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Reavaliando a relação entre independência do Banco Central e custos de desinflação: uma análise de viés de seleção; Reassessing the relationship between Central Bank independence and disinflation costs: a selection bias analysis

Passos, Danilo José Rodrigues
Fonte: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP Publicador: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
Tipo: Dissertação de Mestrado Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 22/11/2012 PT
Relevância na Pesquisa
86.3%
A literatura empírica que buscou investigar os efeitos da independência do banco central sobre os custos de desinflação encontra, quase que em sua totalidade, uma relação positiva entre estas duas variáveis, indicando que episódios desinflacionários mais custosos estão relacionados a países com bancos centrais mais independentes, contrariando a teoria novo clássica, que atribui um prêmio para a credibilidade da política monetária em termos de custos de desinflação. No entanto, a maioria desses trabalhos limita-se à utilização de uma amostra que compreende apenas países desenvolvidos durante o período 1960-1990. Além disso, a metodologia econométrica freqüentemente utilizada é a de Mínimos Quadrados Ordinários, método incapaz de controlar para a existência de algum tipo de endogeneidade ou viés de seleção na relação de interesse. Dessa forma, o presente trabalho busca complementar a literatura existente de duas formas: (1) utilizando uma amostra mais ampla, que inclua não somente países em desenvolvimento, mas também episódios desinflacionários mais recentes; e (2) empregando os métodos baseados em \textit{propensity score}, metodologia econométrica capaz de controlar para a possível existência de viés de seleção na relação entre independência do banco central e custos de desinflação. Algumas conclusões importantes são obtidas. Primeiramente...

Independência do banco central e equilíbrio fiscal: algumas observações para o caso brasileiro

Mendonça,Helder Ferreira de
Fonte: Editora 34 Publicador: Editora 34
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: text/html
Publicado em 01/03/2006 PT
Relevância na Pesquisa
76%
The objective of this paper is to analyze the main theoretical arguments for the analysis of the conduction of monetary policy on the fiscal side. Besides this, an analysis is made of the possible effects on the fiscal balance from the conduction of the monetary policy in the search for price stability after the Real Plan and due to an increase in the central bank independence (CBI) in the Brazilian case. The findings denote that the strategy for the conduction of the adopted monetary policy and the increase in the degree of CBI did not contribute to an imrovement in the fiscal balance.

Efeitos da independência do banco central e da taxa de rotatividade sobre a inflação brasileira

Mendonça,Helder Ferreira de
Fonte: Editora 34 Publicador: Editora 34
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: text/html
Publicado em 01/12/2006 PT
Relevância na Pesquisa
76.26%
Nowadays, the belief is strong in the Brazilian federal government that operational central bank independence is a basic condition to assure price stability. The literature concerning this subject highlights that a high degree of independence and a low turnover of central bank governor are associated with low inflation. This paper analyzes the relation between central bank independence and inflation in Brazil during 1980-2002. The findings denote that there is no effect on inflation due to an increase in degree of independence and a fall in turnover rate.

The external impacts of Central Bank independence

Griffin,Carroll Howard
Fonte: Universidade de São Paulo, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade, Departamento de Contabilidade e Atuária Publicador: Universidade de São Paulo, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade, Departamento de Contabilidade e Atuária
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: text/html
Publicado em 01/12/2010 EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
96.36%
The term "central bank independence" (or abbreviated, CBI) can be broadly defined as the degree of freedom of the central bank to pursue monetary policy without interference from political considerations. The idea of central bank independence has been widely accepted over the last several decades by many countries around the world, both developed and developing. Since being first written about academically in the late 1980s, many countries have come to adopt this policy and many governments have come to recognize this as standard procedure. As such, many countries around the world granted autonomy to their central banks during the 1980s and 1990s. The majority of past studies have examined primarily the impact of central bank independence on inflation. however, the additional theoretical benefits are much more far reaching, the result of a more stable and prosperous macroeconomic environment. Additionally, there is only now sufficient data to empirically determine whether many of these claims are true. This study examines central bank independence in developing countries of Latin America and Asia as well as selected developed countries to determine what actual impact an autonomous central bank has had. It also examines such phenomena as financial crises (including the current global crisis of 2008-2009)...

Equilibrium Credit : The Reference Point for Macroprudential Supervisors

Buncic, Daniel; Melecky, Martin
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
76.17%
Equilibrium credit is an important concept because it helps identify excessive credit provision. This paper proposes a two-stage approach to determine equilibrium credit. It uses two stages to study changes in the demand for credit due to varying levels of economic, financial and institutional development of a country. Using a panel of high and middle-income countries over the period 1980-2010, this paper provides empirical evidence that the credit-to-GDP ratio is inappropriate to measure equilibrium credit. The reason for this is that such an approach ignores heterogeneity in the parameters that determine equilibrium credit across countries due to different stages of economic development. The main drivers of this heterogeneity are financial depth, access to financial services, use of capital markets, efficiency and funding of domestic banks, central bank independence, the degree of supervisory integration, and experience of a financial crisis. Countries in Europe and Central Asia show a slower adjustment of credit to its long-run equilibrium compared with other regions of the world.

Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments

Keefer, Philip; Stasavage, David
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
76.27%
The authors develop and test several new hypotheses about the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence and exchange rate pegs in the context of different institutions and different degrees of citizen information about government policies. Theory provides strong reason to believe that while central bank independence will prove more effective as a commitment mechanism in countries where multiple players in government have veto power (checks and balances), the number of veto players will have no effect on the credibility of exchange rate pegs. Conversely, the authors argue that central bank independence does not solve the problems of commitment that arise when citizens are imperfectly informed about the contribution of government policy to inflation. Exchange rate pegs, however, mitigate these problems. The authors present extensive evidence from cross-country tests using newly developed data that provide strong support for their propositions.

The Banking and Financial Sector of Lao PDR : Financial Sector Note

Asian Development Bank; World Bank
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
76.07%
During the second half of the 1980s, Lao PDR embarked on an ambitious program of economic reforms, called the New Economic Mechanism, whose main purpose was to gradually transform its centrally-planned economy into a market-oriented economy. The initial reform momentum lasted about one decade. The far-reaching reform program encompassed many critical components including: (a) promotion of private production through improved incentives; (b) institutional infrastructure to improve market economy operations; (c) the strengthening of Lao comparative advantages through trade liberalization and further specialization; and (d) the establishment of price stability through macroeconomic policy measures. The systemic changes introduced in Lao PDR have contributed to a significant transformation of the country s economic system, away from a rigorously centrally-planned economy and towards a form of market economy based on private ownership. The percentage of poor declined based on the national poverty line from 45 to 39 percent between 1992-93 and 1997-982. But the percentage of very poor did not decline and remained at slightly above 30 percent evidencing the need for even broader and faster growth. Moreover...

The Degree of Legal Independence of the Mediterranean Central Banks: International Comparison and Macroeconomic Implications

GISOLO, Enrico
Fonte: Instituto Universitário Europeu Publicador: Instituto Universitário Europeu
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf; digital
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.21%
The aim of the present paper is to assess the degree of central bank legal independence enjoyed by the central banks of the south shore of the Mediterranean Sea, which belong to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and to shed some light on the macroeconomic outcomes of different degrees of independence. To this end a methodology used by the International Monetary Fund, here slightly modified to better suit the characteristics of the central banks in the area, is introduced and applied. The main findings of the present work are as follows: i) as regards legal independence, the Mediterranean countries show a diverse picture, sometimes far from the common wisdom; ii) legal independence does not always appear in line with the de facto situation; iii) Cyprus and Malta (that recently joined the European Union), as well as Turkey, that has been recognized a candidate country status, do not always show the best degrees of legal/actual independence and iv) many central banks of the area have recently amended their Statutes with a view to achieving more independence, as the issue has a key role in the modernization of the economies and a priority status in the implementation of a comprehensive and effective set of political and economic reforms.

The new ECB and its relationship with the Eurozone Member States : between central bank independence and central bank intervention

BEUKERS, Thomas
Fonte: Instituto Universitário Europeu Publicador: Instituto Universitário Europeu
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.15%
The financial and sovereign debt crisis has had a great impact on the relationship between the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Member States of the Eurozone, a relationship traditionally studied from the perspective of central bank independence. This article takes a different perspective on that relationship, namely that of central bank intervention in Member State economic policy making. It focuses on the pressure and influence exercised by the ECB on the Member States of the eurozone. The two perspectives combined reveal the nature of the ever more frequent and intense interaction between the ECB and the Member States of the eurozone. In the crisis, several different forms can be identified of ECB pressure on eurozone Member States to adopt reforms in the areas of fiscal policy and structural reforms, marking a shift from interaction to central bank intervention. This ECB intervention is parallel to an equally unprecedented intervention by the collective of eurozone Member States in the economic policy of several Member States through the economic policy conditionality linked to financial assistance. The article analyses several instances of ECB intervention, offers an explanation and a theoretical framework for normatively assessing it. The main risk identified for the ECB in this article is that of being perceived as a political or politicized actor...

A historical analysis of central bank independence in Latin America: the Colombian experience, 1923-2008

Meisel, Adolfo; Barón, Juan D.
Fonte: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Instituto Laureano Figuerola Publicador: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Instituto Laureano Figuerola
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion; info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Publicado em /03/2010 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
86.31%
This paper explores the relationship between central bank independence and inflation in Latin America, using the experience of Colombia (1923-2008) as a case study. Since its creation, in 1923, Colombia’s central bank has undergone several reforms that have changed its objectives and degree of independence. Between 1923 and 1951, it was private and independent, with a legal commitment to price stability. In 1962, monetary responsibilities were divided between a government-dominated monetary board, in charge of monetary policies, and the central bank, which carried them out. In the early 1990s, the bank recovered its independence and its focus on price stability. Inflation varied substantially during these subperiods. Our analysis suggests that the central bank independence, combined with a commitment to price stability, renders the best results in terms of price stability.; Este documento explora la relación entre la independencia del banco central y los niveles de inflación en Latinoamérica, usando como estudio de caso la experiencia de Colombia (1923-2008). Desde su creación en 1923, la independencia y objetivos del banco central en Colombia han sido modificados substancialmente. Entre 1923 y 1951, el banco central fue privado e independiente...

A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence; Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking

Eggertsson, Gauti B.; Le Borgne, Eric
Fonte: Banco Mundial Publicador: Banco Mundial
Tipo: Journal Article; Journal Article
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
76%
We propose a simple theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician delegates policy tasks to a technocrat in an independent institution and then analyze under what conditions delegation is optimal for society. Our theory builds on Holmstrom's (1982, 1999) "hidden effort" principal-agent model. The election pressures that politicians face, and the absence of such pressures for technocrats, give rise to a dynamic incentive structure that formalizes two rationales for delegation, one highlighted by Hamilton (1788) and the other by Blinder (1998). Delegation trades off the cost of having a possibly incompetent technocrat with a long-term job contract against the benefit of having a technocrat who (i) invests more effort into the specialized policy task and (ii) is better insulated from the whims of public opinion. A natural application of our framework suggests a new theory of central bank independence.

Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions : When Are Independent Central Banks Irrelevent?

Keefer, Philip; Stasavage, David
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper; Publications & Research
ENGLISH; EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
76.2%
The government's ability to credibly commit to policy announcements is critical to the successful implementation of economic policies as diverse as capital taxation and utilities regulation. One frequently advocated means of signaling credible commitment is to delegate authority to an agency that will not have an incentive to opportunistically change policies once the private sector has taken such steps as signing wage contracts or making irreversible investments. Delegating authority is suggested as a government strategy particularly for monetary policy. And existing work on the independence of central banks generally assumes that government decisions to delegate are irrevocable . But delegation - in monetary policy as elsewhere-is inevitably a political choice, and can be reversed, contend the authors. They develop a model of monetary policy that relaxes the assumption that monetary delegation is irreversible. Among the testable predictions of the model are these: A) The presence of an independent central bank should reduce inflation only in the presence of political checks and balances. This effect should be evident in both developing and industrial countries. B) Political actions to interfere with the central bank should be more apparent when there are few checks and balances. C) The effects of checks and balances should be more marked when political decisionmakers are more polarized. The authors test these predictions and find extensive empirical evidence to support each of the observable implications of their model: Central banks are associated with better inflation outcomes in the presence of checks and balances. The turnover of central bank governors is reduced when governors have tenure protection supported by political checks and balances. And the effect of checks and balances is enhanced in more polarized political environments.

Financial Dollarization and Central Bank Credibility

Cowan, Kevin; Do, Quy-Toan
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper; Publications & Research
ENGLISH; EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
86.08%
Why do firms and banks hold foreign currency denominated liabilities? The authors argue that foreign currency debt, by altering the effect of a devaluation on output, has a disciplining effect when the Central Bank's objectives differ from the social optimum. However, under imperfect information, bad priors about the Central Bank induce excess dollarization of liabilities, which in turn limits the ability of the Central Bank to conduct an optimal monetary policy. In addition the economy may become stuck in a "dollarization trap" in which dollarized liabilities limit the ability of agents to learn the true type of the monetary authority. The model has clear-cut policy implications regarding the taxation of foreign currency liabilities as a way to encourage perfect information and avoid dollarization traps. Moreover, it reinforces the existing argument for Central Bank independence. Finally, the authors believe this model to be consistent with a growing empirical literature on the determinants of foreign currency liabilities and their relationships to Central Bank credibility.

Central bank independence and its relationship to inflation

Mendonça, Helder Ferreira de
Fonte: CEPAL - Comissão Econômica para a América Latina e o Caribe Publicador: CEPAL - Comissão Econômica para a América Latina e o Caribe
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.06%
Includes bibliography; This paper builds on earlier studies of central bank independence (CBI);, making a comparison of the rankings of central banks for 15 countries through three different indices. The analysis reveals that there is no shared concept of CBI and that the indices are a measure of the inflation bias. The Brazilian case is used as an example, with the objective of examining the impact on inflation of an increase in independence over time, as measured by Cukierman's index. The findings indicate that CBI is a consequence of the conduct of monetary policy and that it is not an adequate framework for developing credibility.

Sustainability of the Brazilian fiscal policy and central bank independence

Luporini,Viviane
Fonte: Fundação Getúlio Vargas Publicador: Fundação Getúlio Vargas
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: text/html
Publicado em 01/06/2000 EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
86.05%
This paper analyzes the sustainability of fiscal policy in Brazil since the financial reform of 1965 and discusses how the relationship between the Treasury and the Central Bank has determined the federal government's capacity to finance itself. A sustainable policy is defined as one such that the discounted government debt as a ratio to the GDP is backed by expected primary surpluses of equal present-value. In the context of an infinite-horizon framework, sustainability is tested through the mean-zero stationarity of the discounted debt/GDP ratio. Although the overall results indicate sustainability, tests on subsamples show that the fiscal policy was sustainable prior to 1980, but it assumed an unsustainable path during the 80's and early 90's.

Modeling the monetary policy reaction function of the colombian central bank

Otero, Jesús; Ramírez, Manuel
Fonte: Facultad de Economía Publicador: Facultad de Economía
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/book; info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /04/2008
Relevância na Pesquisa
76.01%
This paper proposes a simple Ordered Probit model to analyse the monetary policy reaction function of the Colombian Central Bank. There is evidence that the reaction function is asymmetric, in the sense that the Bank increases the Bank rate when the gap between observed inflation and the inflation target (lagged once) is positive, but it does not reduce the Bank rate when the gap is negative. This behaviour suggests that the Bank is more interested in fulfilling the announced inflation target rather than in reducing inflation excessively. The forecasting performance of the model, both within and beyond the estimation period, appears to be particularly good.

Central bank independence and stock market returns

Costa, Pedro Miguel Mendes Rosa
Fonte: Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão Publicador: Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão
Tipo: Dissertação de Mestrado
Publicado em //2015 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
96.23%
Mestrado em Finanças; A independência dos bancos centrais é considerada tanto pela literatura como pelos decisores políticos como essencial para atingir estabilidade nos níveis de inflação estável e bem estar económico a longo prazo nas economias modernas. Geralmente, é uma teoria suportada pela ideia de que a independência dos bancos centrais permite atingir essa estabilidade sem prejudicar outras variáveis da economia. Até agora, e salvo raras exceções, os estudos feitos pela literatura sobre a relação da independência dos bancos centrais e as variáveis macroeconómicas têm negligenciado os retornos agregados dos mercados financeiros. Usando um conjunto de 21 países desenvolvidos, calculamos os respetivos retornos dos índices financeiros utilizando os índices MSCI, cotados em dólares americanos, e testamos se é possível encontrar algum impacto causado pelos vários níveis de independência dos bancos centrais. A nossa análise abrange um período de 20 anos e os resultados levam-nos a concluir que a hipótese de "free lunch" que acompanha os defensores da independência dos bancos centrais não é rejeitada quando estudamos o seu impacto nos retornos dos mercados financeiros.; Central bank independence is regarded by both literature and policymakers as essential for achieving stability in inflation and long term welfare in modern economies...

The external impacts of Central Bank independence; Os impactos externos da independência dos Bancos Centrais

Griffin, Carroll Howard
Fonte: Universidade de São Paulo. Escola de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade Publicador: Universidade de São Paulo. Escola de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion; ; ; ; ; ; Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 01/12/2010 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
96.37%
O termo "independência do banco central" (ou IBC) pode ser amplamente definido como o grau de liberdade que o banco central possui para seguir sua política monetária sem a interferência de considerações políticas. A ideia da independência do banco central foi aceita nas últimas décadas por muitos países ao redor do mundo, tanto desenvolvidos como em desenvolvimento. Desde a primeira literatura acadêmica a respeito no final dos anos 80, muitos países começaram a adotar essa política e muitos governos a reconheceram como padrão. Assim, muitos países ao redor do mundo concederam autonomia a seus bancos centrais nos anos 80 e 90. A maior parte dos estudos existentes investigou principalmente o impacto da independência do banco central na inflação. Porém, os benefícios teóricos adicionais vão muito além, resultado de um ambiente macroeconômico mais estável e próspero. Ademais, somente agora há dados suficientes para a determinação empírica da veracidade de muitas dessas alegações. Este estudo investiga a independência dos bancos centrais em países em desenvolvimento na América Latina e na Ásia, além de determinados países desenvolvidos, para determinar o real impacto de um banco central autônomo. Também examina fenômenos como crises financeiras (inclusive a crise global em curso no período 2008-2009)...

Two naked emperors? Concerns about the Stability & Growth Pact and second thoughts about central bank independence

Buiter, Willem H.
Fonte: London School of Economics and Political Science Research Publicador: London School of Economics and Political Science Research
Tipo: Article; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /09/2004 EN; EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.2%
This 2003 Institute for Fiscal Studies Lecture addresses two sets of issues relevant to current and prospective future E(M)U members: the consequences of the Stability and Growth Pact for fiscal-financial sustainability and macroeconomic stability, and some risks associated with operational independence of the central bank. The relevance of the second issue is not restricted to E(M)U members. Poor communication, co-operation and co-ordination between the fiscal and monetary authorities can be costly in two contingencies. The first of these occurs when the central bank’s role as the lender of last resort needs to be backed up by the willingness of the Treasury to recapitalise the central bank, should the need arise. The second contingency occurs when unwanted deflation needs to be prevented or combated, but the central bank’s conventional monetary arsenal is exhausted. Friedman’s helicopter drop of money, a temporary tax cut or transfer payment increase financed through the issuance of base money will always stimulate demand provided it is not expected to be reversed, in present value terms, in the future. In most real-world institutional/legal settings, – the implementation of a helicopter drop of base money requires co-ordinated actions by the central bank and Treasury. Central bank independence is unlikely to survive if either or both of these contingencies occur...

Distributional politics and central bank independence: Monetary reform in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

King, Michael R
Fonte: London School of Economics and Political Science Thesis Publicador: London School of Economics and Political Science Thesis
Tipo: Thesis; NonPeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em //2001 EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.29%
Why do politicians change the legislation governing the central bank to give this institution operational independence in the setting of monetary policy. This thesis examines the political debates over central bank independence in New Zealand, Canada, Australia and New Zealand during the 1980s and 1990s. These cases were selected due to the variation in their levels of central bank independence, while holding key institutional variables constant. Four hypotheses are suggested by the political economy literature to explain the timing of this legislative change: the need to signal creditworthiness to international financial markets, in response to lobbying by domestic interest groups opposed to inflation, in response to proposals from an epistemic community of monetary experts or based on the self-interest of politicians concerned with re-election. The case studies find that politicians delegate to the central bank when this reform has the consensus support of an epistemic community of monetary experts, and a key politician is willing to champion the legislation through parliament. This epistemic community has increased influence during periods of economic uncertainty, such as following a financial crisis. A key politician is motivated to support this reform due to ideological or electoral reasons. This reform was facilitated by political institutions characterised by few checks and balances that concentrated power in the hands of the executive and offered few obstacles to changing the central bank's statute. Central bank independence was rejected in the cases where the epistemic community did not hold a consensus on the need for reform...