Página 1 dos resultados de 656 itens digitais encontrados em 0.012 segundos

A Combinatorial Auction for Collaborative Planning

Hunsberger, Luke; Grosz, Barbara
Fonte: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Publicador: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.16%
When rational, utility-maximizing agents encounter an opportunity to collaborate on a group activity they must determine whether to commit to that activity. We refer to this problem as the initial-commitment decision problem (ICDP). The paper describes a mechanism that agents may use to solve the ICDP. The mechanism is based on a combinatorial auction in which agents bid on sets of roles in the group activity, each role comprising constituent subtasks that must be done by the same agent. Each bid may specify constraints on the execution times of the subtasks it covers. This mechanism permits agents to keep most details of their individual schedules of prior commitments private. The paper reports the results of several experiments testing the performance of the mechanism. These results demonstrate a significant improvement in performance when constituent subtasks are grouped into roles. They also show that as the number of time constraints in bids increases, the probability that there is a solution decreases, the cost of an optimal solution (if one exists) increases, and the time required to find an optimal solution (if one exists) decreases. The paper also describes several strategies that agents might employ when using this mechanism.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

Product attribute as an important dimension in developing online auction strategy for businesses

Xiao, Wen, 1968-
Fonte: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Publicador: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: 70 leaves; 7588430 bytes; 7588191 bytes; application/pdf; application/pdf
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
45.94%
by Wen Xiao.; Thesis (M.Eng.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, 2000.; Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-70).

Transportation service procurement using combinatorial auctions

Chen, XiaoPing, 1971-
Fonte: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Publicador: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: 40 leaves; 1709252 bytes; 1711568 bytes; application/pdf; application/pdf
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.36%
Auction is a mechanism of selling distinct assets that can be both physical objects and virtual objects. Examples of virtual objects are the rights to use assets like airport time slots and FCC spectrum, or to service truckload delivery routes in a transportation network. Under some situations bidding on combinations of objects can render lower total price compare with bidding the objects one at a time, and the auction that allows bidders to bid on combinations of different assets are called combinatorial auctions. With shipper being the auctioneer and carriers being the bidders, combinatorial auction has become increasingly important in the transportation service procurement domain, due to its mechanism to align shipper s procurement interest with carrier transportation service cost structure, which in turn lowers shippers total procurement cost. The thesis provides a comprehensive review of the use of conditional bidding within a transportation combinatorial auction framework. The thesis first describes the general forms of the transportation services available, and discusses the economics of motor carriers that provide LTL and TL services. It then illustrates the basic optimization technique of conditional bidding for TL service procurement and discusses the information technologies that enable the optimization-based procurement and the actual application of the method in the real world.; by XiaoPing Chen.; Thesis (M. Eng. in Logistics)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology...

Financial Sector Assessment Program Update : India - CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems and Central Counterparties

International Monetary Fund; World Bank
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.02%
The securities and derivatives clearing and settlement systems in India are organized around different types of products, which are (1) government securities, money market instruments and forex instruments; (2) corporate securities and financial derivatives; and (3) commodity derivatives. The scope of this assessment is limited to the clearing and settlement systems for the first two sets of products. The different sets are subject to different legal frameworks, different regulatory arrangements and the clearing and settlement systems are operated by different entities. The different securities and derivatives clearing and settlement systems handle a large number of transactions and are as such of systemic importance. Volumes in the derivatives segments increased strongly during the last years. Given the growth and volumes of the commodity derivatives market it is recommended that a detailed self-assessment by the Forwards Market Commission (FMC) and/or an independent assessment of the commodity derivatives clearing and settlement systems be considered in the immediate future.

India : CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems and Central Counterparties

International Monetary Fund; World Bank
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.02%
The securities and derivatives clearing and settlement systems in India are organized around different types of products, which are (1) government securities, money market instruments and forex instruments; (2) corporate securities and financial derivatives; and (3) commodity derivatives. The scope of this assessment is limited to the clearing and settlement systems for the first two sets of products. The different sets are subject to different legal frameworks, different regulatory arrangements and the clearing and settlement systems are operated by different entities. The different securities and derivatives clearing and settlement systems handle a large number of transactions and are as such of systemic importance. Volumes in the derivatives segments increased strongly during the last years. Given the growth and volumes of the commodity derivatives market it is recommended that a detailed self-assessment by the Forwards Market Commission (FMC) and/or an independent assessment of the commodity derivatives clearing and settlement systems be considered in the immediate future.

Assessment Framework to Monitor and Evaluate e-Government Procurement Systems in India

World Bank
Fonte: Washington, DC Publicador: Washington, DC
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.03%
This working paper elaborates on an assessment framework to monitor and evaluate e-government procurement systems in India. This is relevant due to the fact that many government agencies have sought to extend use of e-tendering system implemented in their organization to handle procurement in World Bank funded projects. The World Bank has developed a procedure to assess e-tendering systems for compliance to certain guidelines laid down by Multilateral Development Banks. The World Bank prefers to work with the Government of India in development of a robust mechanism for assessment of e-tendering systems instead of independently assessing e-tendering systems as has been done till date. The Government of India has already established a set-up under Standardization, Quality and Testing Certification (STQC) for assessment of e-procurement systems. From its assessment experience, the World Bank has found that the e-procurement applications deployed in many of the e-procurement installations assessed by the Bank were STQC certified...

Mulitlateral Development Bank International Survey of e-Procurement Systems

Soontiens, Werner; Miyamoto, Tadayuki; Egan, Victor; Schapper, Paul; McDermont, David; Vargas, Jorge Enrique
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.26%
This survey of e-procurement systems in Asia/Oceania, South America and Europe was funded by the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. It is a project of the Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) harmonization of e-procurement group. The survey was developed by Curtin University and International Governance Solutions using an experienced research and consultancy team. The survey covered systems in fourteen countries, which vary in size of the procurement market, the degree of integration of systems and degree of centralized management of procurement. While there is clear evidence as to how common issues were addressed, the relatively small number of countries involved makes identifying some trends difficult.

e-Reverse Auction Guidelines for MDB Financed Procurement

Asian Development Bank; Inter-American Development Bank; World Bank
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.54%
Borrowing countries are increasingly inclined to use electronic procurement systems and means for processing and managing MDB funded activities. This guide is intended to be used for the application of e-reverse auctions during the procurement process. Not all procurement is suitable for e-reverse auction. Some governments consider e-reverse auction to be a special case of e-bidding while others see it as part of e-Purchasing. For United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), an e-reverse auction is described as an online, real-time dynamic auction between a buying organization and a number of suppliers who compete against each other to win the contract by submitting successively lower priced bids during a scheduled time period. Where e-GP systems are intended to be used for e-reverse auctions for works, goods, or services under MDB financed procurement, the MDB administering division or resident office administering the project will, consistent with any approved delegations, evaluate the e-reverse auction features...

Secured Transaction Systems and Collateral Registries

International Finance Corporation
Fonte: Washington, DC Publicador: Washington, DC
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.03%
The main objective of this toolkit is to provide technical advice and guidance to World Bank Group staff, donor institutions, government officials and other practitioners on the implementation of secured transactions law and institutional reforms in emerging market countries. However, the Toolkit has not been designed to eliminate the need for in-person expert advice for governments that undertake to introduce a secured transactions system. It is necessary to take into account the factors that are unique to each jurisdiction. The content of the Toolkit will guide the reader through the various stages of the project cycle (identification, diagnostic, solution design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation) involved in the introduction of secured transactions reforms. The recommendations presented in the Toolkit are based on IFC s experience in the secured transactions area, the contributions of a number of experts in this field, existing literature, and reform experience in a number of emerging market countries and the existing best practices in jurisdictions with advanced secured transactions systems. While the Toolkit does not cover all aspects of secured transactions reform...

Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms

Iwasaki, A.; Conitzer, V.; Omori, Y.; Sakurai, Y.; Todo, T.; Guo, M.; Yokoo, M.
Fonte: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; USA Publicador: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; USA
Tipo: Conference paper
Publicado em //2010 EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.04%
This paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. False-name-proofness generalizes strategy-proofness by assuming that a bidder can submit multiple bids under fictitious identifiers. Even the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is not false-name-proof. It has previously been shown that there is no false-name-proof mechanism that always achieves a Pareto efficient allocation. Consequently, if false-name bids are possible, we need to sacrifice efficiency to some extent. This leaves the natural question of how much surplus must be sacrificed. To answer this question, this paper focuses on worst-case analysis. Specifically, we consider the fraction of the Pareto efficient surplus that we obtain and try to maximize this fraction in the worst-case, under the constraint of false-name-proofness. As far as we are aware, this is the first attempt to examine the worst-case efficiency of false-name-proof mechanisms. We show that the worst-case efficiency ratio of any false-name-proof mechanism that satisfies some apparently minor assumptions is at most 2/(m + 1) for auctions with m different goods. We also observe that the worst-case efficiency ratio of existing false-name-proof mechanisms is generally 1/m or 0. Finally...

Slovak Republic : Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems

World Bank
Fonte: Washington, DC Publicador: Washington, DC
Tipo: Economic & Sector Work :: Insolvency Assessment (ROSC); Economic & Sector Work
ENGLISH; EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.16%
The assessment team interviewed a cross section of country stakeholders regarding the effectiveness of the legal infrastructure, and its implementation supporting debtor-creditor relationships, corporate insolvency and credit risk management, and resolution practices, including among others, members of the Inter-Agency Commission for the preparation of a new insolvency law, and members of the drafting team for the new collateral law; and, various professionals serving as trustees, executors, lawyers and accountants also provided their input. The conclusions in this assessment are based largely on the above interviews, a review of applicable legislation, data and information, various reports prepared by the Bank between 1999-2001, and other reports or analyses pertaining to the areas assessed, including the project on the new collateral legislation, and registration system for pledges (charges). Some laws unavailable in English at the time were discussed in a number of meetings with institutions, and professionals in the public...

Bidder response to combinatorial auctions in truckload procurement

Plummer Clinton Lee, 1980-
Fonte: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Publicador: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: 81 p.; 4537523 bytes; 4546633 bytes; application/pdf; application/pdf
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.17%
This thesis explores how truckload carriers use conditional bids within the framework of a combinatorial auction to win more business and balance their existing networks. Because a considerable portion of a truckload carrier's cost of serving a given lane is associated with the probability of finding a follow-on load (i.e. economies of scope), bidding on a lane-by-lane basis may not accurately reflect a carrier's true cost of serving that lane. In a combinatorial auction, a truckload carrier can more accurately reflect its true cost of serving a given lane by offering package discounts, conditional on winning lanes that increase the probability of finding follow-on loads. Though a considerable amount has been written about the economics of truckload carrier's operations and the benefits of combinatorial auctions to shippers, few have studied conditional bidding from a bidder's (carrier's) perspective. This thesis makes three contributions. First, an explanation of why bidders do and don't submit conditional bids in combinatorial auctions is provided. Second, a model of carrier costs functions, including package discounts (a measure of economies of scope) is developed. Finally, this thesis examines regional pricing differences, and quantifies the amount by which carriers will change their prices in different regions of the US.; by Clinton Lee Plummer.; Thesis (M. Eng. in Logistics)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology...

Multi Agent Communication System for Online Auction with Decision Support System by JADE and TRACE

Martin, A.; Lakshmi, T. Miranda; Madhusudanan, J.
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 06/09/2011
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.39%
The success of online auctions has given buyers access to greater product diversity with potentially lower prices. It has provided sellers with access to large numbers of potential buyers and reduced transaction costs by enabling auctions to take place without regard to time or place. However it is difficult to spend more time period with system and closely monitor the auction until auction participant wins the bid or closing of the auction. Determining which items to bid on or what may be the recommended bid and when to bid it are difficult questions to answer for online auction participants. The multi agent auction advisor system JADE and TRACE, which is connected with decision support system, gives the recommended bid to buyers for online auctions. The auction advisor system relies on intelligent agents both for the retrieval of relevant auction data and for the processing of that data to enable meaningful recommendations, statistical reports and market prediction report to be made to auction participants.; Comment: Multi-Agents, Agents communication, intelligent auction agents, Decision support system, JADE, TRACE

An Investigation Report on Auction Mechanism Design

Niu, Jinzhong; Parsons, Simon
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.36%
Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used in solving real-world optimization problems, and in structuring stock or futures exchanges. Auctions also provide a very valuable testing-ground for economic theory, and they play an important role in computer-based control systems. Auction mechanism design aims to manipulate the rules of an auction in order to achieve specific goals. Economists traditionally use mathematical methods, mainly game theory, to analyze auctions and design new auction forms. However, due to the high complexity of auctions, the mathematical models are typically simplified to obtain results, and this makes it difficult to apply results derived from such models to market environments in the real world. As a result, researchers are turning to empirical approaches. This report aims to survey the theoretical and empirical approaches to designing auction mechanisms and trading strategies with more weights on empirical ones, and build the foundation for further research in the field.

Optimal Spectrum Auction Design with Two-Dimensional Truthful Revelations under Uncertain Spectrum Availability

Nadendla, V. Sriram Siddhardh; Brahma, Swastik; Varshney, Pramod K.
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.23%
In this paper, we propose a novel sealed-bid auction framework to address the problem of dynamic spectrum allocation in cognitive radio (CR) networks. We design an optimal auction mechanism that maximizes the moderator's expected utility, when the spectrum is not available with certainty. We assume that the moderator employs collaborative spectrum sensing in order to make a reliable inference about spectrum availability. Due to the presence of a collision cost whenever the moderator makes an erroneous inference, and a sensing cost at each CR, we investigate feasibility conditions that guarantee a non-negative utility at the moderator. We present tight theoretical-bounds on instantaneous network throughput and also show that our algorithm provides maximum throughput if the CRs have i.i.d. valuations. Since the moderator fuses CRs' sensing decisions to obtain a global inference regarding spectrum availability, we propose a novel strategy-proof fusion rule that encourages the CRs to simultaneously reveal truthful sensing decisions, along with truthful valuations to the moderator. Numerical examples are also presented to provide insights into the performance of the proposed auction under different scenarios.; Comment: 14 double-column pages...

Automated Linear Function Submission-based Double Auction as Bottom-up Real-Time Pricing in a Regional Prosumers' Electricity Network

Taniguchi, Tadahiro; Kawasaki, Koki; Fukui, Yoshiro; Takata, Tomohiro; Yano, Shiro
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.12%
A linear function submission-based double-auction (LFS-DA) mechanism for a regional electricity network is proposed in this paper. Each agent in the network is equipped with a battery and a generator. Each agent simultaneously becomes a producer and consumer of electricity, i.e., a prosumer and trades electricity in the regional market at a variable price. In the LFS-DA, each agent uses linear demand and supply functions when they submit bids and asks to an auctioneer in the regional market.The LFS-DA can achieve an exact balance between electricity demand and supply for each time slot throughout the learning phase and was shown capable of solving the primal problem of maximizing the social welfare of the network without any central price setter, e.g., a utility or a large electricity company, in contrast with conventional real-time pricing (RTP). This paper presents a clarification of the relationship between the RTP algorithm derived on the basis of a dual decomposition framework and LFS-DA. Specifically, we proved that the changes in the price profile of the LFS-DA mechanism are equal to those achieved by the RTP mechanism derived from the dual decomposition framework except for a constant factor.

Combinatorial Auction-Based Pricing for Multi-tenant Autonomous Vehicle Public Transportation System

Lam, Albert Y. S.
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.16%
A smart city provides its people with high standard of living through advanced technologies and transport is one of the major foci. With the advent of autonomous vehicles (AVs), an AV-based public transportation system has been proposed recently, which is capable of providing new forms of transportation services with high efficiency, high flexibility, and low cost. For the benefit of passengers, multitenancy can increase market competition leading to lower service charge and higher quality of service. In this paper, we study the pricing issue of the multi-tenant AV public transportation system and three types of services are defined. The pricing process for each service type is modeled as a combinatorial auction, in which the service providers, as bidders, compete for offering transportation services. The winners of the auction are determined through an integer linear program. To prevent the bidders from raising their bids for higher returns, we propose a strategy-proof Vickrey-Clarke-Groves-based charging mechanism, which can maximize the social welfare, to settle the final charges for the customers. We perform extensive simulations to verify the analytical results and evaluate the performance of the charging mechanism.; Comment: 12 pages...

Long-Run Equilibrium Modeling of Alternative Emissions Allowance Allocation Systems in Electric Power Markets

Schulkin, Jinye Z.; Hobbs, Benjamin F.; Pang, Jong-Shi
Fonte: Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, UK Publicador: Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, UK
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.19%
A question in the design of carbon dioxide trading systems is how allowances are to be initially allocated: by auction, by giving away fixed amounts, or by allocating based on output, fuel, or other decisions. The latter system can bias investment, operations, and pricing decisions, and increase costs relative to other systems. A nonlinear complementarity model is used to investigate long-run equilibria that would result under alternative systems for power markets characterized by time varying demand and multiple generation technologies. Existence of equilibria is shown under mild conditions. Solutions show that allocating allowances to new capacity based on fuel use or generator type can distort generation mixes, invert the operating order of power plants, and inflate consumer costs. The distortions can be smaller for tighter CO2 restrictions, and are somewhat mitigated if there are also electricity capacity markets or minimum-run restrictions on coal plants.

The FCC Rules for the 700MHZ Auction: A Potential Disaster

Plott, Charles R.
Fonte: California Institute of Technology Publicador: California Institute of Technology
Tipo: Report or Paper; PeerReviewed Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /11/2000
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.42%
In July 2000 the FCC issued the rules to govern the upcoming 700MHz auction. The rules are a departure from the auction architectures previously used by the FCC. Rather than all bidding only on individual licenses, the auction participants will be able to bid on combinations or packages of licenses. Several combinatorial auction processes exist in the literature and testing demonstrates that such processes have a potential for substantially increasing the efficiency of the auction. While combinatorial auction systems have been studied in various forms, indeed a particular auction architecture was developed and studied extensively for the FCC, the rules that emerged from the FCC deliberations are unlike any that have ever been implemented before. The purpose of this note is to call attention to the fact that the particular rules developed by the FCC hold the potential for tarnishing the long history of successful auctions within the FCC. The questions posed in the pages that follow are; (i) Will the auction perform efficiently? (ii) Does the FCC have the tools to accelerate the auction or hasten its timely termination? (iii) Will the auction architecture scale up? The thesis of this paper is that the answer to all three of these fundamental questions is “no”. At base the auction rules rest on an inappropriate set of principles. The principles and the intuition drawn from those principles might serve well when the auction is restricted to bids on individual items but when the bids can be on packages of items the principles simply do not apply. The first section of this note outlines the rules. The second section lists problems that can evolve from the implementation of the rules. The third section contains observations about the sources of the problems caused by the rules and the final section suggests changes in the rules that will remove all of the problems listed.

Mathematical Models of Coordination Mechanisms in Multi-Agent Systems

Terán,Juan; Aguilar,José L; Cerrada,Mariela
Fonte: CLEI Electronic Journal Publicador: CLEI Electronic Journal
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: text/html
Publicado em 01/08/2013 EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.38%
The good performance of a set of computer systems based on agents depends on the coherence degree and coordination between their activities. The study of coordination problem is an important topic for designers and researchers in the multi-agents systems field. There are several coordination mechanisms in the current literature, being the auction and the contract net the most popular ones. These mechanisms allow the agents to allocate resources and tasks to achieve their objectives. This paper aims to present formal models of the auction and the contract net as coordination mechanisms in multi-agents systems based on FIPA (Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents) Protocols. Mathematical equations describe the different parameters characterizing the auction and the contract net mechanisms; they allow define a generic structure of each mechanism and groups of agents can create several instances of them to coordinate their needs