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Accounting for Cognitive Costs in On-Line Auction Design

Parkes, David C.; Ungar, Lyle H.; Foster, Dean P.
Fonte: Springer Verlag Publicador: Springer Verlag
Tipo: Monograph or Book
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.47%
Many auction mechanisms, including first and second price ascending and sealed bid auctions, have been proposed and analyzed in the economics literature. We compare the usefulness of different mechanisms for on-line auctions, focusing on the cognitive costs placed on users (e.g. the cost of determining the value of a good), the possibilities for agent mediation, and the trust properties of the auction. Different auction formats prove to be attractive for agent mediated on-line auctions than for traditional off-line auctions. For example, second price sealed bid auctions are attractive in traditional auctions because they avoid the communication cost of multiple bids in first price ascending auctions, and the “gaming” required to estimate the second highest bid in first price sealed bid auctions. However, when bidding agents are cheap, communication costs cease to be important, and a progressive auction mechanism is preferred over a closed bid auction mechanism, since users with semi-autonomous agents can avoid the cognitive cost of placing an accurate value on a good. As another example, when an on-line auction is being conducted by an untrusted auctioneer (e.g. the auctioneer is selling its own items), rational participants will build bidding agents that transform second price auctions into first price auctions.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms

Iwasaki, A.; Conitzer, V.; Omori, Y.; Sakurai, Y.; Todo, T.; Guo, M.; Yokoo, M.
Fonte: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; USA Publicador: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; USA
Tipo: Conference paper
Publicado em //2010 EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.25%
This paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. False-name-proofness generalizes strategy-proofness by assuming that a bidder can submit multiple bids under fictitious identifiers. Even the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is not false-name-proof. It has previously been shown that there is no false-name-proof mechanism that always achieves a Pareto efficient allocation. Consequently, if false-name bids are possible, we need to sacrifice efficiency to some extent. This leaves the natural question of how much surplus must be sacrificed. To answer this question, this paper focuses on worst-case analysis. Specifically, we consider the fraction of the Pareto efficient surplus that we obtain and try to maximize this fraction in the worst-case, under the constraint of false-name-proofness. As far as we are aware, this is the first attempt to examine the worst-case efficiency of false-name-proof mechanisms. We show that the worst-case efficiency ratio of any false-name-proof mechanism that satisfies some apparently minor assumptions is at most 2/(m + 1) for auctions with m different goods. We also observe that the worst-case efficiency ratio of existing false-name-proof mechanisms is generally 1/m or 0. Finally...

Rank-order tournaments as selection mechanisms: Applications in project finance; Relative Leistungsturniere als Auslesemechanismen: Anwendungen in der Projektfinanzierung

Kaldewei, Cornelia
Fonte: Universidade de Tubinga Publicador: Universidade de Tubinga
Tipo: Dissertação
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.45%
Tournaments are used in a variety of contexts for ranking competitors on an ordinal scale according to their relative achievements. From competitive sports to manager compensation, they provide a mechanism for incentivizing and selecting contestants in a world of incomplete information. This thesis focuses on the selection aspect, and shows how external (institutional and market) conditions affect selection efficiency in the context of heterogeneous competitors, when the winning prize is determined endogenously by a post-tournament auction. The introduction of a post-tournament auction to endogenize contestants’ expected payoffs allows for a scenario where the tournament winner benefits less from the winning prize itself than more from the positive signal that his victory conveys to the outside world. In the case of a sports tournament, for example, the winner is likely to earn more from resulting endorsement contracts than from the actual prize money. Similarly, in project finance, contestants are more interested in the actual financing of their projects than in what is usually a comparatively small winner’s prize. In addition to an extensive review of the literature on tournaments, this thesis therefore provides a detailed discussion of a common value auction with asymmetric information...

From Uniform Auction to Discriminatory Auction: Assessment of the Restructuring Proposal for the Italian Electricity Day-Ahead Market

GUERCI, Eric; RASTEGAR, Mohammad Ali
Fonte: Instituto Universitário Europeu Publicador: Instituto Universitário Europeu
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf; digital
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.37%
In the context of the 2009 debate on reforming the Italian market, a realistic agent-based computational model of the day-ahead market session of the Italian wholesale electricity market is simulated to compare market performances between uniform-price and pay-as-bid clearing mechanisms. An empirical validation of computational results at a macro-level is performed to test for accuracy of simulated outcomes with historical ones. The level of prices are accurately reproduced except for few peak hours. As far as concerns pay-as-bid auction, the computational experiments point out that it results in higher market prices than the uniform-price auction. In the pay-as-bid mechanism, sellers’ endeavours to maximize their profits are more costly thus leading to higher price levels.

The combinatorial retention auction mechanism (CRAM): integrating monetary and non-monetary reenlistment incentives

Coughlan, Peter J.; Gates, William R.; Zimmerman, Brooke M.
Fonte: Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Relatório
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.41%
This research addresses the potential retention and cost impacts of providing an optimal individualized portfolio of non-monetary and monetary incentives to influence reenlistment and retention behavioral in enlisted Sailors. Specifically, it explores three mechanisms for administrating enlisted retention: a purely monetary auction, a Universal Incentive Package (UIP) auction, and the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM). In this text, the mechanisms are simulated, their outcomes compared and their respective strengths and weaknesses explored. The findings of this research confirm that CRAM clearly outperformed the monetary and UIP auctions. Cost savings to the Navy reanged from 25 to 80% over monetary incentives alone. Additionally, this research addresses the force-diversfying potential of CRAM. It is shown, for the sample used, that offering certain non-monetary incetives changed the demographic mix of Sailors retained. By allowing Sailors to choose only those benefits which suit them, the Navy can eliminate the waste associated with unwanted benefits, while at the same time empowering its members.

Improving the efficiency of aviation retention bonuses through the use of market mechanisms

Kelso, Eric W.
Fonte: Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.46%
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited; Aviation Career Continuation Pay (ACCP), the retention bonus for Naval Aviators, has historically failed to meet stated retention goals. For fiscal year 2013 Naval Personnel Command reported that ACCP exceeded retention goals in some communities by more than 60%, while simultaneously falling over 60% short of retention objectives in others. We analyze the potential for using auction mechanisms to improve upon these results by controlling cost, quantity, and quality of aviators retained. Using survey data to estimate aviators’ quality and willingness to stay in active duty naval aviation, we compare the results of ACCP against three mechanisms, 1) uniform-price auction, 2) Quality Adjusted Discount (QUAD) auction, and 3) Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM). We find that by implementing a uniform-price auction naval aviation can exactly meet 100% of its retention objectives, while reducing costs in some communities by more than $2,200,000. Additionally, while we find no significant correlation between officer quality and retention costs, we demonstrate the potential for QUAD auctions to improve upon these results by further reducing retention costs and improving the overall quality of retained aviators. Lastly...

Evaluation of aviation career pay incentives among the Naval Aviation enterprise utilizing auction mechanisms

Williams, Brett M.
Fonte: Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.54%
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited; Naval Aviation utilizes the Aviation Career Continuation Pay (ACCP) as a means to retain qualified aviators to meet manpower requirements. However, the current program has failed to meet targeted retention across communities while overpaying nearly $5,300,000 during FY-2013, according to Eric Kelso. This thesis examines the potential improvements of applying uniform-price auction, Quality Adjusted Discount (QUAD), and CombiNATOrial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) compensation programs to replace the current bonus system. Incorporating survey results from 2,316 naval officers across Navy Aviation, we analyzed the impact that market-based mechanisms would have on quantity, quality, and cost for retained naval aviators. Using these responses, we developed individual quality scores and reservation prices to apply three auction mechanisms to the retention goals and costs of the FY-2013 ACCP program. Our research shows that a market-based auction could include improvements in cost, quality, and particularly quantity of aviators eligible for the Department Head Screen Board. The uniform-price auction meets all retention objectives across Navy Aviation, while reducing costs in some communities by $1...

Simulation of the behavior of bidders in first-price sealed-bid auctions on communication networks

García Díaz, Pilar; Hackbarth Planeta, Klaus Dietrich; Portilla Figueras, José Antonio; Salcedo Sanz, Sancho
Fonte: World Scientific and Engineering Academy and Society (WSEAS) Publicador: World Scientific and Engineering Academy and Society (WSEAS)
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject; publishedVersion
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.36%
Auction mechanisms have arisen as very efficient methods for scarce resource allocations. For this reason there is a current research topic based on the application of these economics mechanisms to the design of communication networks, mainly in the provision of QoS to new multimedia services. The main research works are oriented to the assignment and pricing rules, that is, the network resource assigned to the user (the bandwidth on a link, or the route of a traffic demand) and the amount of money it is going to cost to him respectively. However, as far as we know, there is a little research focused in the analysis of the behaviour of the user. Note that an auction is in fact a competition where the user will behave selfishly in order to obtain the greater profit. In this paper we present the first results of a simulator which analyzes the behaviour of the user in an auction over a communication link. They obtain the revenue of the auctioneer that is the network provider, and the resource allocation under different schemes of user behaviour, from a very conservative character up to most risky behaviours.

A genetic algorithm for solving the first price sealed bid auction in communication networks

Portilla Figueras, José Antonio; Salcedo Sanz, Sancho; García Díaz, Pilar; Hackbarth Planeta, Klaus Dietrich
Fonte: World Scientific and Engineering Academy and Society (WSEAS) Publicador: World Scientific and Engineering Academy and Society (WSEAS)
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject; publishedVersion
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.34%
This paper shows the first result obtained in the application of economic mechanisms for the efficient assignment of resources in communication networks. The final objective is to determine which Service Provider will carry their traffic over the network of a Network Provider, which will be the most profitable route and which price the ISPs will pay for it to the Network provider. As the price is a key driver a good approach to select the ISP may be an auction mechanism. The implementation of these kind of auction mechanisms becomes a NP complete problem which is solved in this paper using novel metaheuristics, specifically a genetic algorithm.

Auction mechanisms for allocating individualized non-monetary retention incentives in complex decision environments evaluation via laboratory experimentation

Hahn, Kyle P.
Fonte: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: xviii, 155 p.
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.49%
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited; Interest in non-monetary incentives (NMIs) as a retention tool in the military services is increasing; however, prior research indicates that providing the same NMIs to all retainees is an expensive and inefficient approach. This research used an experimental methodology to investigate the use of auction mechanisms that create individualized retention bonuses combining both monetary and non-monetary incentives. Specifically, the experiment examined individuals' behavior patterns in using these auction mechanisms while including NMIs with independent and combinatorial qualities (complements and substitutes). Prior research with NMIs has assumed an additive relationship; however, this is often not the case. Hypotheses suggested that experimental subjects would choose NMI combinations that maximize their personal compensation value and then appropriately adjust their bid to the optimal level. The experimental results of the study support the hypotheses. In all auction formats, individuals appropriately selected the optimal NMI combinations 70 percent of the time. Those choices that were considered complex were still chosen correctly 66 percent of the time, suggesting individuals do behave rationally when dealing with various combinations of NMIs. These results provide support for the practical use of such auction mechanisms for incorporating NMIs in the retention process.; US Marine Corps (USMC) author

(Un)bundling Infrastructure Procurement: Evidence from Water Supply and Sewage Projects

Estache, Antonio; Iimi, Atsushi
Fonte: Banco Mundial Publicador: Banco Mundial
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
ENGLISH
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.36%
Competition in public procurement auctions in the water supply and sanitation sector is largely limited. This is partly because of high technical complexity and partly because of auction design flaws. The division of lot contracts is an important policy choice for auctioneers to achieve efficiency. In general, there is a tradeoff between competition in auctions and size of contracts. Larger works could benefit from economies of scale and scope, but large contracts might undermine competition. Using data on public procurement auctions for water and sewage projects in developing countries, this paper shows that bidder entry is crucially endogenous, especially because it is determined by the auctioneer's bundling and unbundling strategy. If water treatment plant and distribution network works are bundled in a single lot package, competition would be significantly reduced, and this adverse entry effect would in turn raise the public procurement costs of infrastructure. There is no evidence of positive scope economies in the bidder cost structure. It is important to account for the underlying cost structure for designing efficient auction mechanisms.

Performance of Renewable Energy Auctions : Experience in Brazil, China and India

Elizondo Azuela, Gabriela; Barroso, Luiz; Khanna, Ashish; Wang, Xiaodong; Wu, Yun; Cunha, Gabriel
Fonte: World Bank Group, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank Group, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper; Publications & Research
ENGLISH; EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.52%
This paper considers the design and performance of auction mechanisms used to deploy renewable energy in three emerging economies: Brazil, China, and India. The analysis focuses on the countries' experience in various dimensions, including price reductions, bidding dynamics, coordination with transmission planning, risk allocation strategies, and the issue of domestic content. Several countries have turned to public competitive bidding as a mechanism for developing the renewable generation sector in recent years, with the number of countries implementing some sort of auction procedure rising from nine in 2009 to 36 by the end of 2011 and about 43 in 2013. In general, the use of auctions makes sense when the contracting authority expects a large volume of potentially suitable bids, so that the gains from competition can offset the costs of implementation. A study of the successes and failures of the particular auction design schemes described in this paper can be instrumental in informing future policy making.

iBundle: An Efficient Ascending Price Bundle Auction

Parkes, David C.
Fonte: Association for Computing Machinery Publicador: Association for Computing Machinery
Tipo: Monograph or Book
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.31%
Standard auction mechanisms often break down in important e-commerce applications, where agents demand bundles of complementary resources, i.e. "I only want B if I also get A". This paper describes iBundle, an ascending-price auction that is guaranteed to compute optimal bundle allocations with agents that follow a best-response bidding strategy. The auction prices bundles directly and allows agents to place additive or exclusive-or bids over collections of bundles. Empirical results confirm that iBundle generates efficient allocations for hard resource allocation problems. Furthermore, we shoe that iBundle generates solutions without complete revelation (or computation) of agent preferences.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

Near-Optimal Truthful Auction Mechanisms in Secondary Spectrum Markets

Sun, Yu-e; Huang, He; Li, Xiang-Yang; Chen, Zhili; Yang, Wei; Xu, Hongli; Huang, Liusheng
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 28/05/2013
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.37%
In this work, we study spectrum auction problem where each request from secondary users has spatial, temporal, and spectral features. With the requests of secondary users and the reserve price of the primary user, our goal is to design truthful mechanisms that will either maximize the social efficiency or maximize the revenue of the primary user. As the optimal conflict-free spectrum allocation problem is NP-hard, in this work, we design near optimal spectrum allocation mechanisms separately based on the following techniques: derandomized allocation from integer programming formulation, its linear programming (LP) relaxation, and the dual of the LP. We theoretically prove that 1) our near optimal allocation methods are bid monotone, which implys truthful auction mechanisms; and 2) our near optimal allocation methods can achieve a social efficiency or a revenue that is at least $1-\frac{1}{e}$ times of the optimal respectively. At last, we conduct extensive simulations to study the performances (social efficiency, revenue) of the proposed methods, and the simulation results corroborate our theoretical analysis.; Comment: 9 pages, 7 figures

Auction-based Resource Allocation for Multi-relay Asynchronous Cooperative Networks

Huang, Jianwei; Han, Zhu; Chiang, Mung; Poor, H. Vincent
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 20/01/2008
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.37%
Resource allocation is considered for cooperative transmissions in multiple-relay wireless networks. Two auction mechanisms, SNR auctions and power auctions, are proposed to distributively coordinate the allocation of power among multiple relays. In the SNR auction, a user chooses the relay with the lowest weighted price. In the power auction, a user may choose to use multiple relays simultaneously, depending on the network topology and the relays' prices. Sufficient conditions for the existence (in both auctions) and uniqueness (in the SNR auction) of the Nash equilibrium are given. The fairness of the SNR auction and efficiency of the power auction are further discussed. It is also proven that users can achieve the unique Nash equilibrium distributively via best response updates in a completely asynchronous manner.; Comment: To appear in the Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, Las Vegas, NV, March 30 to April 4, 2008

PPS: Privacy-Preserving Strategyproof Social-Efficient Spectrum Auction Mechanisms

Huang, He; Li, Xiang-Yang; Sun, Yu-e; Xu, Hongli; Huang, Liusheng
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 29/07/2013
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.57%
Many spectrum auction mechanisms have been proposed for spectrum allocation problem, and unfortunately, few of them protect the bid privacy of bidders and achieve good social efficiency. In this paper, we propose PPS, a Privacy Preserving Strategyproof spectrum auction framework. Then, we design two schemes based on PPS separately for 1) the Single-Unit Auction model (SUA), where only single channel to be sold in the spectrum market; and 2) the Multi-Unit Auction model (MUA), where the primary user subleases multi-unit channels to the secondary users and each of the secondary users wants to access multi-unit channels either. Since the social efficiency maximization problem is NP-hard in both auction models, we present allocation mechanisms with approximation factors of $(1+\epsilon)$ and 32 separately for SUA and MUA, and further judiciously design strategyproof auction mechanisms with privacy preserving based on them. Our extensive evaluations show that our mechanisms achieve good social efficiency and with low computation and communication overhead.; Comment: 10 pages, 4 figures

Auction-Based Distributed Resource Allocation for Cooperation Transmission in Wireless Networks

Huang, Jianwei; Han, Zhu; Chiang, Mung; Poor, H. Vincent
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 04/08/2007
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.37%
Cooperative transmission can greatly improve communication system performance by taking advantage of the broadcast nature of wireless channels. Most previous work on resource allocation for cooperation transmission is based on centralized control. In this paper, we propose two share auction mechanisms, the SNR auction and the power auction, to distributively coordinate the resource allocation among users. We prove the existence, uniqueness and effectiveness of the auction results. In particular, the SNR auction leads to a fair resource allocation among users, and the power auction achieves a solution that is close to the efficient allocation.; Comment: To appear in the Proceedings of the IEEE IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), Washington, DC, November 26 - 30, 2007

Truthful Auction Mechanism for Heterogeneous Spectrum Allocation in Wireless Networks

Huang, He; Sun, Yu-e; Li, Xiang-yang; Xu, Hongli; Zhou, Yousong; Huang, Liusheng
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 01/08/2012
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.41%
Secondary spectrum auction is widely applied in wireless networks for mitigating the spectrum scarcity. In a realistic spectrum trading market, the requests from secondary users often specify the usage of a fixed spectrum frequency band in a certain geographical region and require a duration time in a fixed available time interval. Considering the selfish behaviors of secondary users, it is imperative to design a truthful auction which matches the available spectrums and requests of secondary users optimally. Unfortunately, existing designs either do not consider spectrum heterogeneity or ignore the differences of required time among secondary users. In this paper, we address this problem by investigating how to use auction mechanisms to allocate and price spectrum resources so that the social efficiency can be maximized. We begin by classifying the spectrums and requests from secondary users into different local markets which ensures there is no interference between local markets, and then we can focus on the auction in a single local market. We first design an optimal auction based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to maximize the social efficiency while enforcing truthfulness. To reduce the computational complexity, we further propose a truthful sub-optimal auction with polynomial time complexity...

Online Auction Markets

Yao, Song
Fonte: Universidade Duke Publicador: Universidade Duke
Tipo: Dissertação Formato: 1538884 bytes; application/pdf
Publicado em //2009 EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.58%

Central to the explosive growth of the Internet has been the desire

of dispersed buyers and sellers to interact readily and in a manner

hitherto impossible. Underpinning these interactions, auction

pricing mechanisms have enabled Internet transactions in novel ways.

Despite this massive growth and new medium, empirical work in

marketing and economics on auction use in Internet contexts remains

relatively nascent. Accordingly, this dissertation investigates the

role of online auctions; it is composed of three essays.

The first essay, ``Online Auction Demand,'' investigates seller and

buyer interactions via online auction websites, such as eBay. Such

auction sites are among the earliest prominent transaction sites on

the Internet (eBay started in 1995, the same year Internet Explorer

was released) and helped pave the way for e-commerce. Hence, online

auction demand is the first topic considered in my dissertation. The

second essay, ``A Dynamic Model of Sponsored Search Advertising,''

investigates sponsored search advertising auctions, a novel approach

that allocates premium advertising space to advertisers at popular

websites, such as search engines. Because sponsored search

advertising targets buyers in active purchase states...

Mathematical Models of Coordination Mechanisms in Multi-Agent Systems

Terán,Juan; Aguilar,José L; Cerrada,Mariela
Fonte: CLEI Electronic Journal Publicador: CLEI Electronic Journal
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: text/html
Publicado em 01/08/2013 EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.47%
The good performance of a set of computer systems based on agents depends on the coherence degree and coordination between their activities. The study of coordination problem is an important topic for designers and researchers in the multi-agents systems field. There are several coordination mechanisms in the current literature, being the auction and the contract net the most popular ones. These mechanisms allow the agents to allocate resources and tasks to achieve their objectives. This paper aims to present formal models of the auction and the contract net as coordination mechanisms in multi-agents systems based on FIPA (Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents) Protocols. Mathematical equations describe the different parameters characterizing the auction and the contract net mechanisms; they allow define a generic structure of each mechanism and groups of agents can create several instances of them to coordinate their needs