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Outsourcing and portuguese collective bargaining

Lambelho, Ana
Fonte: Instituto Politécnico de Leiria Publicador: Instituto Politécnico de Leiria
Tipo: Conferência ou Objeto de Conferência
Publicado em //2010 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
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Comunicação apresentada na Global Conference on Business and Finance, 2010.; The globalization, the technological innovations, the pressures of the market means that enterprises have to face new challenges that to surmount them, has to adopt new business processes, increase the productivity and innovation at all the levels, namely organizational. The new forms of business organization are based on network cooperation, and often achieved by outsourcing. The outsourcing and network programs have important effects on the rates of Union affiliation, on the collective bargaining structure, and effects on the effectiveness of Union collective bargaining as an instrument to regulate labour relations. The effects of outsourcing and network cooperation in working relationships can and should be regulated in collective bargaining. Thus, we will examine how Portuguese collective bargaining considers the complex nature of corporate employers, analyze if collective agreements consider the new working forms and the diversification of employees status, analyze the dispositions that aim to protect the employees of the outsourcer and analyze the dispositions that aim to protect the employees of contracted enterprises. So, this work aims to study...

A negociação coletiva de trabalho no serviço público; Labor collective bargaining in the public service

Teixeira, Marcia Cunha
Fonte: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP Publicador: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
Tipo: Dissertação de Mestrado Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 14/06/2007 PT
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O presente estudo enfoca o tema da negociação coletiva de trabalho no serviço público, afirmando a necessidade de sua efetivação no Brasil. Efetua-se a explanação sobre os conflitos coletivos de trabalho e as dificuldades de trilhar caminhos mais democráticos para a solução desses conflitos, que se prolongam, com prejuízo para a administração, os servidores públicos e principalmente para os cidadãos. Examina-se a resistência à adoção da negociação coletiva no setor público, em solo pátrio, propiciada pela construção dogmática e elaboração jurisprudencial de que a supremacia do interesse público e a obediência ao princípio da legalidade conflitam com o procedimento democrático da negociação. Enfoca-se o debate jurídico mais recente, com as alterações trazidas pela Emenda Constitucional n. 45/2004. Cuida-se da negociação coletiva como direito fundamental no trabalho, discorre-se sobre o papel do Estado na sua sustentação e na tutela da liberdade sindical, com foco nas normas internacionais vigentes, e explana-se sobre os princípios intrínsecos à negociação coletiva em geral, constantes da doutrina estrangeira e nacional. Trata-se da negociação coletiva de trabalho no serviço público...

The Efficiency of Collective Bargaining in Public Schools.

Hosken, D.S.; Margolis, D.N.
Fonte: Université de Montréal Publicador: Université de Montréal
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: 1549878 bytes; application/pdf
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This paper develops a bargaining model of wage and employment determination for the public sector. the solution to the model generates structural wage and employment equations that are estimated using data from New York State teacher-school district collective bargaining agreements.

Unions and Collective Bargaining : Economic Effects in a Global Environment

Aidt, Toke; Tzannatos, Zafiris
Fonte: Washington, DC: World Bank Publicador: Washington, DC: World Bank
EN_US
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The development of industrial relations in different countries, can be essential in their efforts to balance competitiveness, with equitable wages, and improved working conditions. Consequently, a well-functioning labor market is essential for solid economic performance, as well as future economic growth, and, for the well-being of workers, and their families. And, the effects of globalization on workers, on firms, and on macroeconomic performance, relate critically to labor institutions such as, trade unions, and dispute resolution mechanisms. "Unions and Collective Bargaining" is a comprehensive, reference book which evaluates the economic effects of unions, and collective bargaining. This book provides a detailed survey, and synthesis of the economic literature on trade unions, and collective bargaining, and their impact on micro- and macroeconomic outcomes. It shows the effects of collective bargaining in different country settings and time periods.

Collective Bargaining And Faculty Unionization: An Administrative Perspective

Quinn, Colleen M.
Fonte: FIU Digital Commons Publicador: FIU Digital Commons
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: application/pdf
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The purpose of this qualitative case study was to gain insight into the perspectives of experienced higher education administrators regarding faculty unionization, the collective bargaining process, and the interpersonal relationships between higher education faculty members and administrators. The primary method of data collection was semi-structured face to face interviews with nine administrators from two community colleges and two universities in the south Florida area. All of the study participants worked with unionized faculty members and had direct experience participating in bargaining negotiations. Upon the completion of each interview, the researcher listened to the taped audio recording of the interview several times and then transcribed all of the information from the audiotape into a Word file. Data collection and analysis for each participant were performed concurrently. Using a modified concept mapping approach, the research questions were written on large yellow sticky notes and placed in the middle of a wall in the researcher’s home with nine descriptive categorical themes written on smaller sticky notes placed around the study questions. The highlighted quotes and key phrases were cut from each transcript and placed under each of the descriptive categories. Over the course of a few months repeatedly reviewing the research questions that guided this study...

Individual contracts, collective bargaining, wages and power

Peetz, David
Fonte: Universidade Nacional da Austrália Publicador: Universidade Nacional da Austrália
Tipo: Working/Technical Paper Formato: 186531 bytes; application/pdf
EN_AU
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Over the past decade or more, employer use of individual contracts to determine pay and conditions for employees increased in Australia and elsewhere, in no small part due to encouragement by governments, including through legislation promoting Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs). This paper considers the evidence on the impact of individual contacts and collective bargaining on outcomes such as pay and conditions for employees and the implications for the distribution of power. Employees on AWAs receive higher pay on average than other employees, due to the overrepresentation of managerial and senior specialised skilled staff amongst AWA employees. For other employees, however, individual contracts appear to be more likely to be associated with lower wage increases and/or a reduction in other conditions of employment. This in turn reflects the impact that individual contracting, compared to collective bargaining, has on the power of employees. Collective bargaining increases the bargaining power of employees, is the mechanism by which unions achieve most gains for their members, and is strengthened when union density is high. However, not all employees receive lower wages if they shift from collective bargaining to AWAs: some receive a non-union premium...

Die Bewertung des Geständnisses in der Strafzumessung und in der Beweisaufnahme als Sonderproblem der Urteilsabsprache; The assessment of confession in sentencing and in hearing evidence as a particular problem of plea bargaining

Hsu, Tze-Tien
Fonte: Universidade de Tubinga Publicador: Universidade de Tubinga
Tipo: Dissertação
DE_DE
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Diese Arbeit konzentriert sich auf das abgesprochene Geständnis, das in der Regel im Gegenzug eine Strafmilderung gewährt. Ansonsten würde wohl kaum ein Angeklagter jemals ein Geständnis ablegen. Das bedeutet, dass Geständnis und Strafrabatt im Rahmen der Absprachepraxis eindeutig zur "Handelsware" geworden sind, gleichgültig, ob man es wahrhaben will oder nicht. Demnach können die prozessrechtlichen Fragen der Absprachepraxis nicht isoliert von jenen materiell-rechtlichen betrachtet werden. Daher hängt die grundlegende Frage, ob und inwieweit die Praxis der Absprache den wesentlichen Grundsätzen des auf materielle Wahrheitsfindung und schuldangemessene Strafe abzielenden (bisherigen) deutschen Strafverfahrens widerspricht, in großem Maße davon ab, welche Rolle ein Geständnis in der Strafzumessung und in der Beweisaufnahme sowohl im "normalen" Strafverfahren als auch bei der Urteilsabsprache spielt. Diese Fragen sind daher Gegenstand der vorliegenden Arbeit.; This study focuses on confessions obtained through plea bargaining which, in general, guarantee more lenient sentencing in return. Otherwise, hardly any defendant would ever make a confession. This means that confession and penal abatement have clearly become a "commodity" ("an article of trade") in plea bargain practice...

Envy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining

KOHLER, Stefan
Fonte: Instituto Universitário Europeu Publicador: Instituto Universitário Europeu
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf; digital
EN
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Bargainers in an open-ended alternating-offer bargaining situation may perceive envy, a utility loss caused by receiving the smaller share that is modeled in some social preferences in addition to self-interest. I extend Rubinstein (1982)’s original solution of the bargaining problem for two self-interested bargainers to this strategic situation. Bargainers still reach agreement in the first period and their bargaining shares increase in the strength of their own envy.

Endogenous scope of bargaining in oligopoly

Petrakis, Emmanuel; Vlassis, Minas
Fonte: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid Publicador: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /04/1996 ENG
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In this paper the scope of firm-union decentralized bargaining is shown to be endogenously determined in industries with market power. We consider a homogenous industry where firms compete in quantities. Efficient Bargains may only occur if both, the firm and its own union, unanimously agree to negotiate over employment as well as wages. Right-to-Manage bargaining takes place, if either the firm or its union choose to bargain only over wages, leaving employment decision at the firm's discretion. We show that Right-to-Manage emerges, as a subgame perfect equilibrium bargaining institution, only if the union's bargaining power is sufficiently high. If, however, the union's bargaining power is low enough, Efficient Bargains is always chosen by a subset of firm/union pairs. A firm/union pair prefers to conduct Efficient Bargains, because the firm can thus commit to a particulary quantity, and hence enjoy a sufficient portion ofthe Stackelberg leader's profits in the product market.

Endogenous wage-bargaining institutions in oligopolistic industries

Petrakis, Emmanuel; Vlassis, Minas
Fonte: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid Publicador: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /01/1996 ENG
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This paper develops a framework of endogenous formation of wage-bargaining institutions regarding the level at which unions and firms negotiate in industries with market power. We show that economic factors, such as asymmetries in productive efficiency and bargaining power, are responsible for the en~ ',gence of various degrees of bargaining centralization. An all unionefficient firms majorit) coalition typically establishes an extra stage of wage negotiations at the sectorial level. If, for given bargaining powers, the productivity differences are sufficiently high, wage negotiations are also conducted at firm-level. Otherwise, the (minimum) wage bargain struck at the sectorial level is simply confirmed by both, firms and unions. This is a case of complete bargaining centralization. If, however, technological and bargaining power asymmetries cancel out, wage negotiations are conducted only at the firm level (decentralized bargaining).

Bargaining tactics and strategy in a Government/Contractor bilateral monopoly

Van Veen, Dennis Gerard.
Fonte: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: ix, 161 p.
EN_US
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited; The purpose of this research is to examine potential bargaining strategies and tactics which might be used to respond to an offer perceived as unfair or unreasonable from a sole source offeror. Initially, a sole source offeror normally has considerable bargaining leverage over the Government. Pricing data needed to properly evaluate the seller's quotation may be incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable. Urgent and compelling need may require accelerating the procurement process. Using bargaining theory and the classic economic paradigm of bilateral monopoly as a foundation for the research, potential bargaining strategies and tactics were evaluated through a survey of 62 Department of Defense contracting specialists. A primary conclusion of the research is that attaining a bargaining agreement that reflects a fair and reasonable price under bilateral monopoly conditions is not possible unless the Government possesses adequate information to accurately assess the fairness and reasonableness of the offered price.; http://www.archive.org/details/bargainingtactic00vanv; Lieutenant, United States Navy

Intrahousehold Bargaining and Resource Allocation in Developing Countries

Doss, Cheryl
Fonte: Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank Publicador: Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank
Tipo: Journal Article; Publications & Research :: Journal Article
EN_US
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Many key development outcomes depend on women s ability to negotiate favorable intrahousehold allocations of resources. Yet it has been difficult to clearly identify which policies can increase women's bargaining power and result in better outcomes. This paper reviews both the analytical frameworks and the empirical evidence on the importance of women's bargaining power. It argues that there is sufficient evidence from rigorous studies to conclude that women's bargaining power does affect outcomes. But in many specific instances, the quantitative evidence cannot rigorously identify causality. In these cases, a combination of quantitative and qualitative evidence may suggest policy levers. Taken together, there are sufficient data in place to support a greatly expanded focus on intrahousehold outcomes and bargaining power. Additional data at the individual level will allow for further and more detailed research. A growing literature supports the current conventional wisdom -- namely, that the patterns of evidence suggest that women s education, incomes, and assets all are important aspects of women s bargaining power.

Intrahousehold Bargaining and Resource Allocation in Developing Countries

Doss, Cheryl
Fonte: Washington, DC Publicador: Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper; Publications & Research
ENGLISH; EN_US
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Many key development outcomes depend on women's ability to negotiate favorable intrahousehold allocations of resources. Yet it has been difficult to clearly identify which policies can increase women's bargaining power and result in better outcomes. This paper reviews both the analytical frameworks and the empirical evidence on the importance of women's bargaining power. It argues that there is sufficient evidence from rigorous studies to conclude that women's bargaining power does affect outcomes. But in many specific instances, the quantitative evidence cannot rigorously identify causality. In these cases, a combination of quantitative and qualitative evidence may suggest policy levers. Taken together, there are sufficient data in place to support a greatly expanded focus on intrahousehold outcomes and bargaining power. Additional data at the individual level will allow for further and more detailed research. A growing literature supports the current conventional wisdom -- namely, that the patterns of evidence suggest that women's education...

Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation : Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories

Wang, Hua; Mamingi, Nlandu; Laplante, Benoît; Dasgupta, Susmita
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper; Publications & Research
ENGLISH; EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
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Only a small number of studies have empirically examined the determinants of the monitoring and enforcement performed by environmental regulators, and most of these have focused on industrial countries. In contrast, the authors empirically examine the determinants of enforcement in China. More precisely, they analyze the determinants of firms' relative bargaining power with local environmental authorities with respect to the enforcement of pollution charges. The authors show that private sector firms appear to have less bargaining power than state-owned enterprises. Contrary to earlier findings, they also show that firms facing adverse financial situations have more bargaining power than other firms and are more likely to pay smaller pollution charges than they should be paying. Finally, the authors show that the greater the social impact of a firm's emissions (as measured by complaints), the less bargaining power it has with local environmental authorities.

Three essays on game theory and bargaining; Equilibrium outcomes of repeated two-person zero-sum games; A constructive proof of the Nash Bargaining Solution; Equilibria and outcomes in multiplayer bargaining

Carvalho, Luís
Fonte: NSBE - UNL Publicador: NSBE - UNL
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
Publicado em 27/03/2014 ENG
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A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics; Equilibrium Outcomes of Repeated Two-Person Zero-Sum Games - We consider discounted repeated two-person zero-sum games. We show that even when players have different discount factors (in which case the repeated game is not a zero-sum game), an outcome is subgame perfect if and only if all of its components are Nash equilibria of the stage game. This implies that in all subgame perfect equilibria, each player's payoff is equal to his minmax payoff. In conclusion, the competitive nature of two-player zero-sum games is not altered when the game is repeated.; A Constructive Proof of the Nash Bargaining Solution - We consider the classical axiomatic Nash bargaining framework and propose a constructive proof of its solution. On the first part of this paper we prove Nash’s solution is the result of a maximization problem; on the second part, through the properties of maximand’s indifference curves we derive that it must be equal to xy.; Equilibria and Outcomes in Multiplayer Bargaining - Multiplayer bargaining is a game in which all possible divisions are equilibrium outcomes. This paper presents the classical subgame perfect equilibria strategies and analyses their weak robustness...

Bargaining and negative externalities

Loyola, Gino; Laengle Scarlazetta, Sigifredo
Fonte: Springer Publicador: Springer
Tipo: Artículo de revista
EN
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Artículo de publicación ISI; Two important issues in distributive bargaining theory are, first, the conditions under which a negotiation breakdown occurs, and second, what and how source of parties’ bargaining powers influences the properties of a possible agreement. Research based on classicNash’s demand game has explored both questions by sophisticating the original game a lot. As an attempt to deal with both issues under a simpler framework, we propose a modification of the Nash demand game in which bargainers suffer negative externalities proportional to the share of the surplus captured by their rival. It is shown that the negotiator experiencing a relatively high externality level has greater bargaining power and thus, appropriates a larger proportion of the surplus at stake. However, if externality levels are sufficiently high, bargaining powers become incompatible and a negotiation breakdown emerges from the bargaining process. We compare our results with the previous literature, and argue that they can be especially relevant in negotiations held under highly polarized environments.

Between decentralisation and centralisation of collective bargaining. The Spanish case

Martin, Antonio (Martin Artiles); Alós, Ramón
Fonte: Universidade Autônoma de Barcelona Publicador: Universidade Autônoma de Barcelona
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: application/pdf; application/pdf
Publicado em //2003 ENG
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This article examines four aspects of Spanish industrial relations. It examines first the impact of labour reforms on collective bargaining in 1994 and 1997, and second, the socio-economic consequences of collective bargaining, especially as concerns the control of inflation through pay restraint. Third, it examines the changes in the articulation of the bargaining levels, and fourth, it deals with the coverage and legitimacy introduced by the current changes in collective bargaining. The conclusions of this exploration are twofold. On the one hand, legal changes imply a dual process of decentralisation and centralisation in the structure of collective bargaining. Both processes are complementary to a certain extent, but they are also independent of each other. On the other hand, legal changes have resulted in a widening and enrichment of the content of bargaining. This means introducing new clauses in collective agreements. The exchange of security of employment for flexibility in working time and the introduction of a new agenda of qualitative bargaining are the most important ones; Dieser Aufsatz untersucht Spaniens Tarifsystem in Bezug auf (1) die Auswirkungen der arbeitsrechtlichen Reformen auf das System, (2) dessen sozioökonomische Effekte...

The governability of collective bargaining. The case of Spain

Nonell, Rosa; Alós, Ramón; Martin, Antonio (Martin Artiles); Molins, Joaquim,
Fonte: Universidade Autônoma de Barcelona Publicador: Universidade Autônoma de Barcelona
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article; info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em //2006 ENG
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The aim of this article is to analyse the concept of governability of collective bargaining proposed by Traxler, Blaschke and Kittel (2001) and to demonstrate its explanatory capacity and limitations in the Spanish case. Governability is today an important subject that should be taken into account in the reform of industrial relations systems and in the debate between centralisation and decentralisation of collective bargaining in Europe. Our main hypothesis is drawn up in line with the institutionalist approach. We will argue and document with the results of collective bargaining, that the Spanish system of collective bargaining, in spite of the organizational weakness of the unions and of the employers associations, is governable thanks to the role of the state, the institutions, the legal ordering, as well as the tradition and the custom.

The Biodiversity Bargaining Problem

Gatti, J. Rupert J.; Goeschl, Timo; Groom, Ben; Swanson, Timothy
Fonte: Universidade de Cambridge Publicador: Universidade de Cambridge
Formato: 389133 bytes; application/pdf; application/pdf
EN_GB
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This paper describes global biodiversity conservation as a co-operative bargaining problem. We model an interdependent ?technology rich? North and a ?gene rich? South who must co-operate in the biotechnology sector in order to combine their unique and essential resources and maximise global surplus. Chief among the ideas presented here is that, in a manner similar to the ?rational threats? idea posited by Nash (1953), and in line with observations of pre-contractual bargaining over biodiversity conservation in Latin America (World Bank 2003), destruction of biological resources represents a real source of bargaining power to the South in determining the bargaining outcome. Not only this, but current institutional arrangements relevant to the biodiversity bargaining problem, namely the incremental cost approach enshrined in the CBD and IPRs for innovation enshrined in TRIPS, can be shown to offer a second-best solution. These arrangements may induce the strategic incentives in the game of surplus division.

Plea bargaining in major german corporate criminal proceedings - an empirical study negotiated Judgements; “Plea bargaining” em processos envolvendo grandes corporações alemãs – estudo empírico. Julgamentos negociados

Frankenberg, Kiyomy v.
Fonte: Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Direito Publicador: Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Direito
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion; ; Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 01/01/2012 POR
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In August 2009, the German Parliament passed a law that allows for plea bargaining, a fundamental change in the German Code of Criminal Procedure. Whilst the German practice of plea bargaining is harshly criticized by academic discourse, there is little empirical knowledge on the concrete course of plea bargaining negotiations. This study seeks to provide an insight into the precise course of plea bargaining negotiations in an effort to reveal the normative order that underlies plea bargaining proceedings in corporate criminal trials. Interviews with the participants of major German corporate criminal proceedings show that trust and diplomacy characterize the beginning of plea bargaining negotiations. These negotiations mostly take place secretly, but in major corporate criminal proceedings, the general public is informed about the plea bargaining, because the legal practitioners want to maintain the public‘s trust in the justice system. Plea bargaining can be seen as an effort to maintain basic tenets of criminal procedure and to enforce principles of criminal law even in complex corporate criminal cases.; Em agosto de 2009, o Parlamento alemão aprovou Lei que autoriza a plea bargaining, uma mudança de impacto no Código de Processo Penal Alemão. Embora a plea bargaining seja duramente criticada por discurso acadêmico...