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Spousal Employment and Intra-Household Bargaining Power*

Antman, Francisca M.
Fonte: PubMed Publicador: PubMed
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em /05/2014 EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.43%
This paper considers the relationship between work status and decision-making power of the head of household and his spouse. I use household fixed effects models to address the possibility that spousal work status maybe correlated with unobserved factors that also affect bargaining power within the home. Consistent with the hypothesis that greater economic resources yield greater bargaining power, I find that the spouse of the head of household is more likely to be involved in decisions when she has been employed. Similarly, the head of household is less likely to be the sole decision-maker when his spouse works.

Bargaining Power Dynamics and the Negotiation of Commercial Rights and Obligations: A Case of Athlete Agreements

Arsenault, Craig
Fonte: Brock University Publicador: Brock University
Tipo: Electronic Thesis or Dissertation
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
56.55%
This qualitative case study explored how the structural power imbalance in high performance sport influenced the bargaining process and resulting commercial rights and obligations of a single Canadian national sport organization’s (NSO1) Athlete Agreement. Principles comprising the doctrine of unconscionability, specifically the identification of a power imbalance between contracting parties, and the exploration of how that power imbalance influenced the terms of the contract, provided a framework to analyze factors influencing the commercial contents of NSO1’s Athlete Agreement. The results of this analysis revealed that despite the overarching influence of the inherent structural power imbalance on all aspects of NSO1 and its membership, an athletes’ level of commercial appeal can reach such heights as to balance the bargaining positions of both parties and subsequently influence the commercial contents of the Athlete Agreement.

Bargaining Over Labor: Do Patients have any Power?

Gans, Joshua S; Leigh, Andrew
Fonte: CEPR, RSSS, ANU Publicador: CEPR, RSSS, ANU
Tipo: Working/Technical Paper Formato: 240587 bytes; application/pdf
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
56.43%
Using data on births from Australia, we estimate the level of patient bargaining power in negotiations over birth timing. In doing so, we exploit the fact that parents do not like to have children born on the “inauspicious” dates of February 29 and April 1. We show that, in general, the birth rate is lower on these dates, and argue that this reflects parent preferences. When these inauspicious dates abut a weekend, this creates a potential conflict between avoiding the inauspicious date, and avoiding the weekend. We find that in approximately three-quarters of cases, this conflict is resolved in favor of the physician. This suggests that while doctors have more power than patients, patients are sometimes able to influence medical decisions for non-medical reasons.; no

Individual contracts, collective bargaining, wages and power

Peetz, David
Fonte: Universidade Nacional da Austrália Publicador: Universidade Nacional da Austrália
Tipo: Working/Technical Paper Formato: 186531 bytes; application/pdf
EN_AU
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.68%
Over the past decade or more, employer use of individual contracts to determine pay and conditions for employees increased in Australia and elsewhere, in no small part due to encouragement by governments, including through legislation promoting Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs). This paper considers the evidence on the impact of individual contacts and collective bargaining on outcomes such as pay and conditions for employees and the implications for the distribution of power. Employees on AWAs receive higher pay on average than other employees, due to the overrepresentation of managerial and senior specialised skilled staff amongst AWA employees. For other employees, however, individual contracts appear to be more likely to be associated with lower wage increases and/or a reduction in other conditions of employment. This in turn reflects the impact that individual contracting, compared to collective bargaining, has on the power of employees. Collective bargaining increases the bargaining power of employees, is the mechanism by which unions achieve most gains for their members, and is strengthened when union density is high. However, not all employees receive lower wages if they shift from collective bargaining to AWAs: some receive a non-union premium...

Bargaining Power and Efficiency in Principal-Agent Relationships

Quiggin, John; Chambers, R. G
Fonte: Universidade Nacional da Austrália Publicador: Universidade Nacional da Austrália
Tipo: Working/Technical Paper Formato: 1168704 bytes; application/pdf
EN_AU
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.43%
Agrarian contracts such as sharecropping are frequently modelled as principal agent relationships. Although it is commonly assumed that the principal has complete freedom to design the contract, the problem formulation in much of the principal agent literature presumes that the sharecropping contract is constrained-Paretoefficient. In the present paper, we consider the implications of a richer specification of the choices available to peasants. In particular, we consider the entire spectrum of possible power differentials in the contracting relationship between landlords and peasants. Our central result is that the agent can exploit information asymmetries to offset the bargaining power of the principal, but that this process is socially costly.; no

Hidden information, bargaining power, and efficiency: an experiment

Cabrales, Antonio; Charness, Gary; Villeval, Marie Claire
Fonte: Springer Publicador: Springer
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion; info:eu-repo/semantics/article Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em //2011 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.43%
We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of bargaining power on the design and the selection of contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent of unknown type. In our second treatment, a principal can select one of three agents, while in a third treatment an agent may choose between the contract menus offered by two principals. We first show theoretically how different ratios of principals and agents affect outcomes and efficiency. Informational asymmetries generate inefficiency. In an environment where principals compete against each other to hire agents, these inefficiencies may disappear, but they are insensitive to the number of principals. In contrast, when agents compete to be hired, efficiency improves dramatically, and it increases in the relative number of agents because competition reduces the agents’ informational monopoly power. However, this environment also generates a high inequality level and is characterized by multiple equilibria. In general, there is a fairly high degree of correspondence between the theoretical predictions and the contract

Hidden information, bargaining power, and efficiency: an experiment

Cabrales, Antonio; Charness, Gary; Villeval, Marie Claire
Fonte: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid Publicador: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 18/01/2009 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.43%
We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of bargaining power on the design and the selection of contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent of unknown type. In our second treatment, a principal can select one of three agents, while in a third treatment an agent may choose between the contract menus offered by two principals. We first show theoretically how different ratios of principals and agents affect outcomes and efficiency. Informational asymmetries generate inefficiency. In an environment where principals compete against each other to hire agents, these inefficiencies remain. In contrast, when agents compete to be hired, efficiency improves dramatically, and it increases in the relative number of agents because competition reduces the agents’ informational monopoly power. However, this environment also generates a high inequality level and is characterized by multiple equilibria. In general, there is a fairly high degree of correspondence between the theoretical predictions and the contract menus actually chosen in each treatment. There is, however, a tendency to choose more ‘generous’ (and more efficient) contract menus over time. We find that competition leads to a substantially higher probability of trade...

Endogenous scope of bargaining in oligopoly

Petrakis, Emmanuel; Vlassis, Minas
Fonte: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid Publicador: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /04/1996 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.58%
In this paper the scope of firm-union decentralized bargaining is shown to be endogenously determined in industries with market power. We consider a homogenous industry where firms compete in quantities. Efficient Bargains may only occur if both, the firm and its own union, unanimously agree to negotiate over employment as well as wages. Right-to-Manage bargaining takes place, if either the firm or its union choose to bargain only over wages, leaving employment decision at the firm's discretion. We show that Right-to-Manage emerges, as a subgame perfect equilibrium bargaining institution, only if the union's bargaining power is sufficiently high. If, however, the union's bargaining power is low enough, Efficient Bargains is always chosen by a subset of firm/union pairs. A firm/union pair prefers to conduct Efficient Bargains, because the firm can thus commit to a particulary quantity, and hence enjoy a sufficient portion ofthe Stackelberg leader's profits in the product market.

Endogenous wage-bargaining institutions in oligopolistic industries

Petrakis, Emmanuel; Vlassis, Minas
Fonte: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid Publicador: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /01/1996 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.62%
This paper develops a framework of endogenous formation of wage-bargaining institutions regarding the level at which unions and firms negotiate in industries with market power. We show that economic factors, such as asymmetries in productive efficiency and bargaining power, are responsible for the en~ ',gence of various degrees of bargaining centralization. An all unionefficient firms majorit) coalition typically establishes an extra stage of wage negotiations at the sectorial level. If, for given bargaining powers, the productivity differences are sufficiently high, wage negotiations are also conducted at firm-level. Otherwise, the (minimum) wage bargain struck at the sectorial level is simply confirmed by both, firms and unions. This is a case of complete bargaining centralization. If, however, technological and bargaining power asymmetries cancel out, wage negotiations are conducted only at the firm level (decentralized bargaining).

Essays on bargaining power

Heidhues, Paul Franz
Fonte: Universidade Rice Publicador: Universidade Rice
Tipo: Thesis; Text Formato: 156 p.; application/pdf
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.7%
This thesis contains three essays in which the formation of coalitions affects players' bargaining power in input markets. The first essay considers two independent bilateral monopoly markets. It shows that integrating two players on the same side of these independent bilateral monopoly markets may increase their bargaining power. The exposition focuses on multiple cable system operators, which may have a bargaining advantage over unintegrated cable system operators when negotiating with broadcasters. The second essay extends the bargaining theory developed in the first essay to multiple (interconnected) bilateral negotiations between producers and distributors. Using a bargaining theoretic framework, it studies the effects of integration among local distributors on the incentives for producers' entry. The essay shows that concentration in the distributor industry may increase distributors' bargaining power vis-a-vis producers and thereby reduce incentives for producers to enter the upstream industry. The third essay investigates the effects of coalition formation across two bilateral negotiations in which the downstream players compete with each other on the product market. As an illustrative example, it analyzes the effects of industry unions and employers' associations in a duopolistic industry. Using an "efficient bargaining" model...

Intrahousehold Bargaining and Resource Allocation in Developing Countries

Doss, Cheryl
Fonte: Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank Publicador: Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank
Tipo: Journal Article; Publications & Research :: Journal Article
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
56.68%
Many key development outcomes depend on women s ability to negotiate favorable intrahousehold allocations of resources. Yet it has been difficult to clearly identify which policies can increase women's bargaining power and result in better outcomes. This paper reviews both the analytical frameworks and the empirical evidence on the importance of women's bargaining power. It argues that there is sufficient evidence from rigorous studies to conclude that women's bargaining power does affect outcomes. But in many specific instances, the quantitative evidence cannot rigorously identify causality. In these cases, a combination of quantitative and qualitative evidence may suggest policy levers. Taken together, there are sufficient data in place to support a greatly expanded focus on intrahousehold outcomes and bargaining power. Additional data at the individual level will allow for further and more detailed research. A growing literature supports the current conventional wisdom -- namely, that the patterns of evidence suggest that women s education, incomes, and assets all are important aspects of women s bargaining power.

Labor Market Reforms, Growth, and Unemployment in Labor-Exporting Countries in the Middle East and North Africa

Agénor, Pierre-Richard; Nabli, Mustapha K.; Yousef, Tarik; Jensen, Henning Tarp
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, D.C. Publicador: World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper; Publications & Research
ENGLISH; EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.51%
This paper studies the impact of labor market policies on growth and unemployment in labor-exporting countries in the Middle East and North Africa. The analysis is based on a framework that captures many of the main features of the labor market in these countries. We conduct a variety of policy experiments, including a reduction in payroll taxation, cuts in public sector wages and employment, an increase in employment subsidies, a reduction in trade unions' bargaining power, and a composite reform program. Our key message is that to foster broad-based growth and job creation in the region, labor market reforms must not be viewed in isolation but rather as a component of a comprehensive program of structural reforms.

Intrahousehold Bargaining and Resource Allocation in Developing Countries

Doss, Cheryl
Fonte: Washington, DC Publicador: Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper; Publications & Research
ENGLISH; EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
56.68%
Many key development outcomes depend on women's ability to negotiate favorable intrahousehold allocations of resources. Yet it has been difficult to clearly identify which policies can increase women's bargaining power and result in better outcomes. This paper reviews both the analytical frameworks and the empirical evidence on the importance of women's bargaining power. It argues that there is sufficient evidence from rigorous studies to conclude that women's bargaining power does affect outcomes. But in many specific instances, the quantitative evidence cannot rigorously identify causality. In these cases, a combination of quantitative and qualitative evidence may suggest policy levers. Taken together, there are sufficient data in place to support a greatly expanded focus on intrahousehold outcomes and bargaining power. Additional data at the individual level will allow for further and more detailed research. A growing literature supports the current conventional wisdom -- namely, that the patterns of evidence suggest that women's education...

Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation : Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories

Wang, Hua; Mamingi, Nlandu; Laplante, Benoît; Dasgupta, Susmita
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper; Publications & Research
ENGLISH; EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
56.62%
Only a small number of studies have empirically examined the determinants of the monitoring and enforcement performed by environmental regulators, and most of these have focused on industrial countries. In contrast, the authors empirically examine the determinants of enforcement in China. More precisely, they analyze the determinants of firms' relative bargaining power with local environmental authorities with respect to the enforcement of pollution charges. The authors show that private sector firms appear to have less bargaining power than state-owned enterprises. Contrary to earlier findings, they also show that firms facing adverse financial situations have more bargaining power than other firms and are more likely to pay smaller pollution charges than they should be paying. Finally, the authors show that the greater the social impact of a firm's emissions (as measured by complaints), the less bargaining power it has with local environmental authorities.

Bargaining and negative externalities

Loyola, Gino; Laengle Scarlazetta, Sigifredo
Fonte: Springer Publicador: Springer
Tipo: Artículo de revista
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.42%
Artículo de publicación ISI; Two important issues in distributive bargaining theory are, first, the conditions under which a negotiation breakdown occurs, and second, what and how source of parties’ bargaining powers influences the properties of a possible agreement. Research based on classicNash’s demand game has explored both questions by sophisticating the original game a lot. As an attempt to deal with both issues under a simpler framework, we propose a modification of the Nash demand game in which bargainers suffer negative externalities proportional to the share of the surplus captured by their rival. It is shown that the negotiator experiencing a relatively high externality level has greater bargaining power and thus, appropriates a larger proportion of the surplus at stake. However, if externality levels are sufficiently high, bargaining powers become incompatible and a negotiation breakdown emerges from the bargaining process. We compare our results with the previous literature, and argue that they can be especially relevant in negotiations held under highly polarized environments.

The Biodiversity Bargaining Problem

Gatti, J. Rupert J.; Goeschl, Timo; Groom, Ben; Swanson, Timothy
Fonte: Universidade de Cambridge Publicador: Universidade de Cambridge
Formato: 389133 bytes; application/pdf; application/pdf
EN_GB
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.42%
This paper describes global biodiversity conservation as a co-operative bargaining problem. We model an interdependent ?technology rich? North and a ?gene rich? South who must co-operate in the biotechnology sector in order to combine their unique and essential resources and maximise global surplus. Chief among the ideas presented here is that, in a manner similar to the ?rational threats? idea posited by Nash (1953), and in line with observations of pre-contractual bargaining over biodiversity conservation in Latin America (World Bank 2003), destruction of biological resources represents a real source of bargaining power to the South in determining the bargaining outcome. Not only this, but current institutional arrangements relevant to the biodiversity bargaining problem, namely the incremental cost approach enshrined in the CBD and IPRs for innovation enshrined in TRIPS, can be shown to offer a second-best solution. These arrangements may induce the strategic incentives in the game of surplus division.

The Long Side of the Market and the Short End of the Stick: Bargaining Power and Price Formation in Buyers', Sellers', and Balanced Markets

Taylor, Curtis
Fonte: The Quarterly Journal of Economics Publicador: The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: 1685675 bytes; application/pdf
Publicado em //1995 EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.4%
The determinants of bargaining power and price formation in a dynamic exchange market where new traders enter randomly over time are studied. When agents on the long side of the market possess the option to wait for the arrival of future partners, the terms of trade in the spot market must honor the value of this option. The equilibrium terms of trade are expressed in intuitive closed-form equations that highlight the distinct influences of short-run spot-market conditions and long-run market demographics. Copyright 1995, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Price discrimination and bargaining power in the global vaccine market

Li, Linda
Fonte: Universidade Duke Publicador: Universidade Duke
Publicado em 26/04/2013 EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
66.51%
Since the 1980s, the market structure of vaccines has become increasingly oligopolistic, and in some cases, monopolistic. Alongside these supply trends, we see the emergence and growth of group procurement schemes on the demand side of the market. National governments and international organizations procure vaccines on behalf of end users. Two such organizations include the UNICEF Supply Division and the PAHO EPI Revolving Fund, for which participation is based on income or geography. Consistent with one of the main goals of group procurement, these groups obtain price discounts on vaccines relative to the private sector. This paper seeks to disentangle two possible explanations for this observed price dispersion using vaccine price data over the years 2002-2012 from UNICEF, PAHO, and the U.S. The two explanations are that of price discrimination and bargaining power. Using proxy variables in a fixed eff ects model, I find that price discrimination does have a signifi cant impact on price discount. I also fi nd support for a bargaining power e ffect, however, with less certainty, and the existence of supply constraints. These fi ndings have important policy implications for national governments, as well as procurement groups.; Honors thesis

Bargaining power in multilateral trade negotiations: Canada and Japan in the Uruguay Round and Doha development agenda.

Lamprecht, Jens
Fonte: London School of Economics and Political Science Thesis Publicador: London School of Economics and Political Science Thesis
Tipo: Thesis; NonPeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /01/2014 EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.7%
The thesis analyses the conditioning factors of Canada’s and Japan’s bargaining power in the multilateral trade negotiations of the Uruguay Round and Doha Development Agenda (DDA). It deals with two related research questions. The central question of this research is: to what extent and why did Canada’s and Japan’s bargaining power decrease from the Uruguay Round to the DDA? This question is related to the following auxiliary research question: what are the conditioning factors of Canada’s and Japan’s bargaining power during the Uruguay Round and DDA, and to what extent have these factors changed from one round to the other? While the thesis includes a general overview of their negotiation profiles, it analyzes specific, detailed case studies of the profiles of these countries in anti-dumping and market access/NAMA negotiations in both rounds. The hypothesis of this research is that Japan and Canada have lost bargaining power from the Uruguay Round to the DDA because of changes in the following conditioning factors: economic power; activity in country coalitions and groups; interests groups and decision-making structures on the domestic level; ideational power; and foreign policy objectives. In addition, the importance of the position of the preferences a country in the spectrum of the overall membership of multilateral trade negotiations is examined. The thesis finds that this hypothesis is partially confirmed. Canada and Japan have mainly lost bargaining power owing to a relative decrease in their economic power...

Frontiers of change and governance in contractual agreements: the possible role of exploitation - Uniting Reformed Church De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 (WCC)

Hawthorne,L
Fonte: PER: Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad Publicador: PER: Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: text/html
Publicado em 01/01/2014 EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.5%
In the South African common law of contract there appears to be support for the open norm of public policy as a general clause to ameliorate the effects of unfair contracts and terms which are contrary to public policy. The courts have on several occasions held that contracts or terms would be regarded as contrary to public policy had they come about where the parties were in an unequal bargaining relationship and this inequality was linked with another factor(s). In this case note it is argued that the element of unequal bargaining position may be contrary to public policy if it is linked with exploitation as the other factor. The element of exploitation was highlighted in the recent court decision of Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 (WCC). In this case the applicant church owned three properties on which were three schools under the control of the State. The church and the State had concluded 20-year notarial leases in respect of each of the properties. A term in the contract provided that after the expiration of the lease period the church would transfer the properties to the State free of charge. After the expiration of the leases the State demanded the transfer of the properties. The church disputed the claim...