of prior commitments private. The paper reports the results of several experiments testing the performance of the mechanism. These results demonstrate a significant improvement in performance when constituent subtasks are grouped into roles. They also show that as the number of time constraints in bids increases, the probability that there is a solution decreases, the cost of an optimal solution (if one exists) increases, and the time required to find an optimal solution (if one exists) decreases. The paper also describes several strategies that agents might employ when using this mechanism.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

Transportation service procurement using combinatorial auctions

Chen, XiaoPing, 1971-
Fonte: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Publicador: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: 40 leaves; 1709252 bytes; 1711568 bytes; application/pdf; application/pdf
EN_US
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Auction is a mechanism of selling distinct assets that can be both physical objects and virtual objects. Examples of virtual objects are the rights to use assets like airport time slots and FCC spectrum, or to service truckload delivery routes in a transportation network. Under some situations bidding on combinations of objects can render lower total price compare with bidding the objects one at a time, and the auction that allows bidders to bid on combinations of different assets are called combinatorial auctions. With shipper being the auctioneer and carriers being the bidders, combinatorial auction has become increasingly important in the transportation service procurement domain, due to its mechanism to align shipper s procurement interest with carrier transportation service cost structure, which in turn lowers shippers total procurement cost. The thesis provides a comprehensive review of the use of conditional bidding within a transportation combinatorial auction framework. The thesis first describes the general forms of the transportation services available, and discusses the economics of motor carriers that provide LTL and TL services. It then illustrates the basic optimization technique of conditional bidding for TL service procurement and discusses the information technologies that enable the optimization-based procurement and the actual application of the method in the real world.; by XiaoPing Chen.; Thesis (M. Eng. in Logistics)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology...

Estratégias de participação em leilões combinatoriais aplicadas em um problema de transporte de derivados de petróleo

Vieira, Kely Plucinski
Fonte: Curitiba Publicador: Curitiba
Tipo: Dissertação de Mestrado
POR
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.39%
Recent researches have shown that approaches based on multi-agent systems (MAS) and market mechanisms like auctions are efficient on the resolution of planning problems in supply chains. This work uses the combinatorial auction-based MAS paradigm and participation strategies in auctions for solving the problem of transporting oil derivatives of PETROBRAS - Petroleo Brasileiro S/A, called Simplified Problem of Transporting Oil Derivatives (SPTOD), which is characterized as a planning problem in supply chains. In combinatorial auctions, the winner determination is a NP-Complete problem without approximation algorithms, whose computational cost increases with the number of bids received by the auctioneer. In this context, this work aims at enlarging the scope of application of combinatorial-auction mechanisms in planning problems by using a heuristic strategy for participation in auctions, besides serving as a support tool for decision-making process by specialists of industrial oil. The results were drawn from several scenarios where the MAS was used with the proposed strategy (global evaluation of needs) and with other strategies for comparison (general – all possible auctions – and greedy – only one auction). The results show that the use of the proposed strategy reduces the processing time when compared to the general strategy and that the quality of the solution is preserved in comparison with the general and greedy strategies. Other contributions of this work are the development of a MAS to realize the planning of transporting oil derivatives between producing and consuming basis having as negotiation model the combinatorial auction-based mechanism and a proposition of a decentralized model where several combinatorial auctions can be run simultaneously.; Pesquisas recentes mostram que abordagens baseadas em sistemas multiagentes (SMA) e mecanismos de mercado como leilões são eficazes para encontrar soluções factíveis para problemas de planejamento em cadeias de suprimento. Esta dissertação aborda a utilização do paradigma de SMA baseado em Leilões Combinatoriais e o uso de estratégias de participação em leilões na resolução do problema de transporte de derivados de petróleo em uma rede multimodal da PETROBRAS – Petróleo Brasileiro S/A...

Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms

Iwasaki, A.; Conitzer, V.; Omori, Y.; Sakurai, Y.; Todo, T.; Guo, M.; Yokoo, M.
Fonte: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; USA Publicador: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; USA
Tipo: Conference paper
Publicado em //2010 EN
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56.32%
This paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. False-name-proofness generalizes strategy-proofness by assuming that a bidder can submit multiple bids under fictitious identifiers. Even the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is not false-name-proof. It has previously been shown that there is no false-name-proof mechanism that always achieves a Pareto efficient allocation. Consequently, if false-name bids are possible, we need to sacrifice efficiency to some extent. This leaves the natural question of how much surplus must be sacrificed. To answer this question, this paper focuses on worst-case analysis. Specifically, we consider the fraction of the Pareto efficient surplus that we obtain and try to maximize this fraction in the worst-case, under the constraint of false-name-proofness. As far as we are aware, this is the first attempt to examine the worst-case efficiency of false-name-proof mechanisms. We show that the worst-case efficiency ratio of any false-name-proof mechanism that satisfies some apparently minor assumptions is at most 2/(m + 1) for auctions with m different goods. We also observe that the worst-case efficiency ratio of existing false-name-proof mechanisms is generally 1/m or 0. Finally...

Integrating monetary and non-monetary reenlistment incentives utilizing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM)

Zimmerman, Brooke Maura
Fonte: Monterey California. Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey California. Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.31%
This research addressed the potential retention and cost impacts of providing an optimal individualized portfolio of non-monetary and monetary incentives to influence reenlistment and retention behavior in enlisted Sailors by exploring three mechanisms for administrating enlisted retention: a purely monetary auction, a Universal Incentive Package (UIP) auction, and the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM). The mechanisms were simulated, their outcomes compared and their respective strengths and weaknesses were explored. CRAM clearly outperformed the monetary and UIP auctions. Cost savings to the Navy ranged from 25 to 80% over monetary incentives alone. Additionally, this research addressed the force-diversifying potential of CRAM. It was shown, for the sample used, that offering certain non-monetary incentives changed the demographic mix of Sailors retained. By allowing Sailors to choose only those benefits, which suit them, the Navy can eliminate the waste associated with unwanted benefits while at the same time empowering its members.

Applying the combinatorial retention auction mechanism (CRAM) to a cost-benefit analysis of the post 9/11 era GI Bill transferability benefit

Lay, Richard H.
Fonte: Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
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46.31%
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited; This research determined the costs, benefits and efficiency of the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill Transferability benefit by simulating four different retention mechanisms and comparing the cost of each to provide desired retention levels among a population of sailors who valued the Transferability benefit more than or less than the Cost of the mechanisms investigated were a purely monetary auction, a Universal Incentive Package (UIP) Auction, and the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM). All three mechanisms were simulated, data were analyzed and results were compared. The CRAM clearly showed it was the most efficient method for meeting retention objectives while constraining Costs to the Navy as much as possible. Cost savings to the Navy ranged from 27% to 51% over Cash Only Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRB). Furthermore, this report confirms that an across-the-board benefit such as GI Bill Transferability significantly reduces the positive surplus when sailors who have a Value of Transferability less than the Cost of Transferability nonetheless exploit this benefit. Maintaining the status quo SRB policy combined with the estimated negative retention effects of the GI Bill Transferability benefit only magnifies the cost ineffectiveness of the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill.

Variability of valuation of non-monetary incentives motivating and implementing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism

Ellis, Jason Blake
Fonte: Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.19%
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited; This thesis explores the concept of preference variability relative to non-monetary and monetary incentives in the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM). CRAM offers a mix of monetary and non-monetary incentives to encourage retention behavior. Recent research demonstrated the utility of non-monetary incentives as part of a military retention program. While CRAM was shown to cost effectively motivate retention, variability in valuation of non-monetary incentives as part of CRAM introduces complexity in eliciting preferences to implement the model. Making certain complexity decreasing assumptions regarding the personal valuation of incentives potentially affects the model cost and retention outcomes. These assumptions could potentially increase costs and retain the "wrong" sailors. This thesis examines an operational version of the CRAM, which assumes additive personal preferences across combinations of nonmonetary incentives to decrease complexity of the model. The outcomes of this "simplified" model are compared to the "more complex" previous research findings. The simplified CRAM model continues to produce cost saving, with no significant changes to the mix of personnel retained. Overall...

Integrating monetary and non-monetary retention incentives for the U.S. Navy Dental Corps officers utilizing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM)

Kumar, Sandeep
Fonte: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.31%
This research focused on the Navy Dental Corps community because of the retention challenges encountered, especially at the senior Lieutenant and Lieutenant Commander Ranks. The Dental Corps has retention goals by accession cohort and specialty mix to support the correct number of specialty trained officers to meet billet requirements in support of Navy and Marine Corps Dental Readiness. The requirement is to retain a healthy number of Dental Officers by specialty and pay grade to meet both clinical needs, and maintain senior leadership capability in the future. This research used the Universal Incentive Package (UIP) auction and Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) to identify the cost savings opportunities for the Navy, while retaining the optimal number of Dental Corps officers. Additionally, this research summarized the importance of creating a balance between monetary and non-monetary incentives. The Oracle Crystal Ball Monte Carlo simulation indicated that CRAM outperformed monetary only and universal auction mechanisms with an average savings between 24 and 30 percent. This research concluded that 61 percent retention level could be achieved by offering CRAM with an average savings of 24 percent over monetary only and UIP. The research concludes that CRAM provides an opportunity to individualize benefits that are not only valued by Dental Corps officers...

The combinatorial retention auction mechanism (CRAM): integrating monetary and non-monetary reenlistment incentives

Coughlan, Peter J.; Gates, William R.; Zimmerman, Brooke M.
Fonte: Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Relatório
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.4%
This research addresses the potential retention and cost impacts of providing an optimal individualized portfolio of non-monetary and monetary incentives to influence reenlistment and retention behavioral in enlisted Sailors. Specifically, it explores three mechanisms for administrating enlisted retention: a purely monetary auction, a Universal Incentive Package (UIP) auction, and the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM). In this text, the mechanisms are simulated, their outcomes compared and their respective strengths and weaknesses explored. The findings of this research confirm that CRAM clearly outperformed the monetary and UIP auctions. Cost savings to the Navy reanged from 25 to 80% over monetary incentives alone. Additionally, this research addresses the force-diversfying potential of CRAM. It is shown, for the sample used, that offering certain non-monetary incetives changed the demographic mix of Sailors retained. By allowing Sailors to choose only those benefits which suit them, the Navy can eliminate the waste associated with unwanted benefits, while at the same time empowering its members.

The Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM)

Coughlan, Peter; Gates, William; Myung, Noah
Fonte: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Relatório
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.43%
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.; Revised version; We propose a reverse uniform price auction called Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) that integrates both monetary and non-monetary incentives (NMIs). CRAM computes the cash bonus and NMIs to a single cost parameter, retains the lowest cost employees and provides them with compensation equal to the cost of the first excluded employee. CRAM is dominant strategy incentive compatible. We provide optimal bidding strategy, and show that there is cost saving compared to a benchmark auction (monetary retention auction). Because CRAM and the benchmark may retain different employees, we provide for whom and under what conditions the utility may increase or decrease by CRAM. Finally, we show that there is an increase in the total social welfare by utilizing CRAM to the benchmark.

Analysis of bidding behaviors in non-monetary incentivized, real-time uniform auctions

Tiley, Joshua H.
Fonte: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Formato: xvi, 73 p. : ill.; 28 cm.
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MBA Professional Report; The Navy continually fights economic surge and recession, budget constraints, and natural personnel turnover to maintain personnel levels at desired "end-strength." Forecasting retention bonus levels based on these socio-economic factors is extremely difficult. Current forecasting techniques are less precise than retention auctions because auctions provide the market clearing price to retain the desired end strength. This research examines bidding strategies adopted within a retention auction incorporating monetary and non-monetary retention incentives in a competitive bidding environment. This research compared user inputs across several subjects and determined which subjects to retain. Previous experiments compared participants' bids to computer simulated "optimal" bids; it was hard to say how or if bidding strategies would change if competing with other live players. There are two issues when dealing with optimal bidding strategies. The first is correct choosing non-monetary incentives. We found that 70% of these choices were made correctly. The second involves the salary requested after choosing non-monetary incentives. The salary requests were above the optimal bids. Coupled with the fact that non-monetary incentives were generally chosen correctly...

Knowledge Benchmarks in Adversarial Mechanism Design and Implementation in Surviving Strategies (Part I)

Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio
Fonte: MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology Publicador: MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Formato: 17 p.
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36.25%
We put forward new benchmarks and solution concepts for Adversarial Mechanism Design, as defined by [MV07.a], and we exemplify them in the case of truly combinatorial auctions.We benchmark the combined performance (the sum of the auction's efficiency and revenue) of a truly combinatorial auction against a very relevant but private knowledge of the players: essentially, the maximum revenue that the best informed player could guarantee if he were the seller. (I.e., by offering each other player a subset of the goods for a take-it-or-leave-it price.)We achieve this natural benchmark within a factor of 2, by means of a new and probabilistic auction mechanism, in surviving strategies. That is, the above performance of our mechanism is guaranteed in any rational play, independent of any possible beliefs of the players. Indeed, our performance guarantee holds for any possible choice of strategies, so long as each player chooses a strategy among those surviving iterated elimination of dominated strategies.Our mechanism is extremely robust. Namely, its performance guarantees hold even if all but one of the players collude (together or in separate groups) in any possible but reasonable way. Essentially, the only restriction for the collective utility function of a collusive subset S of the players is the following: the collective utility increases when one member of S is allocated a ubset of the goods "individually better" for him and/or his "individual price" is smaller...

Measuring the Performance of Large-Scale Combinatorial Auctions: A Structural Estimation Approach

Olivares Acuña, Marcelo Osvaldo; Weintraub, Gabriel Y.; Kim, Sang Won
Fonte: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) Publicador: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Tipo: Artículo de revista
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
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Artículo de publicación ISI; The main advantage of a procurement combinatorial auction (CA) is that it allows suppliers to express cost synergies through package bids. However, bidders can also strategically take advantage of this flexibility, by discounting package bids and “inflating” bid prices for single items, even in the absence of cost synergies; the latter behavior can hurt the performance of the auction. It is an empirical question whether allowing package bids and running a CA improves performance in a given setting. In this paper, we develop a structural estimation approach that estimates the firms’ cost structure using bidding data and use these estimates to evaluate the performance of the auction. To overcome the computational difficulties arising from the large number of bids observed in large-scale CAs, we propose a novel simplified model of bidders’ behavior based on pricing package characteristics. We apply our method to the Chilean school meals auction, in which the government procures half a billion dollars’ worth of meal services every year and bidders submit thousands of package bids. Our estimates suggest that bidders’ cost synergies are economically significant in this application ( 5%)...

Efficiency Resource Allocation for Device-to-Device Underlay Communication Systems: A Reverse Iterative Combinatorial Auction Based Approach

Xu, Chen; Song, Lingyang; Han, Zhu; Zhao, Qun; Wang, Xiaoli; Cheng, Xiang; Jiao, Bingli
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 09/11/2012
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.38%
Peer-to-peer communication has been recently considered as a popular issue for local area services. An innovative resource allocation scheme is proposed to improve the performance of mobile peer-to-peer, i.e., device-to-device (D2D), communications as an underlay in the downlink (DL) cellular networks. To optimize the system sum rate over the resource sharing of both D2D and cellular modes, we introduce a reverse iterative combinatorial auction as the allocation mechanism. In the auction, all the spectrum resources are considered as a set of resource units, which as bidders compete to obtain business while the packages of the D2D pairs are auctioned off as goods in each auction round. We first formulate the valuation of each resource unit, as a basis of the proposed auction. And then a detailed non-monotonic descending price auction algorithm is explained depending on the utility function that accounts for the channel gain from D2D and the costs for the system. Further, we prove that the proposed auction-based scheme is cheat-proof, and converges in a finite number of iteration rounds. We explain non-monotonicity in the price update process and show lower complexity compared to a traditional combinatorial allocation. The simulation results demonstrate that the algorithm efficiently leads to a good performance on the system sum rate.; Comment: 26 pages...

Beyond Equilibria: Mechanisms for Repeated Combinatorial Auctions

Lucier, Brendan
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 30/09/2009
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.37%
We study the design of mechanisms in combinatorial auction domains. We focus on settings where the auction is repeated, motivated by auctions for licenses or advertising space. We consider models of agent behaviour in which they either apply common learning techniques to minimize the regret of their bidding strategies, or apply short-sighted best-response strategies. We ask: when can a black-box approximation algorithm for the base auction problem be converted into a mechanism that approximately preserves the original algorithm's approximation factor on average over many iterations? We present a general reduction for a broad class of algorithms when agents minimize external regret. We also present a new mechanism for the combinatorial auction problem that attains an $O(\sqrt{m})$ approximation on average when agents apply best-response dynamics.; Comment: 16 pages, 0 figures

Virtualization of 5G Cellular Networks as a Hierarchical Combinatorial Auction

Zhu, Kun; Hossain, Ekram
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 25/11/2015
Relevância na Pesquisa
56.19%
Virtualization has been seen as one of the main evolution trends in the forthcoming fifth generation (5G) cellular networks which enables the decoupling of infrastructure from the services it provides. In this case, the roles of infrastructure providers (InPs) and mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) can be logically separated and the resources (e.g., subchannels, power, and antennas) of a base station owned by an InP can be transparently shared by multiple MVNOs, while each MVNO virtually owns the entire BS. Naturally, the issue of resource allocation arises. In particular, the InP is required to abstract the physical resources into isolated slices for each MVNO who then allocates the resources within the slice to its subscribed users. In this paper, we aim to address this two-level hierarchical resource allocation problem while satisfying the requirements of efficient resource allocation, strict inter-slice isolation, and the ability of intra-slice customization. To this end, we design a hierarchical combinatorial auction mechanism, based on which a truthful and sub-efficient resource allocation framework is provided. Specifically, winner determination problems (WDPs) are formulated for the InP and MVNOs, and computationally tractable algorithms are proposed to solve these WDPs. Also...

Combinatorial Auction-Based Pricing for Multi-tenant Autonomous Vehicle Public Transportation System

Lam, Albert Y. S.
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.27%
A smart city provides its people with high standard of living through advanced technologies and transport is one of the major foci. With the advent of autonomous vehicles (AVs), an AV-based public transportation system has been proposed recently, which is capable of providing new forms of transportation services with high efficiency, high flexibility, and low cost. For the benefit of passengers, multitenancy can increase market competition leading to lower service charge and higher quality of service. In this paper, we study the pricing issue of the multi-tenant AV public transportation system and three types of services are defined. The pricing process for each service type is modeled as a combinatorial auction, in which the service providers, as bidders, compete for offering transportation services. The winners of the auction are determined through an integer linear program. To prevent the bidders from raising their bids for higher returns, we propose a strategy-proof Vickrey-Clarke-Groves-based charging mechanism, which can maximize the social welfare, to settle the final charges for the customers. We perform extensive simulations to verify the analytical results and evaluate the performance of the charging mechanism.; Comment: 12 pages...

Hierarchical package bidding: A paper & pencil combinatorial auction

Goeree, Jacob K.; Holt, Charles A.
Fonte: Elsevier Publicador: Elsevier
Tipo: Article; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /09/2010
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.32%
We introduce a new combinatorial auction format based on a simple, transparent pricing mechanism tailored for the hierarchical package structure proposed by Rothkopf, Pekeč, and Harstad to avoid computational complexity [Rothkopf, M., Pekeč, A., Harstad, R., 1998, Computationally manageable combinatorial auctions. Manage. Sci. 44, 1131–1147]. This combination provides the feedback necessary for bidders in multi-round auctions to discern winning bidding strategies for subsequent rounds and to coordinate responses to aggressive package bids. The resulting mechanism is compared to two leading alternatives in a series of laboratory experiments involving varying degrees of value synergies. Based on these “wind tunnel” tests the FCC has decided to use hierarchical package bidding in a segment of the upcoming 700 MHz auction.