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Proposta de aperfeiçoamento da metodologia dos leilões de comercialização de energia elétrica no ambiente regulado: aspectos conceituais, metodológicos e suas aplicações; Proposal for Improving Methodology of Regulated Electricity Procurement Auction: Concepts, Methodologies, and Their Applications

Rego, Erik Eduardo
Fonte: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP Publicador: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 05/11/2012 PT
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.62%
Este trabalho analisou os leilões de comercialização de energia elétrica no ambiente de contratação regulada no Brasil, realizados entre 2005 e 2011, com o objetivo de propor aperfeiçoamentos em sua metodologia. Para tanto, foram estudadas três linhas de pesquisa: teoria de leilões, internalização (adicionais) de custos não privados (externalidades) e organização de mercados de capacidade. Após a análise dos 21 leilões de novos empreendimentos realizados no período, conclui-se que o desenho do leilão com fase discriminatória final é adequado aos objetivos de modicidade tarifária, mas que também permite melhoras. As fraquezas da sistemática atual identificadas foram: metodologia de contratação termelétrica por disponibilidade, com viés das fontes de maior custo variável unitário, adoção de preço-teto nem sempre adequado, dificuldade em mitigar o exercício de poder de mercado da Eletrobras nos leilões de energia existente e licitação pelo custo econômico privado. De forma a aprimorar os leilões, as seguintes ações foram sugeridas: realização de uma etapa adicional e prévia ao desenho de leilão híbrido atual visando contornar a problemática de estabelecimento de preço-teto adequado; utilização de adicionais ao lance do leilão para internalizar os custos de transmissão não recolhidos pelo gerador; substituição do mecanismo de contratação termelétrica pelo modelo Colombiano de opções; condução de leilões de energia nova e existente em conjunto...

Auctions with options for re-auction

Menezes, Flavio Marques
Fonte: Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV Publicador: Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
Tipo: Relatório
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.86%
We examine the role of seller bidding and reserve prices in an infinitely repeated independent-private-value (IPV) ascending-price auction. The seller has a single object that she values at zero. At the end of any auction round, she may either sell to the highest bidder or pass-in the object and hold a new auction next period. New bidders are drawn randomly in each round. The ability to re-auction motivates a notion of reserve price as the option value of retaining the object for re-auctioning. Even in the absence of a mechanism with which to commit to a reserve price, the optimal “secret” reserve is shown to exceed zero. However, despite the infinite repetition, there may be significant value to the seller from a binding reserve price commitment: the optimal binding reserve is higher than the optimal “secret” reserve, and may be substantially so, even with very patient players. Furthermore, reserve price commitments may even be socially preferable at high discount factors. We also show that the optimal “phantom” bidding strategy for the seller is revenue-equivalent to a commitment to an optimal public reserve price.

O leilão GSP e preço da anarquia; The GSP auction and price of anarchy

Vinicius de Novaes Guimarães Pereira
Fonte: Biblioteca Digital da Unicamp Publicador: Biblioteca Digital da Unicamp
Tipo: Dissertação de Mestrado Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 19/04/2013 PT
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.65%
Uma das fontes de receita mais lucrativas da internet são os anúncios para sites de busca. O crescimento deste mercado bilionário foi, em média, 20% ao ano nos últimos anos. Como o público alvo e variedade de anunciantes deste mercado são grandes e diversificados, um pequeno aumento da eficiência deste mecanismo representa um grande aumento de receita para os sites. Neste trabalho discutimos a evolução dos mecanismos usados neste mercado, identificando as razões destas mudanças. Avaliamos os mecanismos usados atualmente, modelando-o de formas diferentes e calculando o seu preço da anarquia.; Sponsored search auction is one of the most profitable sources of revenue on the internet. The growth of this market was, on average, 20% per year over the past years. Since the target audience and advertiser variety are big and diverse, a small increase in efficiency in this mechanism can bring a huge increase in the sites profits. In this work we discuss the evolution of the mechanisms used in this market, identifying the reasons of these changes. We evaluate the currently used mechanism, modeling in different ways and calculating the price of anarchy.

Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems

Parkes, David C.
Fonte: Springer-Verlag Publicador: Springer-Verlag
Tipo: Monograph or Book
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.68%
As traditional commerce moves on-line more business transactions will be mediated by software agents, and the ability of agent-mediated electronic marketplaces to efficiently allocate resources will be highly dependent on the complexity of the decision problems that agents face; determined in part by the structure of the marketplace, resource characteristics, and the nature of agents’ local problems. We compare auction performance for agents that have hard local problems, and uncertain values for goods. Perhaps an agent must solve a hard optimization problem to value a good, or interact with a busy and expensive human expert. Although auction design cannot simplify the valuation problem itself, we show that good auction design can simplify meta-deliberation - providing incentives for the “right” agents to deliberate for the “right” amount of time. Empirical results for a particular cost-benefit model of deliberation show that an ascending-price auction will often support higher revenue and efficiency than other auction designs. The price provides agents with useful information about the value that other agents hold for the good.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

Procurement Efficiency for Infrastructure Development and Financial Needs Reassessed

Estache, Antonio; Iimi, Atsushi
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.7%
Infrastructure is the engine for economic growth. The international donor community has spent about 70-100 billion U.S. dollars on infrastructure development in developing countries every year. However, it is arguable whether these financial resources are used efficiently, particularly whether the current infrastructure procurement prices are appropriate. Without doubt a key is competition to curb public procurement costs. This paper analyzes procurement data from multi and bilateral official development projects in three infrastructure sectors: roads, electricity, and water and sanitation. The findings show that the competition effect is underutilized. To take full advantage of competition, at least seven bidders are needed in the road and water sectors, while three may be enough in the power sector. The paper also shows that not only competition, but also auction design, especially lot division, is crucial for reducing unit costs of infrastructure. Based on the estimated efficient unit costs, the annual financial needs are estimated at approximately 360 billion U.S. dollars. By promoting competition...

From Uniform Auction to Discriminatory Auction: Assessment of the Restructuring Proposal for the Italian Electricity Day-Ahead Market

GUERCI, Eric; RASTEGAR, Mohammad Ali
Fonte: Instituto Universitário Europeu Publicador: Instituto Universitário Europeu
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf; digital
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.76%
In the context of the 2009 debate on reforming the Italian market, a realistic agent-based computational model of the day-ahead market session of the Italian wholesale electricity market is simulated to compare market performances between uniform-price and pay-as-bid clearing mechanisms. An empirical validation of computational results at a macro-level is performed to test for accuracy of simulated outcomes with historical ones. The level of prices are accurately reproduced except for few peak hours. As far as concerns pay-as-bid auction, the computational experiments point out that it results in higher market prices than the uniform-price auction. In the pay-as-bid mechanism, sellers’ endeavours to maximize their profits are more costly thus leading to higher price levels.

Investment incentives and auction design in electricity markets

Fabra, Natalia; Fehr, Nils-Henrik M von der; Frutos, María Ángeles de
Fonte: Centre for Economic Policy Research Publicador: Centre for Economic Policy Research
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /01/2008 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.7%
Motivated by the regulatory debate in electricity markets, we seek to understand how market design affects market performance through its impact on investment incentives. For this purpose, we study a two-stage game in which firms choose their capacities under demand uncertainty prior to bidding into the spot market. We analyse a number of different market design elements, including (i) two commonly used auction formats, the uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, (ii) price-caps and (iii) bid duration. We find that, although the discriminatory auction tends to lower prices, this does not imply that investment incentives at the margin are poorer; indeed, under reasonable assumptions on the shape of the demand distribution, the discriminatory auction induces (weakly) stronger investment incentives than the uniform-price format.

A New Approach to Governments' Vendor Selection Decisions: A Three-Stage, Multiattribute Procurement Auction

Jay Simon; Francois Melese
Fonte: Escola de Pós-Graduação Naval Publicador: Escola de Pós-Graduação Naval
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.73%
Sponsored Report (for Acquisition Research Program); The current fiscal crisis has placed unprecedented pressure on public procurements. A major target of future public spending cuts is likely to be defense expenditures. Within the defense budget, the biggest and most immediate targets are likely to be the acquisition of new equipment, facilities, services, and supplies. Addressing the growing global challenge of affordability, this paper offers a new approach to government''s vendor selection decisions in major public procurements. In the absence of profits to guide public procurement decisions, the challenge that faces a government buyer is to select the vendor that delivers the best combination of desired non-price attributes at realistic funding levels. The governance mechanism proposed in this paper is a multiattribute first price, sealed bid procurement auction. It extends traditional price-only auctions to one in which competition takes place exclusively over bundles of desired non-price attributes. The first iteration of the model is a multiattribute auction in which a fixed budget constraint is specified. Next, the model is expanded to incorporate a range of possible budget levels. This expanded model reveals the benefits to the buyer of defining a procurement alternative (vendor bid proposal) in terms of its value to the buyer over a range of possible expenditures...

Liquidity Provision in the Limit Order Book - Adverse Selection, Iceberg Orders and the Opening Auction; Liquiditätsangebot im Orderbuch - Adverse Selektion, Iceberg Orders und die Eröffnungsauktion

Frey, Stefan
Fonte: Universität Tübingen Publicador: Universität Tübingen
Tipo: Dissertation; info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
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The dissertation highlights different topics of equity trading in limit order books using the example of Deutsche Boerse's electronic trading system XETRA. The first introductory chapter is a straight forward discussion of the profitability of exchange trading for both the exchange operator and the liquidity suppliers. It applies Harris and Hasbrouck(1996) for the continuous trading and extends it to the auction phase. The second chapter analyzes the impact of adverse selection on liquidity provision. It relaxes the the assumptions of Sandas(2001) empirical implementation of the theoretical model outlined in Glosten(1994) in two dimensions. Replacing the marginal profit conditions with average ones improves the empirical performance, whereas the nonparametric specification of the market order size does not. A cross sectional analysis corroborates the finding that adverse selection costs are more severe for smaller capitalized stocks. Iceberg orders allow traders to submit hidden liquidity into the order book. The third chapter studies the interaction between hidden liquidity and overall liquidity provision. It provides evidence that iceberg orders can be detected using public information and that market participants follow state-dependent order submission strategies. At times of iceberg orders prevailing in the order book the marker order flow and price impact changes. After adjusting for those effects in the Glosten/Sandas framework the marginal compensation of liquidity provision changes. The fourth chapter changes the focus to the opening auction. It proposes an extension to Biais et al.(1999) to remove the market microstructure noise of the indicative price regression. The results show that the indicative price becomes informative about the true value at the very beginning of the call phase...

Court Auctions : Effective Processes and Enforcement Agents

Gramckow, Heike
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Working Paper; Publications & Research
ENGLISH; EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.73%
This paper considers the historical origins and efficacy of enforcement of civil court judgments, with a special focus on court auctions. It reviews the procedural and practical options available to courts and associated agencies for the identification of assets that may be used to satisfy a judgment debt and the processes for court-supervised asset seizure and sale by public auction. The efficiencies of public court auction processes are considered, including the elements of enforcement systems that can produce sub-optimal returns on sold assets and higher incentives for corrupt practices. Also considered is the trend in some systems for greater use of private agents as a means by which the cost of court enforcement processes can be reduced and for overcoming sometimes lengthy delays in enforcement. The paper concludes by identifying alternatives to public auction that in some cases can offer better prospects of assuring full payment of a judgment debt.

Performance of Renewable Energy Auctions : Experience in Brazil, China and India

Elizondo Azuela, Gabriela; Barroso, Luiz; Khanna, Ashish; Wang, Xiaodong; Wu, Yun; Cunha, Gabriel
Fonte: World Bank Group, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank Group, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper; Publications & Research
ENGLISH; EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
37%
This paper considers the design and performance of auction mechanisms used to deploy renewable energy in three emerging economies: Brazil, China, and India. The analysis focuses on the countries' experience in various dimensions, including price reductions, bidding dynamics, coordination with transmission planning, risk allocation strategies, and the issue of domestic content. Several countries have turned to public competitive bidding as a mechanism for developing the renewable generation sector in recent years, with the number of countries implementing some sort of auction procedure rising from nine in 2009 to 36 by the end of 2011 and about 43 in 2013. In general, the use of auctions makes sense when the contracting authority expects a large volume of potentially suitable bids, so that the gains from competition can offset the costs of implementation. A study of the successes and failures of the particular auction design schemes described in this paper can be instrumental in informing future policy making.

Electricity Auctions : An Overview of Efficient Practices

Maurer, Luiz T. A.; Barroso, Luiz A.
Fonte: World Bank Publicador: World Bank
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Publication; Publications & Research :: Publication
ENGLISH
Relevância na Pesquisa
37.03%
This report assesses the potential of electricity contract auctions as a procurement option for the World Bank's client countries. It focuses on the role of auctions of electricity contracts designed to expand and retain existing generation capacity. It is not meant to be a 'how-to' manual. Rather, it highlights some major issues and options that need to be taken into account when a country considers moving towards competitive electricity procurement through the introduction of electricity auctions. Auctions have played an important role in the effort to match supply and demand. Ever since the 1990s, the use of long-term contract auctions to procure new generation capacity, notably from private sector suppliers, has garnered increased affection from investors, governments, and multilateral agencies in general, as a means to achieve a competitive and transparent procurement process while providing certainty of supply for the medium to long term. However, the liberalization of electricity markets and the move from single-buyer procurement models increased the nature of the challenge facing system planners in their efforts to ensure an adequate and secure supply of electricity in the future at the best price. While auctions as general propositions are a means to match supply with demand in a cost-effective manner...

iBundle: An Efficient Ascending Price Bundle Auction

Parkes, David C.
Fonte: Association for Computing Machinery Publicador: Association for Computing Machinery
Tipo: Monograph or Book
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.7%
Standard auction mechanisms often break down in important e-commerce applications, where agents demand bundles of complementary resources, i.e. "I only want B if I also get A". This paper describes iBundle, an ascending-price auction that is guaranteed to compute optimal bundle allocations with agents that follow a best-response bidding strategy. The auction prices bundles directly and allows agents to place additive or exclusive-or bids over collections of bundles. Empirical results confirm that iBundle generates efficient allocations for hard resource allocation problems. Furthermore, we shoe that iBundle generates solutions without complete revelation (or computation) of agent preferences.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

Modeling On-Line Art Auction Dynamics Using Functional Data Analysis

Reddy, Srinivas K.; Dass, Mayukh
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 11/09/2006
Relevância na Pesquisa
37.04%
In this paper, we examine the price dynamics of on-line art auctions of modern Indian art using functional data analysis. The purpose here is not just to understand what determines the final prices of art objects, but also the price movement during the entire auction. We identify several factors, such as artist characteristics (established or emerging artist; prior sales history), art characteristics (size; painting medium--canvas or paper), competition characteristics (current number of bidders; current number of bids) and auction design characteristics (opening bid; position of the lot in the auction), that explain the dynamics of price movement in an on-line art auction. We find that the effects on price vary over the duration of the auction, with some of these effects being stronger at the beginning of the auction (such as the opening bid and historical prices realized). In some cases, the rate of change in prices (velocity) increases at the end of the auction (for canvas paintings and paintings by established artists). Our analysis suggests that the opening bid is positively related to on-line auction price levels of art at the beginning of the auction, but its effect declines toward the end of the auction. The order in which the lots appear in an art auction is negatively related to the current price level...

Tacit Collusion and Capacity Withholding in Repeated Uniform Price Auctions

Dechenaux, Emmanuel; Kovenock, Dan
Fonte: Conselho Superior de Investigações Científicas Publicador: Conselho Superior de Investigações Científicas
Tipo: Documento de trabajo
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.76%
This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor above which the perfectly collusive outcome with equal sharing is sustainable on a stationary path. Under the Market Clearing Price rule, only one step is required. That is, within the class of step bidding functions with a finite number of steps...

Modifying the uniform-price auction to eliminate ‘collusive-seeming equilibria’

McAdams, Prof David
Fonte: Manuscript, MIT [www. mit. edu/mcadams/papers/mupa. pdf] Publicador: Manuscript, MIT [www. mit. edu/mcadams/papers/mupa. pdf]
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: 270407 bytes; application/pdf
Publicado em //2002 EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.7%
The uniform-price auction is used in many regional electricity procurement auctions and its “collusive-seeming equilibria” have been linked to potential exercise of market power. Such equilibria do not exist, however, if a small amount of cash is split among rationed bidders. To shed light on what drives this result, I also examine variations in which the auctioneer is able to increase and/or decrease quantity after receiving the bids. “Increasable demand” also eliminates all collusive-seeming equilibria. These results suggest ways to modify the uniform-price auction in order to reduce the potential exercise of market power.

Online Auction Markets

Yao, Song
Fonte: Universidade Duke Publicador: Universidade Duke
Tipo: Dissertação Formato: 1538884 bytes; application/pdf
Publicado em //2009 EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.87%

Central to the explosive growth of the Internet has been the desire

of dispersed buyers and sellers to interact readily and in a manner

hitherto impossible. Underpinning these interactions, auction

pricing mechanisms have enabled Internet transactions in novel ways.

Despite this massive growth and new medium, empirical work in

marketing and economics on auction use in Internet contexts remains

relatively nascent. Accordingly, this dissertation investigates the

role of online auctions; it is composed of three essays.

The first essay, ``Online Auction Demand,'' investigates seller and

buyer interactions via online auction websites, such as eBay. Such

auction sites are among the earliest prominent transaction sites on

the Internet (eBay started in 1995, the same year Internet Explorer

was released) and helped pave the way for e-commerce. Hence, online

auction demand is the first topic considered in my dissertation. The

second essay, ``A Dynamic Model of Sponsored Search Advertising,''

investigates sponsored search advertising auctions, a novel approach

that allocates premium advertising space to advertisers at popular

websites, such as search engines. Because sponsored search

advertising targets buyers in active purchase states...

Auction Price Anomalies: Evidence from Wool Auctions in Australia

Jones, Christopher; Menezes, Flavio; Vella, Francis
Fonte: Blackwell Publishing Ltd Publicador: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.58%
Using detailed Australian wool auction data we test for further evidence of pricing anomalies at sequential auctions. We find that an anomaly frequently exists and order is frequently endogenously determined. Moreover, prices increase through some sales and decrease through others. We examine whether it is possible to explain the variation in the anomaly across sales and conclude that that there is no systematic relationship between the direction of the price anomaly and the characteristics of the wool or the auction. We do, however, find evidence that an anomaly is more likely in longer sales.

Reserve price commitments in auctions

Menezes, Flavio; Ryan, Matthew
Fonte: Elsevier Publicador: Elsevier
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.62%
It is well known that the optimal auction-one that maximizes the seller's expected revenue-can be implemented using a standard auction format with a suitably chosen reserve price. This reserve price is above the seller's value of retaining the object and

Factors affecting the auction price of Veldram performance tested Dorper rams in Namibia

Grobler,H. J. F.; Jordaan,J. W.; van der Rijst,M.
Fonte: South African Journal of Agricultural Extension Publicador: South African Journal of Agricultural Extension
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: text/html
Publicado em 01/01/2011 EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
56.66%
Veldram performance testing has been conducted over a period of 14 years (1988 to 2002) at Kalahari Research Station in Namibia. During this period 2660 Dorper rams participated in 22 tests. Rams that met growth and breed standards were put up for auction at the completion of each test. The popularity of these auctions for performance tested rams (89.4 % of rams sold) indicate that Veld tested rams were sought after by buyers. The sale price of 296 Veld tested Dorper rams sold between 1994 and 2001, covering seven different tests, were compared with their measured and observed performances. Multiple regression and analysis of variance were carried out to determine which of the factors that were available to buyers significantly influenced price, as well as its contribution towards ram prices fetched. The contributing factors that had the biggest effect on price were Breed Classification (BC), Selection Index (SI), Average Daily Gain (ADG) and End test Mass (EM). This indicates that buyers did recognize the importance of performance data in selecting breeding rams and but most emphasis was on Breed standards (visual appearance). Although Breed Classification is the industry standard used by buyers, top ranking rams (stud) did not perform consistently/significantly better than flock rams.