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Merger, partial collusion and relocation

Posada, Pedro; Straume, Odd Rune
Fonte: Springer Publicador: Springer
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em /12/2004 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
37.15%
We set up a three-firm model of spatial competition to analyse how a merger affects the incentives for relocation, and conversely, how the possibility of relocation affects the profitability of the merger, particularly for the non-participating firm. We also consider the cases of partial collusion in either prices or locations. Under the assumption of mill pricing, we find that a merger will generally induce the merger participants to relocate, but the direction of relocation is ambiguous, and dependent on the degree of convexity in the consumers transportation cost function. Furthermore, we identify a set of parameter values for which the free-rider effect of a merger vanishes, implying that the possibility of relocation could solve the merger paradox.

Union collusion and intra-industry trade

Straume, Odd Rune
Fonte: Elsevier B.V. Publicador: Elsevier B.V.
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em /05/2002 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
37.15%
This paper analyses the scope for collusive behaviour within the context of an international duopoly supergame in which both firms and monopoly labour unions interact strategically. We find that the presence of unions, implying an endogenisation of production costs, dramatically alters the incentives for inter-firm collusion. There are, however, strong incentives for the unions to collude, raising the wage above the equilibrium level of the one-shot game. We propose two candidates for a Nash equilibrium of the supergame, in both of which the unions collude. The main result of the paper is that the presence of unions could actually promote intra-industry trade as an equilibrium outcome of the infinitely repeated game.

Collusion and reciprocity in infinitely repeated games

Santos-Pinto, Luís
Fonte: Nova SBE Publicador: Nova SBE
Tipo: Outros
Publicado em 18/04/2007 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
37.31%
This paper extends the standard industrial organization models of repeated interaction between firms by incorporating preferences for reciprocity. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (destructive reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (constructive reciprocity). The main finding of the paper is that, for plausible perceptions of fairness, preferences for reciprocity facilitate collusion in infinitely repeated market games, that is, the critical discount rate at wish collusion can be sustained tends to be lower when firms have preferences for reciprocity than when firms are selfish. The paper also finds that the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with reciprocal firms is worse for consumers than the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with selfish firms.

Communication with Relatives and Collusion in Palliative Care: A Cross-Cultural Perspective

Chaturvedi, Santosh K.; Loiselle, Carmen G.; Chandra, Prabha S.
Fonte: Medknow Publications Publicador: Medknow Publications
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em //2009 EN
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27.51%
Handling collusion among patients and family members is one of the biggest challenges that palliative care professionals face across cultures. Communication with patients and relatives can be complex particularly in filial cultures where families play an important role in illness management and treatment decision-making. Collusion comes in different forms and intensity and is often not absolute. Some illness-related issues may be discussed with the patient, whereas others are left unspoken. Particularly in palliative care, the transition from curative to palliative treatment and discussion of death and dying are often topics involving collusion. Communication patterns may also be influenced by age, gender, age, and family role. This paper outlines different types of collusion and how collusion manifests in Indian and Western cultures. In addition, promising avenues for future research are presented.

Crime organisé et construction : un duo indissociable?

Fortin, Gabrielle
Fonte: Université de Montréal Publicador: Université de Montréal
Tipo: Thèse ou Mémoire numérique / Electronic Thesis or Dissertation
FR
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27.68%
La collusion est une pratique anticoncurrentielle qui a pour but la coopération de personnes morales afin d’atteindre un but commun tel que le profit. Cette méthode se retrouve dans le milieu de la construction notamment par la rotation de contrat, par la fixation de prix ou le débalancement de bordereaux. Bien que la collusion dans la construction soit souvent associée au crime organisé, cette étude propose l’hypothèse d’un contrôle du marché par le crime organisant et non le crime organisé. Ainsi, l’industrie de la construction serait influencée par une organisation en mouvance et en développement constant pouvant s’organiser tout en organisant d’autres noyaux. En analysant le marché de l’industrie de la construction, cette étude a pu relever qu’il était possible à l’aide d’outils quantitatifs tels que l’analyse de classification d’identifier des irrégularités au sein du marché, au fil des années. Des entrevues passées auprès d’acteurs du domaine de la construction sont venues confirmer l’hypothèse d’un contrôle du marché par le crime organisant et non le crime organisé. L’analyse qualitative se penchait ainsi sur les motivations des acteurs à entreprendre des pratiques anticoncurrentielles et sur la compréhension de l’émergence de la collusion dans la construction. La discussion identifie les opportunités criminelles...

Forward Trading and Collusion of Firms in Volatile Markets

Aichele, Markus
Fonte: Universität Tübingen Publicador: Universität Tübingen
Tipo: Aufsatz
EN
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37.15%
Commodity markets are characterized by large volumes of forward contracts as well as high volatility. They are often accused of weak competitive pressure. This article extends the existing literature by analyzing tacit collusion of firms, forward trading and volatility simultaneously. The expected collusive profit may depart from the monopoly outcome in a volatile market (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986). Introducing forward trading enables firms to gain the expected monopoly profit for a broader range of parameters. In contrast to a deterministic market (Liski an Montero, 2006), trading forward in a volatile market may lead to an expected collusive profit below the monopoly one.

Strategic profit sharing leads to collusion in Bertrand oligopolies

Ferreira, José Luis; Waddle, Roberts
Fonte: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid Publicador: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/octet-stream; application/octet-stream; application/pdf
Publicado em /10/2010 ENG
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37.15%
One simple way to endogenize the degree of cross ownership in an industry is that rms give away part of their pro ts. We show that this possibility of unilaterally giving pro ts away to the rival previous to Bertrand competition opens the door to multiple equilibria. In the symmetric duopoly with con- stant marginal costs any price between the cost and the monopolistic price can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium. Thus, tacit collusion in the one shot game can be achieved. Further, any market share can also be sustained for any equilibrium price. These results are extended to more than two rms and to asymmetric costs.

Collusion with Capacity Constraints over the Business Cycle

Fabra, Natalia
Fonte: Elsevier Publicador: Elsevier
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion; info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Publicado em /01/2006 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
37.15%
This paper investigates the effect of capacity constraints on the sustainability of collusion in markets subject to cyclical demand fluctuations. In the absence of capacity constraints, Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) [Haltiwanger, J., Harrington, J., 1991. The impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behavior. Rand Journal of Economics. 22, 89–106.] show that firms find it more difficult to collude during periods of decreasing demand. We find that this prediction can be overturned if firms' capacities are sufficiently small. Capacity constraints imply that punishment profits move procyclically, so that periods of increasing demand may lead to lower losses from cheating even if collusive profits are rising. Haltiwanger and Harrington's main prediction remains valid for sufficiently large capacities.

Collusion with Capacity Constraints over the Business Cycle

Fabra, Natalia
Fonte: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid Publicador: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em //2003 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
37.15%
This paper investigates the e®ect of capacity constraints on the sustainability of collusion in markets subject to cyclical demand °uctuations. In the absence of capacity constraints (i.e. a limiting case of our model), Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) show that ¯rms ¯nd it more di±cult to collude during periods of decreasing demand. We ¯nd that this prediction can be overturned if ¯rms' capacities are su±ciently small. Capacity constraints imply that punishment pro¯ts move procyclically, so that periods of increasing demand may lead to lower losses from cheating even if collusive pro¯ts are rising. Haltiwanger and Harrington's main prediction remains valid for su±ciently large capacities.

Does cooperation in manufacturing foster tacit collusion?

Neubecker, Leslie
Fonte: Universität Tübingen Publicador: Universität Tübingen
Tipo: ResearchPaper; info:eu-repo/semantics/other
EN
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37.31%
This paper analyzes the effect of cooperation in manufacturing on firms' inclination to collude in the market. Compared to non-cooperation in manufacturing, coordination of the investments in production yields a higher competitive profit. If firms intensify cooperation and produce in a joint plant, this profit is still higher due to lower investment costs. Since firms return to competition after a defection from the collusive agreement, a high competitive profit implies a weak punishment. Collusion is thus more difficult, the closer firms cooperate in manufacturing. Moreover, given competition or collusion in the market, joint production yields the highest profit and welfare.

Detecting Collusion in Timber Auctions : An Application to Romania

Saphores, Jean-Daniel; Vincent, Jeffrey R.; Marochko, Valy
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper; Publications & Research
ENGLISH; EN_US
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27.61%
Romania was one of the first transition countries in Europe to introduce auctions for allocating standing timber (stumpage) in public forests. In comparison with the former system in the country-administrative allocation at set prices-timber auctions offer several potential advantages: greater revenue generation for the government, a higher probability that tracts will be allocated to the firms that value them most highly, and stronger incentives for technological change within industry and efficiency gains in the public sector. Competition is the key to realizing these advantages. Unfortunately, collusion among bidders often limits competition in timber auctions, including in well-established market economies such as the United States. The result is that tracts sell below their fair market value, which undermines the advantages of auctions. This paper examines the Romanian auction system, with a focus on the use of econometric methods to detect collusion. It begins by describing the historical development of the system and the principal steps in the auction process. It then discusses the qualitative impacts of various economic and institutional factors, including collusion, on winning bids in different regions of the country. This discussion draws on information from a combination of sources...

Steganography and collusion in cryptographic protocols

Lepinski, Matthew (Matthew Baker), 1978-
Fonte: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Publicador: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: 62 leaves
ENG
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27.61%
Steganography, the hiding of covert messages inside innocuous communication, is an active area of cryptographic research. Recent research has shown that provably undetectable steganography is possible in a wide variety of settings. We believe that the existence of such undetectable steganography will have far reaching implications. In this thesis, we investigate the impact of steganography on the design of cryptographic protocols. In particular, we show that that all existing cryptographic protocols allow malicious players to collude and coordinate their actions by steganographicly hiding covert messages inside legitimate protocol traffic. Such collusion is devastating in many settings, and thus we argue that it's elimination is an important direction for cryptographic research. Defeating such steganographic collusion requires not only new cryptographic protocols, but also a new notion of protocol security. Traditional notions of protocol security attempt to minimize the injuries to privacy and correctness inflicted by malicious participants who collude during run-time. They do not, however, prevent malicious parties from colluding and coordinating their actions in the first place! We therefore put forward the notion of a collusion-free protocol which guarantees that no set of players can use the protocol to maliciously coordinate their actions.; (cont.) As should be expected...

Is Collusion-Proof Procurement Expensive?

Aryal, Gaurab; Gabrielli, Maria F.
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.51%
Collusion among bidders adversely affects procurement cost and in some cases efficiency, and it seems collusion is more prevalent that we would like. Statistical methods of detecting collusion just using bid data, in a hope to deter future collusion, is perilous, and access to additional data is rare and often always after the fact. In this paper, we estimate the extra cost of implementing a new procurement rule proposed by Chen and Micali [2012] that is robust to collusion and always guarantees the efficient outcome. The rule requires bidders to report their coalition and to ensure incentive-compatibility, the mechanism allows them to attain rents. We estimate this rent using data from California highway construction and find it to be anywhere between 1.6% to 5%. Even after we factor in the marginal excess burden of taxes needed to finance these rents, the cost ranges between 2.08% and 6.5%, suggesting that there is a room to think about running this new auction, suggesting we should consider this auction.; Comment: 26 Pages, 1 Figure

Detecting, Representing and Querying Collusion in Online Rating Systems

Allahbakhsh, Mohammad; Ignjatovic, Aleksandar; Benatallah, Boualem; Beheshti, Seyed-Mehdi-Reza; Foo, Norman; Bertino, Elisa
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 02/11/2012
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27.57%
Online rating systems are subject to malicious behaviors mainly by posting unfair rating scores. Users may try to individually or collaboratively promote or demote a product. Collaborating unfair rating 'collusion' is more damaging than individual unfair rating. Although collusion detection in general has been widely studied, identifying collusion groups in online rating systems is less studied and needs more investigation. In this paper, we study impact of collusion in online rating systems and asses their susceptibility to collusion attacks. The proposed model uses a frequent itemset mining algorithm to detect candidate collusion groups. Then, several indicators are used for identifying collusion groups and for estimating how damaging such colluding groups might be. Also, we propose an algorithm for finding possible collusive subgroup inside larger groups which are not identified as collusive. The model has been implemented and we present results of experimental evaluation of our methodology.; Comment: 22 pages, 6 figures

Collusion in Growing and Shrinking Markets: Empirical Evidence from Experimental Duopolies

Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi
Fonte: Conselho Superior de Investigações Científicas Publicador: Conselho Superior de Investigações Científicas
Tipo: Documento de trabajo
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
37.31%
Publicado como un capítulo en: Jeroen Hinloopen (ed.). Experiments and Competition Policy. [S.l.]: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p.34-60. ISBN 9780511576201. ISBN 9781107403611. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511576201.003; We study collusive behaviour in experimental duopolies that compete in prices under dynamic demand conditions. In one treatment the demand grows at a constant rate. In the other treatment the demand declines at another constant rate. The rates are chosen so that the evolution of the demand in one case is just the reverse in time than the one for the other case. We use a box-design demand function so that there are no issues of finding and co-ordinating on the collusive price. Contrary to game-theoretic reasoning, our results show that collusion is significantly larger when the demand shrinks than when it grows. We conjecture that the prospect of rapidly declining profit opportunities exerts a disciplining effect on firms that facilitates collusion and discourages deviation.; Financial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia (BEC 2003-00412), the Ministerio de Educación y Cultura (PB98-0465), the Barcelona Economics programme CREA, the British Academy and the University of Nottingham is gratefully acknowledged.

Tacit Collusion and Capacity Withholding in Repeated Uniform Price Auctions

Dechenaux, Emmanuel; Kovenock, Dan
Fonte: Conselho Superior de Investigações Científicas Publicador: Conselho Superior de Investigações Científicas
Tipo: Documento de trabajo
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
37.31%
This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor above which the perfectly collusive outcome with equal sharing is sustainable on a stationary path. Under the Market Clearing Price rule, only one step is required. That is, within the class of step bidding functions with a finite number of steps...

On Interdependent Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion

Spagnolo, Giancarlo
Fonte: Universidade de Cambridge Publicador: Universidade de Cambridge
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: 806093 bytes; application/pdf; application/pdf
EN_GB
Relevância na Pesquisa
37.15%
This paper addresses the effects of multimarket contact on firms? ability to collude. Real world imperfections tend to makes firms? objective function strictly concave and market supergames ?interdependent?: firms? payoffs in each market depend on how they are doing in others. Then, multimarket contact always facilitates collusion. It may even make it sustainable in all markets when otherwise it would not be sustainable in any. The effects of conglomeration are discussed. ?Multi-game contact? is shown to facilitate cooperation in non-oligopolistic supergames as long as agents? objectives function is submodular in material payoffs.

Two types of collusion in a model of hierarchical agency

Bac, Mehemet; Kucuksenel, Serkan
Fonte: Mohr Siebeck Publicador: Mohr Siebeck
Tipo: Article; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /06/2006
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.51%
The standard ex post type of collusion is a supervisor-agent agreement to misrepresent the outcome of supervision. Under ex ante collusion the agent makes a side transfer to the supervisor, who, in return, stops monitoring the agent's productivity. Extending Tirole's [1986] model of hierarchy to include ex ante collusion and supervision costs, we show that the principal can ignore ex ante collusion and the supervisor's incentive constraint if supervision technology is likely to generate information at a low cost. To prevent ex ante collusion the principal increases the difference between the wages paid when the supervisor's report is empty and when it contains productivity evidence.

Risk averse supervisors and the efficiency of collusion

Faure-Grimaud, Antoine; Laffont, Jean-Jacques; Martimort, David
Fonte: London School of Economics and Political Science Research Publicador: London School of Economics and Political Science Research
Tipo: Article; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em //2002 EN; EN
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27.57%
This paper studies the efficiency of collusion between supervisors and supervisees. Building on Tirole (1986)’s results that deterring collusion with infinitely risk averse supervisors is impossible, while it is costless to do so under risk neutrality, we develop here a theory of collusion based on a trade-off between the risk premia required by (less extreme) risk attitudes and incentives. This allows us to link the efficiency of collusion to the supervisor’s risk aversion and to various parameters characterizing the economic environment in which collusion may take place. We are then able to derive implications for the design of organizations, like determining how the number of tasks/agents per supervisor or the level of competition may impact on the cost of collusion, studying the impact of vertical integration on those same costs, or characterizing the role of uncertainty on side-contracting.

An economic theory of collusion, blackmail and whistle-blowing in organisations.

Leppamaki, Mikko
Fonte: London School of Economics and Political Science Thesis Publicador: London School of Economics and Political Science Thesis
Tipo: Thesis; NonPeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em //1997 EN
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27.78%
This thesis examines informal and corruptive activities agents may pursue within organisations. Chapter 1 is a brief introduction to the general theme and the related literature. Chapter 2 develops a simple theory of non-monetary collusion, where agents collude by exchanging favours. It examines the optimal use of supervisory information in a simple hierarchy under potential collusion. It is shown that when only the supervisor's information about the agent is used, collusion does not arise, since favours can not be exchanged. Secondly, it is analysed whether the agent's information about his superior should be used. In this case collusion is possible, and there is an interesting trade-off between the benefits of using additional information and the costs of collusion. It is then shown that sometimes the principal may be better off when using less than all available information. Chapter 3 considers task assignment and whistle-blowing as measures a principal may use to break collusion. The principal's response to potential collusion is to allocate less time to monitoring, and he breaks collusion with money. It is shown that the principal may also break collusion by hiring a third worker, and the decision how to break collusion optimally is endogenously determined. Breaking collusion by task assignment is costly...