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O mercado de concessão de transmissão de energia elétrica no Brasil; The concession market of electricity transmission lines in Brazil

Hirota, Heitor Hiroaki
Fonte: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP Publicador: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
Tipo: Dissertação de Mestrado Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 04/08/2006 PT
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.24%
O objetivo deste trabalho foi analisar o mercado de concessões de prestação do serviço de transmissão de energia elétrica do Brasil. Essa concessão dura trinta anos e, se for considerado que houve muitos interessados em ganhar as concessões, para a maioria dos leilões realizados até 2005 o resultado dos leilões podem ser considerados um grande sucesso. Esses leilões são recentes, se iniciaram em 1999. Antes disso o setor passava por dificuldades de investimento. Após reformulação de algumas leis, o setor elétrico deixou de ser dependente de financiamentos governamentais. O setor privado começou a investir de forma controlada nesses projetos de grande porte e a obrigação do governo passou a ser o de fiscalizar e formular as leis do setor. Como houve muitos interessados em prestar o serviço público, os leilões foram a forma escolhida para decidir qual era a empresa mais eficiente. Os leilões são descendentes de primeiro preço em dois estágios em que o primeiro estágio é secreto em envelope fechado. Caso a diferença entre o menor valor e os outros lances seja menor do que 5%, o leilão passa para o segundo estágio que ocorre em viva-voz. Como o objeto leiloado é uma concessão, o valor que os participantes tem de decidir não é o preço a pagar...

Optimal auction with a general distribution: virtual valuation without densities

Svaiter, Benar Fux; Monteiro, Paulo Klinger
Fonte: Fundação Getúlio Vargas Publicador: Fundação Getúlio Vargas
Tipo: Pré-impressão
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.87%
We characterize the optimal auction in an independent private values framework for a completely general distribution of valuations. We do this introducing a new concept: the generalized virtual valuation. To show the wider applicability of this concept we present two examples showing how to extend the classical models of Mussa and Rosen and Baron and Myerson for arbitrary distributions.

A Combinatorial Auction for Collaborative Planning

Hunsberger, Luke; Grosz, Barbara
Fonte: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Publicador: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.87%
When rational, utility-maximizing agents encounter an opportunity to collaborate on a group activity they must determine whether to commit to that activity. We refer to this problem as the initial-commitment decision problem (ICDP). The paper describes a mechanism that agents may use to solve the ICDP. The mechanism is based on a combinatorial auction in which agents bid on sets of roles in the group activity, each role comprising constituent subtasks that must be done by the same agent. Each bid may specify constraints on the execution times of the subtasks it covers. This mechanism permits agents to keep most details of their individual schedules of prior commitments private. The paper reports the results of several experiments testing the performance of the mechanism. These results demonstrate a significant improvement in performance when constituent subtasks are grouped into roles. They also show that as the number of time constraints in bids increases, the probability that there is a solution decreases, the cost of an optimal solution (if one exists) increases, and the time required to find an optimal solution (if one exists) decreases. The paper also describes several strategies that agents might employ when using this mechanism.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

Testing a Purportedly More Learnable Auction Mechanism

Parkes, David; Tumer, Kagan; Barron, Greg; Burns, James; Milkman, Katherine L.
Fonte: Berkeley Mathemarketics Group Publicador: Berkeley Mathemarketics Group
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.37%
We describe an auction mechanism in the class of Groves mechanisms that has received attention in the computer science literature because of its theoretical property of being more “learnable” than the standard second price auction mechanism. We bring this mechanism, which we refer to as the “clamped second price auction mechanism,” into the laboratory to determine whether it helps human subjects learn to play their optimal strategy faster than the standard second price auction mechanism. Contrary to earlier results within computer science using simulated reinforcement learning agents, we find that both in settings where subjects are given complete information about auction payoff rules and in settings where they are given no information about auction payoff rules,subjects converge on playing their optimal strategy significantly faster in sequential auctions conducted with a standard second price auction mechanism than with a clamped second price auction mechanism. We conclude that while it is important for mechanism designers to think more about creating learnable mechanisms, the clamped second price auction mechanism in fact produces slower learning in human subjects than the standard second price auction mechanism. Our results also serve to highlight differences in behavior between simulated agents and human bidders that mechanism designers should take into account before placing too much faith in simulations to test the performance of mechanisms intended for human use.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

An Iterative Generalized Vickrey Auction: Strategy-Proofness without Complete Revelation

Parkes, David C.
Fonte: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence Publicador: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence
Tipo: Monograph or Book
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.32%
The generalized Vickrey auction (GVA) is a strategy-proof combinatorial auction, in which truthful bidding is the optimal strategy for an agent. In this paper we address a fundamental problem with the GVA, which is that it requires agents to compute and reveal their values for all combinations of items. This can be very difficult for bounded-rational agents with limited or costly computation. We propose an experimental design for an iterative combinatorial auction. We have a theoretical proof that the the auction implements the outcome of the Vickrey auction in special cases, and initial experimental results support our conjecture that the auction implements the outcome of the Vickrey auction in all cases. The auction has better information properties than the sealedbid GVA: in each round agents must only bid for the set of bundles that maximize their utility given current ask prices, which does not require agents to compute their exact values for every bundle.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

Rank-order tournaments as selection mechanisms: Applications in project finance; Relative Leistungsturniere als Auslesemechanismen: Anwendungen in der Projektfinanzierung

Kaldewei, Cornelia
Fonte: Universidade de Tubinga Publicador: Universidade de Tubinga
Tipo: Dissertação
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.39%
Tournaments are used in a variety of contexts for ranking competitors on an ordinal scale according to their relative achievements. From competitive sports to manager compensation, they provide a mechanism for incentivizing and selecting contestants in a world of incomplete information. This thesis focuses on the selection aspect, and shows how external (institutional and market) conditions affect selection efficiency in the context of heterogeneous competitors, when the winning prize is determined endogenously by a post-tournament auction. The introduction of a post-tournament auction to endogenize contestants’ expected payoffs allows for a scenario where the tournament winner benefits less from the winning prize itself than more from the positive signal that his victory conveys to the outside world. In the case of a sports tournament, for example, the winner is likely to earn more from resulting endorsement contracts than from the actual prize money. Similarly, in project finance, contestants are more interested in the actual financing of their projects than in what is usually a comparatively small winner’s prize. In addition to an extensive review of the literature on tournaments, this thesis therefore provides a detailed discussion of a common value auction with asymmetric information...

Evaluation of aviation career pay incentives among the Naval Aviation enterprise utilizing auction mechanisms

Williams, Brett M.
Fonte: Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.28%
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited; Naval Aviation utilizes the Aviation Career Continuation Pay (ACCP) as a means to retain qualified aviators to meet manpower requirements. However, the current program has failed to meet targeted retention across communities while overpaying nearly $5,300,000 during FY-2013, according to Eric Kelso. This thesis examines the potential improvements of applying uniform-price auction, Quality Adjusted Discount (QUAD), and CombiNATOrial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) compensation programs to replace the current bonus system. Incorporating survey results from 2,316 naval officers across Navy Aviation, we analyzed the impact that market-based mechanisms would have on quantity, quality, and cost for retained naval aviators. Using these responses, we developed individual quality scores and reservation prices to apply three auction mechanisms to the retention goals and costs of the FY-2013 ACCP program. Our research shows that a market-based auction could include improvements in cost, quality, and particularly quantity of aviators eligible for the Department Head Screen Board. The uniform-price auction meets all retention objectives across Navy Aviation, while reducing costs in some communities by $1...

Essays in Structural Econometrics of Auctions

Bulbul Toklu, Seda
Fonte: Universidade Rice Publicador: Universidade Rice
Tipo: Thesis; Text Formato: application/pdf
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.34%
The first chapter of this thesis gives a detailed picture of commonly used structural estimation techniques for several types of auction models. Next chapters consist of essays in which these techniques are utilized for empirical analysis of auction environments. In the second chapter we discuss the identification and estimation of the distribution of private signals in a common value auction model with an asymmetric information environment. We argue that the private information of the informed bidders are identifiable due to the asymmetric information structure. Then, we propose a two stage estimation method, which follows the identification strategy. We show, with Monte-Carlo experiments, that the estimator performs well. Third chapter studies Outer Continental Shelf drainage auctions, where oil and gas extraction leases are sold. Informational asymmetry across bidders and collusive behavior of informed firms make this environment very unique. We apply the technique proposed in the second chapter to data from the OCS drainage auctions. We estimate the parameters of a structural model and then run counterfactual simulations to see the effects of the informational asymmetry on the government's auction revenue. We find that the probability that information symmetry brings higher revenue to the government increases with the value of the auctioned tract. In the fourth chapter...

Performance of Renewable Energy Auctions : Experience in Brazil, China and India

Elizondo Azuela, Gabriela; Barroso, Luiz; Khanna, Ashish; Wang, Xiaodong; Wu, Yun; Cunha, Gabriel
Fonte: World Bank Group, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank Group, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper; Publications & Research
ENGLISH; EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.34%
This paper considers the design and performance of auction mechanisms used to deploy renewable energy in three emerging economies: Brazil, China, and India. The analysis focuses on the countries' experience in various dimensions, including price reductions, bidding dynamics, coordination with transmission planning, risk allocation strategies, and the issue of domestic content. Several countries have turned to public competitive bidding as a mechanism for developing the renewable generation sector in recent years, with the number of countries implementing some sort of auction procedure rising from nine in 2009 to 36 by the end of 2011 and about 43 in 2013. In general, the use of auctions makes sense when the contracting authority expects a large volume of potentially suitable bids, so that the gains from competition can offset the costs of implementation. A study of the successes and failures of the particular auction design schemes described in this paper can be instrumental in informing future policy making.

Assignment of exclusive spectrum licenses in Japan : use of an auction for the licensee selection process

Matsunaga, Hironori
Fonte: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Publicador: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: 159 p.; 7651233 bytes; 7657900 bytes; application/pdf; application/pdf
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.32%
The demand for spectrum resources has increased in the past decade due to the flourishing wireless industry worldwide. This change requires Japan's Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) to establish a transparent, fair and efficient spectrum allocation process that will enable it to select an optimal set of licensees to realize efficient spectrum use. This thesis proposes an auction system that assigns exclusive spectrum licenses to firms competing in the Japanese wireless industry. MIC currently uses a comparative examination system, which unfortunately lacks certain features the Ministry is required to address. An auction system is an alternative, already employed by many countries to allocate spectrum resources optimally, to secure a transparent and fair decision-making process, and to raise revenue for national coffers. The Diet's approval of legislation authorizing MIC to use auctions is one obstacle because it requires much time and effort to persuade political parties, incumbents, and newcomers of the value of the auction system over the current system. Another challenge to the effectiveness of the auction system is its design, which must be built-to-order based on the goals of each government and specific market conditions.; (cont.) This research covers four areas: (1) The development and transition of the Japanese mobile industry; (2) Analysis of stakeholders' attitudes toward the introduction of the auction system; (3) A proposed strategy for developing an auction design based on an analysis of English...

The Sequential Auction Problem on eBay: An Empirical Analysis and a Solution

Juda, Adam I.; Parkes, David C.
Fonte: Association for Computing Machinery Publicador: Association for Computing Machinery
Tipo: Monograph or Book
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.87%
Bidders on eBay have no dominant bidding strategy when faced with multiple auctions each offering an item of interest. As seen through an analysis of 1,956 auctions on eBay for a Dell E193FP LCD monitor, some bidders win auctions at prices higher than those of other available auctions, while others never win an auction despite placing bids in losing efforts that are greater than the closing prices of other available auctions. These misqueues in strategic behavior hamper the efficiency of the system, and in so doing limit the revenue potential for sellers. This paper proposes a novel options-based extension to eBay's proxy-bidding system that resolves this strategic issue for buyers in commoditized markets. An empirical analysis of eBay provides a basis for computer simulations that investigate the market effects of the options-based scheme, and demonstrates that the options-based scheme provides greater efficiency than eBay, while also increasing seller revenue.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

Estratégias para leilões de energia

Justo, Diógenes Adriano Rizzotto
Fonte: Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul Publicador: Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Tipo: Dissertação Formato: application/pdf
POR
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.28%
A Teoria de Jogos tem sido amplamente utilizada para compreender e avaliar o comportamento dos agentes econômicos. Sua aplicação no estudo de leilões criou um ramo de estudos chamado Teoria de Leilões, através do trabalho pioneiro de Vickrey. Uma negociação realizada através de um leilão pode tomar diversas formas ou sistemáticas, cada qual com suas características. No Brasil, com a segunda reestruturação do setor elétrico em 2004, passou-se a utilizar este mecanismo para concessão de direitos de geração de energia elétrica, um monopólio do estado, por parte de organizações privadas. Diversos estudos abordam a eficiência de leilões, do ponto de vista da entidade organizadora, com objetivo de maximizar o bem estar para a sociedade. Este estudo visa construir um simulador numérico de leilões para avaliação de estratégias do ponto de vista do investidor. Estas estratégias estão condicionadas as características dos agentes participantes e do tipo de leilão. O trabalho adota uma perpectiva de avaliação da recente história dos leilões brasileiros a fim de identificar as estratégias possivelmente adotadas e sugere um modelo baseado na sistemática dos leilões aplicado computacionalmente a um simulador. De uma forma geral o trabalho segue o seguinte roteiro: teoria de jogos e teoria de leilões; mercado energético brasileiro de eletricidade; ferramentas financeiras para financiamento de projetos de energia; resultados dos leilões brasileiros; sistemática dos leilões; formatação do modelo. Elaboração do simulador utilizando: agentes; lógica fuzzy; função utilidade esperada e estratégias. Exercício de simulação: definição dos cenários; geração das bases de dados; execução do simulador. Para o fim a que se propõe...

Multi Agent Communication System for Online Auction with Decision Support System by JADE and TRACE

Martin, A.; Lakshmi, T. Miranda; Madhusudanan, J.
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 06/09/2011
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.34%
The success of online auctions has given buyers access to greater product diversity with potentially lower prices. It has provided sellers with access to large numbers of potential buyers and reduced transaction costs by enabling auctions to take place without regard to time or place. However it is difficult to spend more time period with system and closely monitor the auction until auction participant wins the bid or closing of the auction. Determining which items to bid on or what may be the recommended bid and when to bid it are difficult questions to answer for online auction participants. The multi agent auction advisor system JADE and TRACE, which is connected with decision support system, gives the recommended bid to buyers for online auctions. The auction advisor system relies on intelligent agents both for the retrieval of relevant auction data and for the processing of that data to enable meaningful recommendations, statistical reports and market prediction report to be made to auction participants.; Comment: Multi-Agents, Agents communication, intelligent auction agents, Decision support system, JADE, TRACE

Price of Anarchy for Auction Revenue

Hartline, Jason; Hoy, Darrell; Taggart, Sam
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.32%
This paper develops tools for welfare and revenue analyses of Bayes-Nash equilibria in asymmetric auctions with single-dimensional agents. We employ these tools to derive price of anarchy results for social welfare and revenue. Our approach separates the standard smoothness framework into two distinct parts, isolating the analysis common to any auction from the analysis specific to a given auction. The first part relates a bidder's contribution to welfare in equilibrium to their contribution to welfare in the optimal auction using the price the bidder faces for additional allocation. Intuitively, either an agent's utility and hence contribution to welfare is high, or the price she has to pay for additional allocation is high relative to her value. We call this condition value covering; it holds in every Bayes-Nash equilibrium of any auction. The second part, revenue covering, relates the prices bidders face for additional allocation to the revenue of the auction, using an auction's rules and feasibility constraints. Combining the two parts gives approximation results to the optimal welfare, and, under the right conditions, the optimal revenue. In mechanisms with reserve prices, our welfare results show approximation with respect to the optimal mechanism with the same reserves. As a center-piece result...

Optimal Auction Design with Quantized Bids

Cao, Nianxia; Brahma, Swastik; Varshney, Pramod K.
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 28/09/2015
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.28%
This letter considers the design of an auction mechanism to sell the object of a seller when the buyers quantize their private value estimates regarding the object prior to communicating them to the seller. The designed auction mechanism maximizes the utility of the seller (i.e., the auction is optimal), prevents buyers from communicating falsified quantized bids (i.e., the auction is incentive-compatible), and ensures that buyers will participate in the auction (i.e., the auction is individually-rational). The letter also investigates the design of the optimal quantization thresholds using which buyers quantize their private value estimates. Numerical results provide insights regarding the influence of the quantization thresholds on the auction mechanism.; Comment: 6 pages, 3 figures, TSP letter

Truthful Auction Mechanism for Heterogeneous Spectrum Allocation in Wireless Networks

Huang, He; Sun, Yu-e; Li, Xiang-yang; Xu, Hongli; Zhou, Yousong; Huang, Liusheng
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 01/08/2012
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.32%
Secondary spectrum auction is widely applied in wireless networks for mitigating the spectrum scarcity. In a realistic spectrum trading market, the requests from secondary users often specify the usage of a fixed spectrum frequency band in a certain geographical region and require a duration time in a fixed available time interval. Considering the selfish behaviors of secondary users, it is imperative to design a truthful auction which matches the available spectrums and requests of secondary users optimally. Unfortunately, existing designs either do not consider spectrum heterogeneity or ignore the differences of required time among secondary users. In this paper, we address this problem by investigating how to use auction mechanisms to allocate and price spectrum resources so that the social efficiency can be maximized. We begin by classifying the spectrums and requests from secondary users into different local markets which ensures there is no interference between local markets, and then we can focus on the auction in a single local market. We first design an optimal auction based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to maximize the social efficiency while enforcing truthfulness. To reduce the computational complexity, we further propose a truthful sub-optimal auction with polynomial time complexity...

Modeling On-Line Art Auction Dynamics Using Functional Data Analysis

Reddy, Srinivas K.; Dass, Mayukh
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 11/09/2006
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.48%
In this paper, we examine the price dynamics of on-line art auctions of modern Indian art using functional data analysis. The purpose here is not just to understand what determines the final prices of art objects, but also the price movement during the entire auction. We identify several factors, such as artist characteristics (established or emerging artist; prior sales history), art characteristics (size; painting medium--canvas or paper), competition characteristics (current number of bidders; current number of bids) and auction design characteristics (opening bid; position of the lot in the auction), that explain the dynamics of price movement in an on-line art auction. We find that the effects on price vary over the duration of the auction, with some of these effects being stronger at the beginning of the auction (such as the opening bid and historical prices realized). In some cases, the rate of change in prices (velocity) increases at the end of the auction (for canvas paintings and paintings by established artists). Our analysis suggests that the opening bid is positively related to on-line auction price levels of art at the beginning of the auction, but its effect declines toward the end of the auction. The order in which the lots appear in an art auction is negatively related to the current price level...

The FCC Rules for the 700MHZ Auction: A Potential Disaster

Plott, Charles R.
Fonte: California Institute of Technology Publicador: California Institute of Technology
Tipo: Report or Paper; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /11/2000
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.4%
In July 2000 the FCC issued the rules to govern the upcoming 700MHz auction. The rules are a departure from the auction architectures previously used by the FCC. Rather than all bidding only on individual licenses, the auction participants will be able to bid on combinations or packages of licenses. Several combinatorial auction processes exist in the literature and testing demonstrates that such processes have a potential for substantially increasing the efficiency of the auction. While combinatorial auction systems have been studied in various forms, indeed a particular auction architecture was developed and studied extensively for the FCC, the rules that emerged from the FCC deliberations are unlike any that have ever been implemented before. The purpose of this note is to call attention to the fact that the particular rules developed by the FCC hold the potential for tarnishing the long history of successful auctions within the FCC. The questions posed in the pages that follow are; (i) Will the auction perform efficiently? (ii) Does the FCC have the tools to accelerate the auction or hasten its timely termination? (iii) Will the auction architecture scale up? The thesis of this paper is that the answer to all three of these fundamental questions is “no”. At base the auction rules rest on an inappropriate set of principles. The principles and the intuition drawn from those principles might serve well when the auction is restricted to bids on individual items but when the bids can be on packages of items the principles simply do not apply. The first section of this note outlines the rules. The second section lists problems that can evolve from the implementation of the rules. The third section contains observations about the sources of the problems caused by the rules and the final section suggests changes in the rules that will remove all of the problems listed.

The CMS Auction: Experimental Studies of a Median-Bid Procurement Auction with Nonbinding Bids

Merlob, Brian; Plott, Charles R.; Zhang, Yuanjun
Fonte: Oxford University Press Publicador: Oxford University Press
Tipo: Article; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /05/2012
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.28%
We report on the experimental results of simple auctions with (i) a median-bid pricing rule and (ii) non-binding bids (winning bids can be withdrawn) – the two central pillars of the competitive bidding program designed by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). Comparisons between the performance of the CMS auction and the performance of the excluded-bid auction reveal the problematic nature of the CMS auction. The CMS auction fails to generate competitive prices of goods and fails to satisfy demand. In all proposed efficiency measures, we find the excluded-bid auction significantly outperforms the CMS auction.

Factors affecting the auction price of Veldram performance tested Dorper rams in Namibia

Grobler,H. J. F.; Jordaan,J. W.; van der Rijst,M.
Fonte: South African Journal of Agricultural Extension Publicador: South African Journal of Agricultural Extension
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: text/html
Publicado em 01/01/2011 EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.87%
Veldram performance testing has been conducted over a period of 14 years (1988 to 2002) at Kalahari Research Station in Namibia. During this period 2660 Dorper rams participated in 22 tests. Rams that met growth and breed standards were put up for auction at the completion of each test. The popularity of these auctions for performance tested rams (89.4 % of rams sold) indicate that Veld tested rams were sought after by buyers. The sale price of 296 Veld tested Dorper rams sold between 1994 and 2001, covering seven different tests, were compared with their measured and observed performances. Multiple regression and analysis of variance were carried out to determine which of the factors that were available to buyers significantly influenced price, as well as its contribution towards ram prices fetched. The contributing factors that had the biggest effect on price were Breed Classification (BC), Selection Index (SI), Average Daily Gain (ADG) and End test Mass (EM). This indicates that buyers did recognize the importance of performance data in selecting breeding rams and but most emphasis was on Breed standards (visual appearance). Although Breed Classification is the industry standard used by buyers, top ranking rams (stud) did not perform consistently/significantly better than flock rams.