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Have We Vindicated the Motivational Unconscious Yet? A Conceptual Review

Billon, Alexandre
Fonte: Frontiers Research Foundation Publicador: Frontiers Research Foundation
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 27/09/2011 EN
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Motivationally unconscious (M-unconscious) states are unconscious states that can directly motivate a subject’s behavior and whose unconscious character typically results from a form of repression. The basic argument for M-unconscious states claims that they provide the best explanation for some seemingly non-rational behaviors, like akrasia, impulsivity, or apparent self-deception. This basic argument has been challenged on theoretical, empirical, and conceptual grounds. Drawing on recent works on apparent self-deception and on the “cognitive unconscious” I assess those objections. I argue that (i) even if there is a good theoretical argument for its existence, (ii) most empirical vindications of the M-unconscious miss their target. (iii) As for the conceptual objections, they compel us to modify the classical picture of the M-unconscious. I conclude that M-unconscious states and processes must be affective states and processes that the subject really feels and experiences – and which are in this sense conscious – even though they are not, or not well, cognitively accessible to him. Dual-process psychology and the literature on cold–hot empathy gaps partly support the existence of such M-unconscious states.

Sobre a acrasia em Aristóteles: sua possibilidade, a abordagem dialética e a resposta antissocrática ao problema

Mendonça, Fernando Martins
Fonte: Universidade Federal de Uberlândia Publicador: Universidade Federal de Uberlândia
Tipo: Dissertação
POR
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Essa dissertação tem como objetivo ligar as diversas passagens em que Aristóteles trata da acrasia na Ethica Nicomachea, mostrando que elas formam uma noção clara e consistente desse tipo de ação. Essa noção também é consistente com a abordagem da acrasia no livro VII 1-3, onde Aristóteles trata a acrasia de modo dialético. O método dialético usado, levado a sério, mostrará que Aristóteles salva os phainomena, que são as opiniões aceitas acerca da acrasia, e recusa fortemente a tese socrática, segundo a qual a acrasia não existe porque ninguém pode agir contra o conhecimento que possui. Em vista disso, a interpretação proposta se colocará fortemente contrária à interpretação que atribui a causa da acrasia á ignorância de algum dos elementos do silogismo prático. ______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT; This dissertation aims to connect the various passages in which Aristotle deals with the akrasia in Nicomachea Ethics, showing that they form a clear and consistent notion of such an action. This notion is also consistent with the approach of the acrasia in the book VII 1-3, where Aristotle treats acrasia in a dialectical way. The dialectical method used...

Leibniz: ação racional e fraqueza da vontade; Leibniz: rational action and weakness of will

Fonte: USP Publicador: USP
PT_BR
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This article is an attempt to investigate a classic problem associated with the human action that can be extracted from the Leibnizian texts about the weakness of will, an issue emblematically briefed by Ovide: “I see clearly which [way] is better, and I know it is right, yet I follow the way that is worse”. The author of the Theodicy seems to suggest a way to understand the phenomenon of akrasia. A good source for this research is his work New Essays on Human Understanding, in which he directly debates thesis of the book An Essay Concerning Human Understanding by Locke. In Leibnizian text, one of the concepts discussed is the uneasiness. Locke believes that the fundamental basis for human actions would be to prevent the uneasiness caused by the feeling of missing something. Leibniz not completely refutes the idea of the English philosopher, however looks for improving it by introducing “the perceptions which are not apperceived”. In Leibnizian philosophy the problem of weakness of will may be linked to a region that the agent does not know directly but which is fundamental to any action, even for the so-called rational.

La faiblesse de volonté : conceptions classiques et dynamiques

Labonté, Jean-François
Fonte: Université de Montréal Publicador: Université de Montréal
Tipo: Thèse ou Mémoire numérique / Electronic Thesis or Dissertation
FR
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La présente thèse expose, analyse et critique les positions classiques et modernes à l’égard de la nature et des causes de la faiblesse de volonté. L’identification du problème par Platon et Aristote a donné lieu à l’explicitation de principes et propositions portant sur la rationalité pratique en général et la motivation en particulier. Une discussion de ces principes et propositions est faite dans la mesure où ils ont conservé une certaine pertinence pour les théories modernes. Ce qui est devenu la conception standard de la stricte akrasie ainsi que son caractère prétendument paradoxal sont mis de l’avant. Nous argumentons qu’une position sceptique à l’égard de la stricte akrasie ne peut pas reposer sur une version ou une autre de la théorie des préférences révélées et montrons qu’une description du processus décisionnel est nécessaire pour attribuer une préférence synthétique ou un meilleur jugement. Nous abordons le débat philosophique qui oppose une conception internaliste du lien entre le meilleur jugement et la décision à une conception externaliste, et soutenons, sur la base de résultats expérimentaux en psychologie cognitive et en neuroscience, que cette dernière conception est plus robuste...

Akrasia, collective and individual

Pettit, Philip
Fonte: Universidade Nacional da Austrália Publicador: Universidade Nacional da Austrália
Tipo: Working/Technical Paper Formato: 67452 bytes; application/pdf
EN_AU
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Perhaps the most famous analogy in the history of philosophical argument is that which Plato draws in the Republic between the constitution of the city and the constitution of the soul. The analogy is justly famous, for it sheds light on many aspects of mentality and personhood. In particular, as I shall try to show here, the analogy — or at least something close to the analogy — sheds light on the nature of akrasia or lack of self-control. How to characterise akrasia? Without going into an analysis of our ordinary conceptions of the phenomena associated with this term, I shall assume that an agent is akratic when the following conditions are fulfilled. The agent holds by intentional states in the light of which a certain response presents itself as required; the states involved may be beliefs or desires, judgments or intentions, or whatever. The agent functions under conditions that are intuitively favourable, and within limits that are intuitively feasible, for acting as required; there is nothing abnormal about how things transpire within their constitution or circumstances — no malfunction, for example, or perturbation. But nevertheless the agent fails to act in the required manner. This is a broad conception of akrasia and may not coincide in extension with received notions like that of weakness of will. Moreover...

Plato's theory of pleasure : essays on Plato's Protagoras, Gorgias, Phaedo, Republic and Philebus

Lee, John Mason
Fonte: Universidade Nacional da Austrália Publicador: Universidade Nacional da Austrália
Tipo: Thesis (PhD); Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
EN_AU
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The essays presented in this thesis are all concerned in some way with Plato's views on pleasure, However I have not hesitated to discuss both topics and particular arguments which, strictly speaking, are ancillary to this central theme, The order followed is this. In Chapter I, I discuss first of all the influence of contemporary medical theory on fifth- and fourth-century Greek ethics, I then mention the views of Prodicus on the semantics of pleasure, and argue that his distinctions were not necessarily mere quibbles: Greek ethical writers needed, and lacked, an enjoyment-exhilaration distinction (of the sort drawn nowadays by authors like Ryle), and one might possibly have been founded on Prodicus's semantics, Next I discuss the family of akrasia idioms and their possible origin, together with the anti-hedonist bias of some of the pre-Platonists. I argue that the status of 'pleasure' in the 'overcome by pleasure' idiom is doubtful: that it is not clear whether 'pleasure' is supposed to function as an intentional or a non-intentional motive word - in other words, whether pleasure is taken to be a goal, or an impulse, or neither of these things, Finally I discuss the Socratic paradoxes, arguing that the paradox S2 ('No one errs willingly') does not represent a Corollary of the paradox S1 ('Virtue is knowledge')...

Between Virtue and Vice: Moral Worth for the Rest of Us

Doucet, Mathieu
Fonte: Quens University Publicador: Quens University
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: 853108 bytes; application/pdf
EN; EN
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Most of us fall short of virtue—we are, at various times, weak-willed, selfish, self-absorbed, hypocritical, morally complacent, cowardly, and self-deceived. But most of us are not vicious, either. In this dissertation I argue that the actions of flawed, morally imperfect agents can be as praiseworthy as the actions of more perfectly virtuous people. The first, introductory chapter explains my account of moral worth, which depends on the assessment of an agent’s deliberative outlook in acting. In the second chapter, I argue that being praiseworthy on every possible occasion is not a precondition for being praiseworthy on any particular occasion. This may seem obvious, but it is also inconsistent with a common interpretation of the nature of virtue. The third chapter argues that someone’s actions can be morally worthy despite displaying a failure of practical rationality quite similar to weakness of will, or akrasia. By exploring cases of so-called inverse akrasia, I argue that sometimes, an agent can be praised for acting in ways that he himself believes are morally wrong, and that while these actions display serious failures of practical reason, they can still be both done for a good reasons and deserving of praise. The fourth chapter explores the moral status of hypocrisy. I reject the standard interpretation of hypocrites as blameworthy manipulative deceivers...

Responsibility for Self: Agency and the Attitudes

Rosner, MARK
Fonte: Quens University Publicador: Quens University
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
EN; EN
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This thesis defends the claim that the core idea of moral responsibility is fixed by our best theory of agency. Such a theory concerns the proper conditions of attribution of an attitude or an action to an agent for the purposes of moral appraisal – or what I call the rational relations view. The first chapter attempts to outline and motivate the conception of agency that has as its core the idea that agents are responsible for the judgement-sensitive attitudes that can be appropriately attributed to them and that they can be morally responsible for those attitudes when their judgements have morally objectionable contents. In my second chapter I present and argue against what I take to be the strongest alternative to the rational relations view, the theory of moral responsibility that has been elaborated by Harry Frankfurt over a number of years. The third chapter addresses a concern that conceptions of responsibility that are too closely tied to theories of agency can either be too superficial in their assessment and evaluation of the agent or actually unfair in their determinations of responsibility. The fourth chapter extends this discussion of the unfairness charge by explicitly addressing the question of the value of moral responsibility. My final chapter concerns an issue that lies at the intersection of questions in the philosophy of agency and moral responsibility: how to make sense of and be open to criticism for our acts of irrationality. I take the example of akratic...

Décisions et perspectives : de la théorie de l'utilité à la philosophie de la volonté.

Contensou, Olivier
Fonte: Université de Montréal Publicador: Université de Montréal
Tipo: Thèse ou Mémoire numérique / Electronic Thesis or Dissertation
FR
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Les implications philosophiques de la Théorie de la Perspective de 1979, notamment celles qui concernent l’introduction d’une fonction de valeur sur les résultats et d’un coefficient de pondération sur les probabilités, n’ont à ce jour jamais été explorées. Le but de ce travail est de construire une théorie philosophique de la volonté à partir des résultats de la Théorie de la Perspective. Afin de comprendre comment cette théorie a pu être élaborée il faut étudier la Théorie de l’Utilité Attendue dont elle est l’aboutissement critique majeur, c’est-à-dire les axiomatisations de la décision de Ramsey (1926), von Neumann et Morgenstern (1947), et enfin Savage (1954), qui constituent les fondements de la théorie classique de la décision. C’est entre autres la critique – par l’économie et la psychologie cognitive – du principe d’indépendance, des axiomes d’ordonnancement et de transitivité qui a permis de faire émerger les éléments représentationnels subjectifs à partir desquels la Théorie de la Perspective a pu être élaborée. Ces critiques ont été menées par Allais (1953), Edwards (1954), Ellsberg (1961), et enfin Slovic et Lichtenstein (1968), l’étude de ces articles permet de comprendre comment s’est opéré le passage de la Théorie de l’Utilité Attendue...

La disculpation platonicienne : étude sur la signification et l'évolution du concept de faute involontaire dans l’œuvre de Platon

Gilbert Tremblay, Ugo
Fonte: Université de Montréal Publicador: Université de Montréal
Tipo: Thèse ou Mémoire numérique / Electronic Thesis or Dissertation
FR
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La présente étude se propose de dégager les significations successives qu’emprunte le fameux paradoxe socratique du mal involontaire dans l’œuvre de Platon. Pour ce faire, notre propos se déclinera en trois principaux développements : 1) le premier consistera à clarifier le sens que recouvraient les catégories du volontaire et de l’involontaire dans l’Antiquité, de manière à éviter toute confusion anachronique avec les acceptions modernes de ces mêmes notions ; 2) le second tâchera de mettre au jour le postulat anthropologique qui fonde chez Platon l’idée qu’aucun homme ne saurait agir méchamment de son plein gré ; 3) le troisième exposera à tour de rôle les trois grands dispositifs de disculpation qu’élabore Platon dans son œuvre : les dispositifs de l’âme ignorante, de l’âme renversée et de l’âme malade. Nous montrerons ainsi comment Platon, à rebours de la théodicée chrétienne classique, cherche à blanchir l’homme de toute implication morale véritable dans la genèse causale de ses « mauvaises » actions.; This study intends to describe the successive meanings borrowed by the famous Socratic paradox of involuntary evil in the work of Plato. For that purpose, our ideas we will developed under three main themes: 1) the first will be to clarify the meaning covered by the voluntary and involuntary categories in ancient times...

Procrastination et faiblesse de la volonté : Agentivité, temporalité et défaillances de la rationalité pratique

Fournier Larocque, Nicolas
Fonte: Université de Montréal Publicador: Université de Montréal
Tipo: Thèse ou Mémoire numérique / Electronic Thesis or Dissertation
FR
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Étant pourtant un phénomène extrêmement répandu, la procrastination a très peu fait l’objet d’études philosophiques. Inversement, la faiblesse de la volonté et les différents phénomènes qu’on lui rattache sont encore aujourd’hui étudiés en profondeur comme des cas paradigmatiques de défaillance de la rationalité pratique. Or, la procrastination présente un cas de défaillance de la rationalité pratique particulier dans notre rapport avec le temps, rapport qui est très souvent laissé de côté dans l’étude de la faiblesse de la volonté. Après avoir présenté dans le premier chapitre les phénomènes majeurs associés à la faiblesse de la volonté et les problématiques qu’ils soulèvent, dans le deuxième chapitre, nous examinerons leurs liens avec la procrastination. Nous verrons comment la procrastination, avec son emphase sur le caractère temporel de notre agentivité, permet de mieux saisir et d'expliquer les problématiques soulevées par la faiblesse de la volonté en les insérant dans un cadre explicatif plus large.; Even if procrastination is extremely widespread, it is still rarely the subject of philosophical study. Conversely, weakness of the will and the various phenomena which are related to it are still extensively studied as paradigmatic cases of failure of our practical rationality. However...

O paradoxo de Moore e a declaração

Neves Filho, Eduardo Ferreira das
Fonte: Florianópolis, SC Publicador: Florianópolis, SC
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
POR
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Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Ciências Humanas. Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia; Neste trabalho, defendemos uma proposta de solução alternativa ao Paradoxo de Moore (PM). Para isso, no primeiro capítulo, após apresentarmos o PM em sua caracterização mais geral, estabelecemos um conjunto de condições que julgamos necessário para uma análise do problema. Com essas condições, pretendemos analisar diferentes soluções encontradas na literatura sobre o problema, criticando-as. No segundo capítulo, procuramos rejeitar aquelas que denominamos 'soluções assercionistas' ao PM, mostrando que discutir o problema em cenários que recorrem a teorias de atos de fala é improdutivo. No terceiro capítulo, a crítica recai sobre soluções que identificamos como 'mentalistas'; procuramos identificar que não são soluções produtivas ao PM, principalmente por necessitarem defender princípios doxásticos e epistêmicos demasiado 'fortes' em suas tentativas de garantir a racionalidade epistêmica. No quarto capítulo, mudamos a rota de investigação. Nossa crítica recai sobre um tipo de solução witgensteiniana ao PM, cuja característica geral é identificar as sentenças Moore-paradoxais como 'contradições disfarçadas'. Procuramos apontar uma lacuna presente neste tipo de análise...

Leibniz: Rational Action and Weakness of Will; Leibniz: Ação Racional e Fraqueza da Vontade

Souza, André Chagas Ferreira de
Fonte: Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas Publicador: Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion; Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 01/06/2011 POR
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This article is an attempt to investigate a classic problem associated with the human action that can be extracted from the Leibnizian texts about the weakness of will, an issue emblematically briefed by Ovide: “I see clearly which [way] is better, and I know it is right, yet I follow the way that is worse”. The author of the Theodicy seems to suggest a way to understand the phenomenon of akrasia. A good source for this research is his work New Essays on Human Understanding, in which he directly debates thesis of the book An Essay Concerning Human Understanding by Locke. In Leibnizian text, one of the concepts discussed is the uneasiness. Locke believes that the fundamental basis for human actions would be to prevent the uneasiness caused by the feeling of missing something. Leibniz not completely refutes the idea of the English philosopher, however looks for improving it by introducing “the perceptions which are not apperceived”. In Leibnizian philosophy the problem of weakness of will may be linked to a region that the agent does not know directly but which is fundamental to any action, even for the so-called rational; Neste artigo, procura-se enfatizar um clássico problema ligado à ação humana que pode ser extraído dos textos leibnizianos...

"El caso del hombre de las ratas" y las paradojas de la irracionalidad.

Maliandi, Graciela
Fonte: Páginas de Filosofía Publicador: Páginas de Filosofía
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion; Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 15/09/2014 SPA
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"El caso del  Hombre de las Ratas"  de Freud constituye un documento particularmente interesante, pues se conservan los originales de las sesiones, aquellos borradores que él  acostumbraba a romper sistemáticamente.   Sobre este caso se ha   escrito mucha bibliografía, especialmente por el valor que se le ha dado a partir de las interpretaciones de Lacan y de su escuela.   El  filósofo norteamericano Donald Davidson ha considerado en algunos de sus escritos que este célebre caso serviría para una ilustración de la akrasía, o debilidad de la voluntad, la que ocurre cuando un agente, a pesar  de   saber  qué   cosa  es   lo  correcto,   actúa  de modo inadecuado con ese saber. Al exponer sus ideas en torno de la akrasía,   Aristóteles   se   proponía   criticar   la concepción socrático-platónica que  explica  la  acción viciosa  por la ignorancia y la virtuosa por la sabiduría. Para Platón, el saber se asocia directamente con la virtud: el auténtico saber  siempre  coincide  con  el  recto  obrar.   Todavía hoy, cuando juzgamos un acto criminal, nos movemos entre esas dos grandes concepciones del mal, una que lo identifica con la ignorancia,  la ceguera,  la enfermedad...

L a akrasia:el lado oscuro de la razón.

Ambrosini, Cristina; UBA-CONICET-UBACyT
Fonte: Páginas de Filosofía Publicador: Páginas de Filosofía
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion; Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 01/08/2014 SPA
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La interdisciplina ha sido malentendida, y se a supuesto una continuidad entre la unidad adcrita a lo real, y la que habría en el plano del conocimiento. Tal versión continuista del conocimiento, desproblematiza las dificultades que aparecen al aticular objetos teorícos y metodológicos diferentes. En particular, el psicoanálisis muestra sin embargo algunas especificaciones epistémicas cercanas a las del narrativismo en historia. Este asume de hecho que le lenguaje no solo referencial, sino también perfomativo: la ciencia sería en ese caso no solo una constatación y explicación, sino una actuación, una jugada en el sentido del ajedrez. El psicoanálisis tiene que ser pensado epistemológicamente en esa clave.

Akrasia and the Rule of Appetite in Plato's Protagoras and Republic

Wilburn, Joshua
Fonte: Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas Publicador: Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion; ; ; Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 10/11/2014 ENG
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According to a prevalent developmentalist line of interpretation, Plato’s introduction of the three-part soul in Republic 4 was motivated in part by his desire to acknowledge and account for cases of akratic action, and thereby to repudiate the psychology and the conclusions of the earlier dialogue Protagoras. In this paper I reject this interpretation, arguing that countenancing akrasia was never a major philosophical concern for Plato, and a fortiori that it was not his motivation for introducing the tripartite soul. I argue that his moral psychological focus and concern in the Republic was rather on the notion of psychic rule, and on illuminating various ways in which reasoning is corrupted by non-rational desires (rather than overcome by them through brute psychic ‘force’). I then offer an explanation of Plato’s lack of concern for akrasia by appealing to the Protagoras itself. I conclude with a rejection of sharp developmentalism between the two dialogues. 

O paradoxo de Moore, a crítica à condição da sinceridade e uma dissolução moraniana

Ferreira Filho, Eduardo; UFPEL
Fonte: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina Publicador: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion; ; ; Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 06/05/2012 POR
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http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2010v9n3p37Neste artigo, pretendemos sustentar que o Paradoxo de Moore (PM) é um problema de natureza epistemológica, rejeitando, assim, que a análise implique questões de natureza ética, particularmente se o argumento é mostrar que o PM, na solução assercionista de J. Williams, descumpre uma condição para o sucesso de atos de fala: a condição da sinceridade. Queremos apontar que essa condição é secundária no exame do problema. Por fim, apresentaremos uma dissolução do PM na perspectiva de R. Moran como um caso de akrasia epistêmica, um choque de autoridades de primeira e terceira pessoas, que tem reflexos na análise assercionista do PM, bem como à ação humana.

PLATONISMO Y AKRASÍA EN CRISIPO. LA INTERPRETACIÓN DE MARCELO BOERI

SALLES,RICARDO
Fonte: Ideas y Valores Publicador: Ideas y Valores
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: text/html
Publicado em 01/12/2010 ES
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Se formulan dos preguntas en torno a la interpretación que ofrece Marcelo Boeri en Apariencia y realidad en el pensamiento griego acerca del problema de la akrasía en el estoicismo: ¿puede la adaptación monista que hizo Crisipo del modelo platónico del alma dividida en República IV ofrecer una explicación filosóficamente satisfactoria del fenómeno clásico de la akrasía?, y ¿es este fenómeno el verdadero explanandum de esta adaptación? Se intentará mostrar que la respuesta a estas preguntas puede ser negativa hasta cierto punto y, por ello, distinta de la respuesta de Boeri en este libro. El argumento se basa en un análisis de Plutarco (vm 446f-447b) y del problema clásico de la akrasía.

Akrasia and Ordinary Weakness of Will

Radoilska,Lubomira
Fonte: Universidad Panamericana, Facultad de Filosofía Publicador: Universidad Panamericana, Facultad de Filosofía
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: text/html
Publicado em 01/01/2012 EN
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This article offers an account of akrasia as a primary failure of intentional agency in contrast to a recent account of weakness of will, developed by Richard Holton, that also points to a kind of failure of intentional agency but presents this as both separate from akrasia and more fundamental than it. Drawing on Aristotle's work, it is argued that the failure of intentional agency articulated by the concept of akrasia is the central case, whereas the phenomenon Holton's account is after, referred to as 'ordinary weakness of will', is best understood as an unsuccessful attempt to tackle akrasia and, more specifically, a secondary failure of intentional agency.

La Akrasia y el principio de continencia en davidson: Una actualización de su pensamiento

Milazzo,Rosario
Fonte: INSTITUTO DE FILOSOFIA UCV Publicador: INSTITUTO DE FILOSOFIA UCV
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: text/html
Publicado em 01/06/2008 ES
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El estudio se propone indagar acerca de la noción de akrasia en Davidson a partir de su ensayo, ¿Cómo es posible la debilidad de la voluntad? (1966). Allí Davidson intenta elaborar una tesis en torno al oscuro problema de la akrasia, de la cual ofrece una noción de tinte aristotélico. Parte de su estrategia para enfrentar las dificultades de este problema es separarlo de la moralidad, puesto que sostiene que la akrasia es un problema de la filosofía de la acción, no de la filosofía moral. En este contexto, sugiere que existe un principio que orienta el actuar del hombre racional: el principio de continencia. Sin embargo, queda sin respuesta el cómo hacer de tal principio algo propio. Este trabajo intentará mostrar, además, cómo ha evolucionado su pensamiento sobre este tema.