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Análise e avaliação dos novos critérios de adjudicação de portos e terminais sob o novo marco regulatório do setor portuário brasileiro.; Analysis and evaluation of new bidding criteria for seaport and seaport terminal concessions under the new Brazilian regulatory regime.

Barros, Tiago Maciel de
Fonte: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP Publicador: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
Tipo: Dissertação de Mestrado Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 08/10/2014 PT
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Este trabalho compreende a análise e avaliação dos critérios de adjudicação de portos e terminais introduzidos pelo novo marco regulatório do setor portuário brasileiro. O objetivo principal consiste em avaliar se a aplicação na prática desses critérios deverá levar ao alcance dos objetivos da alteração do marco regulatório, a partir da MP 595/2012, depois convertida na Lei 12.815/2013: o aumento da oferta de capacidade e a redução dos custos portuários. A metodologia empregada consiste principalmente na revisão bibliográfica e na análise documental dos instrumentos legais e infralegais que regem o tema, bem como das minutas de editais e contratos dos primeiros arrendamentos de instalações que se prevê licitar sob os novos critérios de adjudicação. Dada a previsão de adoção de regulação econômica em parte significativa dos novos arrendamentos, discutem-se também aspectos da competição portuária e formas de regulação. Aborda-se ainda, resumidamente, outros aspectos que foram alterados a partir da MP 595/2012, especialmente a flexibilização dos requisitos para a outorga de autorização a terminais de uso privado e a centralização dos processos de arrendamentos nos órgãos setoriais (SEP e ANTAQ)...

Share bidding auctions, sliding scale royalty rates and the new brazilian regulatory framework for the pre-salt areas

Damé, Otávio Menezes
Fonte: Fundação Getúlio Vargas Publicador: Fundação Getúlio Vargas
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
EN_US
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O governo brasileiro recentemente aprovou uma legislação instituindo um novo marco regulatório para as reservas petrolíferas do pré-sal. Segundo as novas regras, estas áreas deverão ser licitadas mediante um leilão de partilha de lucro. Motivado por esta mudança, apresentamos um modelo de leilão de partilha sob afiliação, demonstrando a existência de um equilíbrio monótono em estratégias puras e caracterizando a solução. Alem disso, provamos que este mecanismo gera receita esperada maior ou igual a um leilão de primeiro preço usual. Em seguida, introduzimos no modelo uma função representando taxas de royalties que dependem do valor do objeto. Este instrumento permite uma elevação na receita esperada de ambos os modelos, fazendo com que a diferença entre eles encolha. Finalmente, analisando o novo marco regulatório sob o ponto de vista dos resultados obtidos, concluímos que o antigo modelo de concessão utilizado pelo governo brasileiro é mais adequado e lucrativo.; Brazilian government recently passed legislation instituting a new regulatory framework for the pre-salt reserves. These areas should be negotiated through a profit-share bidding auction. Motivated by this new rules, we present a model of share bidding auction under affiliation...

As concessões rodoviárias gaúchas à luz do sistema de franchise bidding : 1996/2007

Souza Júnior, Roberto Tadeu de
Fonte: Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul Publicador: Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Tipo: Dissertação Formato: application/pdf
POR
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O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar o sistema de franchise bidding como uma alternativa à regulação tradicional, tomando-se como exemplo as concessões de rodovias, tanto do ponto de vista teórico como empírico. A partir do estudo de caso envolvendo o programa de concessões rodoviárias gaúchas, o presente trabalho realizou uma análise comparativa entre o sistema de franchise bidding, também conhecido na literatura como leilão de Demsetz (1968), e a regulação direta, identificando-se os principais pressupostos teóricos, as características e os problemas enfrentados e, ainda, as similaridades e diferenças existentes entre os dois modelos propostos. Os resultados obtidos confirmam o diagnóstico realizado por Williamson (1976), indicando que regulação e franchise bidding diferem somente na forma e não em espécie.; The aim of this study is to analyze franchise bidding as an alternative to traditional regulatory systems, approaching both empirically and theoretically the highway concessions as an example. Taking the highway concession program from the state of Rio Grande do Sul as a study case, this study compares the franchise bidding system, also known in the literature as Demsetz bidding (1968), with direct regulation and identifies the main theoretical assumptions...

Financial Incentives in Health Care Reform: Evaluating Payment Reform in Accountable Care Organizations and Competitive Bidding in Medicare

Song, Zirui
Fonte: Harvard University Publicador: Harvard University
Tipo: Thesis or Dissertation
EN_US
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Amidst mounting federal debt, slowing the growth of health care spending is one of the nation’s top domestic priorities. This dissertation evaluates three current policy ideas: (1) global payment within an accountable care contracting model, (2) physician fee cuts, and (3) expanding the role of competitive bidding in Medicare. Chapter one studies the effect of global payment and pay-for-performance on health care spending and quality in accountable care organizations. I evaluate the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts Alternative Quality Contract (AQC), which was implemented in 2009 with seven provider organizations comprising 380,000 enrollees. Using claims and quality data in a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences design, I find that the AQC was associated with a 1.9 percent reduction in medical spending and modest improvements in quality of chronic care management and pediatric care in year one. Chapter two studies Medicare’s elimination of payments for consultations in the 2010 Medicare Physician Fee Schedule. This targeted fee cut (largely to specialists) was accompanied by a fee increase for office visits (billed more often by primary care physicians). Using claims data for 2.2 million Medicare beneficiaries, I test for discontinuities in spending...

Choosing Wisely: The Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism

EHLERS, Lars
Fonte: Université de Montréal Publicador: Université de Montréal
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: 507119 bytes; application/pdf
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Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) propose a multi-bidding mechanism to determine a winner from a set of possible projects. The winning project is implemented and its surplus is shared among the agents. In the multi-bidding mechanism each agent announces a vector of bids, one for each possible project, that are constrained to sum up to zero. In addition, each agent chooses a favorite a object which is used as a tie-breaker if several projects receive the same highest aggregate bid. Since more desirable projects receive larger bids, it is natural to consider the multi-bidding mechanism without the announcement of favorite projects. We show that the merits of the multi-bidding mechanism appear not to be robust to this natural simplification. Specifically, a Nash equilibrium exists if and only if there are at least two individually optimal projects and all individually optimal projects are efficient.

Joint Bidding in Infrastructure Procurement

Estache, Antonio; Iimi, Atsushi
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
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To utilize public resources efficiently, it is required to take full advantage of competition in public procurement auctions. Joint bidding practices are one of the possible ways of facilitating auction competition. In theory, there are pros and cons. It may enable firms to pool their financial and experiential resources and remove barriers to entry. On the other hand, it may reduce the degree of competition and can be used as a cover for collusive behavior. The paper empirically addresses whether joint bidding is pro- or anti-competitive in Official Development Assistance procurement auctions for infrastructure projects. It reveals the possible risk of relying too much on a foreign bidding coalition and may suggest the necessity of overseeing it. The data reveal no strong evidence that joint bidding practices are compatible with competition policy, except for a few cases. In road procurements, coalitional bidding involving both local and foreign firms has been found pro-competitive. In the water and sewage sector...

Genetic Algorithms versus Human Bidding Strategies for Auctions

Mochón, Asunción; Quintana, David; Isasi, Pedro; Sáez, Yago
Fonte: Springer Publicador: Springer
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject; info:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em //2005 ENG
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The increasing use of auctions has led to a growing interest in the subject. The objective of this paper is to develop a genetic algorithm to find optimum bidding strategies for Ausubel auctions. The algorithm provides the strategy (defined as the action to be taken under different market conditions) that maximizes pay off to the bidder. The algorithm is tested under a series of scenarios that differ in their composition of utility functions, number of bidders and quantity of lots auctioned. The results suggest that the approach leads to strategies that outperform sincere bidding systems.; This article has been financed by the Spanish founded research MCyT project TRACER, Ref: TIC2002-04498-C05-04; Proceeding of: The fourth IEEE International Workshop WSTST ’05, Muroran, Japan, 25 - 27 May, 2005

Multimarket optimal bidding for a power producer

Plazas, Miguel Ángel; Conejo, Antonio J.; Prieto, Francisco J.
Fonte: IEEE Power & Energy Society Publicador: IEEE Power & Energy Society
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion; info:eu-repo/semantics/article Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /11/2005 ENG
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This paper considers a profit-maximizing thermal producer that participates in a sequence of spot markets, namely, day-ahead, automatic generation control (AGC), and balancing markets. The producer behaves as a price-taker in both the day-ahead market and the AGC market but as a potential price-maker in the volatile balancing market. The paper provides a stochastic programming methodology to determine the optimal bidding strategies for the day-ahead market. Uncertainty sources include prices for the day-ahead and AGC markets and balancing market linear price variations with the production of the thermal producer. Results from a realistic case study are reported and analyzed. Conclusions are duly drawn.; The work of A. J. Conejo was supported in part by the Ministry of Science and Education of Spain under CICYT Project DPI2003-01362 and in part by Junta de Comunidades de Castilla-La Mancha under Project GC-02-006.

The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints

Beker, Pablo F.; Hernando-Veciana, Ángel
Fonte: Elsevier Publicador: Elsevier
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion; info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Publicado em /01/2015 ENG
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We develop a model of bidding markets with financial constraints `a la Che and Gale (1998b) in which two firms choose their budgets optimally and we extend it to a dynamic setting over an infinite horizon. We provide three main results for the case in which the exogenous cash-flow is not too large and the opportunity cost of budgets is positive but arbitrarily low. First, firms keep small budgets and markups are high most of the time. Second, the dispersion of markups and “money left on the table” across procurement auctions hinges on di↵erences, both endogenous and exogenous, in the availability of financial resources rather than on significant private information. Third, we explain why the empirical analysis of the size of markups based on the standard auction model may have a bias, downwards or upwards, positively correlated with the availability of financial resources. A numerical example illustrates that our model is able to generate a rich set of values for markups, bid dispersion and concentration.; Fundación Ramón Areces and the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness (project ECO2012-38863) for their financial support.

Bidding wind energy under uncertainty

Usaola, Julio; Angarita, Jorge
Fonte: IEEE Publicador: IEEE
Tipo: Conferência ou Objeto de Conferência Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /05/2007 ENG
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The integration of wind energy into electricity markets implies that the wind energy must commit their production for a given time period. This requires the use of short term wind power prediction tools to prepare the bids for the spot market. The output of these tools have a limited accuracy, and, therefore, these predictions are uncertain. Optimal bids must take into account this uncertainty in order to get the maximum revenue from the sell of energy, minimizing losses due to imbalance costs. The consequence is that the optimal bids sent to the market do not coincide with the best predictions. Regulatory authorities must consider if this situation is good for the system operation, and encourage TSOs to have their own prediction tools and have results independent of bidding strategies.; International Conference on Clean Electrical Power, ICCEP '07 (Capri, 21-23 May 2007). P. 754-759

Persistent markups in bidding markets with financial constraints

Beker, Pablo F.; Hernando-Veciana, Ángel
Fonte: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid Publicador: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/draft; info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper Formato: application/pdf; text/plain
Publicado em 26/10/2011 ENG
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This paper studies the impact of financial constraints on the persistency of high markups in a class of markets, including public procurement, known by practitioners as bidding markets. We develop an infinite horizon model in which two firms optimally reinvest working capital and bid for a procurement contract each period. Working capital is constrained by the firm's cash from previous period and some exogenous cash flow, it is costly and it increases the set of acceptable bids. We argue that the latter is a natural consequence of the presence of progress payments or the existence of moral hazard. We say that the firm is (severely) financially constrained if its working capital is such that only bids (substantially) above production cost are acceptable. We show that markups are positive (high) if and only if one firm is (severely) financially constrained. Our main result is that markups are persistently high because one firm is severely financially constrained most of the time.

Analysis of First Price Sealed Bidding (FPSB) using game theory

Tozendemir, Suat
Fonte: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: xii, 291 p.;28 cm.
EN_US
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited; This thesis analyzes the First Price Sealed Bidding (FPSB) procurement method using computer simulations. The First Price Sealed Bidding is a static Bayesian Game with incomplete information. These games have a well defined Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Using this theory, this study found the bidders' equilibrium strategies. The equilibrium strategy is the strategy that maximizes bidders' profit simultaneously. Some assumptions have been made to be able to construct a model for the FPSB. Then, the model was transformed into computer simulation code using Visual Basic programming language. Two different simulation programs used to experiment with several scenarios under uniform and triangular production cost distributions. The simulation showed the bidders' behavior and identified factors affecting the bidders' decision while preparing their bids. The most influential factors found to be production cost distributions and number of bidders. Concluding observations concerning both buyers and bidders present the results derived from the analysis of experiments; http://archive.org/details/analysisoffirstp00toze; Turkish Navy author.; Lieutenant Junior Grade, Turkish Navy

Residual demand models for strategic bidding in European power exchanges : revisiting the methodology in the presence of a large penetration of renewables

VAZQUEZ, Samuel; RODILLA, Pablo; BATLLE, Carlos
Fonte: Elsevier Science Sa Publicador: Elsevier Science Sa
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
EN
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In the deregulated framework in place in most power systems, a significant part of the energy is traded through auctions on day-ahead markets where agents submit bids to either buy or sell energy. When defining a bidding strategy, generators usually resort to models that anticipate and simulate agent interactions. The residual demand curve (RDC), a well-known approach to representing competitor behaviour, enables generators to formulate effective oligopolistic strategies. One way to estimate and build an RDC is to use information available about other agents' bids on previous and comparable days as a reference, This basic approach to market modelling has proven useful in the past in European power exchanges. In the current context, however, characterised by substantial market penetration on the part of non-dispatchable renewable resources, the suitability of this method of RDC building may need to be tested. This paper first analyses how the results of day-ahead auctions on European power exchanges have been affected by the growing penetration of renewable energy. It then questions both the use of RDC as an approach in this changing context and the aforementioned simplified estimation method to compute these curves. The discussion is illustrated with empirical evidence from the Iberian market.

Extending Telecommunications Service to Rural Areas-The Chilean Experience : Awarding Subsidies Through Competitive Bidding

Wellenius, Björn
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Viewpoint; Publications & Research
ENGLISH
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Chile's telecommunications market is one of the most open and competitive in the world. Nevertheless, about 10 percent of all Chileans that live in localities do not even have a public telephone. To increase access to public telephones in rural and low-income urban areas, the Chilean government set up a special fund in 1994. The fund, due to expire in 1998, is financed by the national budget and administered by a council chaired by the telecommunications minister. The council decides on the annual program of projects eligible for subsidy and awards the projects and subsidies through competitive bidding. The fund's second round began in August 1996. With successful completion of the 1996 round, more than 97 percent of Chileans will likely have access to basic telecommunications by 1998, and the fund may well have a surplus. This Note describes the Chilean experience and the lessons that may be broadly applicable in other emerging economies.

Optimal Bidding in Online Auctions

Bertsimas, Dimitris J.; Hawkins, Jeff; Perakis, Georgia
Fonte: MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology Publicador: MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: 508996 bytes; application/pdf
EN_US
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Online auctions are arguably one of the most important and distinctly new applications of the internet. The predominant player in online auctions, eBay, has over 18.9 milllion users, and it was the host of over $5 billion worth of goods sold in the year 2000. Using methods from approximate dynamic programming and integer programming, we design algorithms for optimally bidding for a single item online auction, and simultaneous or overlapping multiple online auctions. We report computational evidence using data from eBay's web site from 1772 completed auctions for personal digital assistants and from 4208 completed auctions for stamp collections that show that (a) the optimal dynamic strategy outperforms simple but widely used static heuristic rules for a single auction, and (b) a new approach combining the value functions of single auctions found by dynamic programming using an integer programming framework produces high quality solutions fast and reliably.; Singapore-MIT Alliance (SMA)

Bidding for the Surplus: Realizing Efficient Outcomes in General Economic Environments

Mutuswami, Suresh; Pérez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David
Fonte: Conselho Superior de Investigações Científicas Publicador: Conselho Superior de Investigações Científicas
Tipo: Documento de trabajo
ENG
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In this paper, we consider two classes of economic environments. In the first type, agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. In the second type, economic activity takes place via formation of links. Agents need both to both form a network and decide how to share the output generated. For both scenarios, we suggest a bidding mechanism whereby agents bid for the right to decide upon the organization of the economic activity. The subgame perfect equilibria of this game generate efficient outcomes.; Pérez-Castrillo acknowledges financial support from BEC2000-0172 and 2000SGR-00054.

In whose backyard? A generalized bidding approach

Pérez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David
Fonte: Conselho Superior de Investigações Científicas Publicador: Conselho Superior de Investigações Científicas
Tipo: Documento de trabajo
ENG
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We analyze situations in which a group of agents (and possibly a designer) have to reach a decision that will affect all the agents. Examples of such scenarios are the location of a nuclear reactor or the siting of a major sport event. To address the problem of reaching a decision, we propose a one-stage multi-bidding mechanism where agents compete for the project by submitting bids. All Nash equilibria of this mechanism are efficient. Moreover, the payoffs attained in equilibrium by the agents satisfy intuitively appealing lower bounds.; Pérez-Castrillo gratefully acknowledges financial support from the DGES PB97-018 and SGR96-75.

Competitive Bidding for a Long-term Electricity Distribution Contract

Littlechild, Stephen C.
Fonte: Universidade de Cambridge Publicador: Universidade de Cambridge
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: 145874 bytes; application/pdf; application/pdf
EN_GB
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Demsetz (1968) advocated competitive bidding as a replacement for natural monopoly regulation. Williamson (1976) and Goldberg (1976) argued that these problems of natural monopoly regulation are inherent in long-term investment under uncertainty, and that both long- and short-term franchising contracts may be more problematic than regulation. Williams illustrated this argument with the problems experienced in bidding to provide cable TV in Oakland. London Underground recently put out top tender to provide cable (thirty-year) contract for operation, maintenance, repair and renewal of its electricity distribution network. The evidence of this contract suggests that competitive bidding to provide a natural monopoly service is feasible and advantageous. The problems in Oakland CATV case were not encountered. However, the contract involves considerable resources to formulate and monitor, and envisages repeated modification and additional works. The possibility of competitive contracting to replace or supplement utility network regulation deserves further consideration.

Considerations of mandatory bidding and tutelage of administrative morality; Considerações sobre a obrigatoriedade licitatória e a tutela da moralidade administrativa

Vilhena, Isabella Magalhães; Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF)
Fonte: Revista de Direito dos Monitores da Universidade Federal Fluminense (Monitor's Law Review); Revista de Direito dos Monitores da Universidade Federal Fluminense Publicador: Revista de Direito dos Monitores da Universidade Federal Fluminense (Monitor's Law Review); Revista de Direito dos Monitores da Universidade Federal Fluminense
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion; ; Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 07/09/2011 POR
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This study aims to correlate the concepts relating to bidding and administrative morality, stressing the constitutional obligation to hold bidding contests for Public Administration as a way to protect the effectiveness of the Principle of Morality, and on the other hand, the need for compliance morality in order to validate administrative acts and administrative procedures, among which the bidding.; O presente trabalho tem por finalidade correlacionar os conceitos atinentes à licitação e à moralidade administrativa, ressaltando a obrigatoriedade constitucional de realização de certames licitatórios pela Administração Pública como forma de tutelar a efetividade do Princípio da Moralidade, e, por via inversa, a necessidade da observância da moralidade administrativa a fim de validar os atos e procedimentos administrativos, dentre os quais, a licitação.

MODELING OF BIDDING PRICES IN POWER MARKETS USING CLUSTERING AND FUZZY ASSOCIATION RULES

GALLEGO VEGA,LUIS EDUARDO; DUARTE VELASCO,OSCAR GERMAN
Fonte: DYNA Publicador: DYNA
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: text/html
Publicado em 01/04/2011 EN
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In this paper, a strategy for discovering patterns over the continuous domain of bidding prices is proposed. In particular, the proposed method represents bidding functions as points in a multidimensional space where a clustering algorithm is applied. Also, as a result of this method, a dramatic reduction over the search space of bidding strategies is achieved. In addition, some relations of dominance over bidding strategies are found, improving the pattern recognition process of agents’ bidding behavior. This method is applied on the bidding prices database for some GENCOs of the Colombian power (electricity) market. Furthermore, an application of some data mining algorithms is presented with the purpose of quantifying some hypothesis formulated on the effect of hydrology over both spot and bidding prices.