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More on the dynamic Vickrey mechanism for multi-unit auctions : an experimental study on the emission permits initial auction

Botelho, Anabela; Pinto, Lígia; Fernandes, Maria Eduarda
Fonte: NIMA Publicador: NIMA
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento
Publicado em /11/2013 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.49%
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the multiple-units auction literature, by testing the performance of the dynamic Vickrey auction (the Ausubel model), in an experimental setting, representing the functioning of an emission permits market with an Ausubel auction for the initial allocation of permits. Other features of the experiment include the possibility of banking and the inclusion of uncertainty, and the parameters were set so as to replicate an environment similar to the EU-ETS market. Our results reveal that emission permits are not exactly allocated as theoretically predicted in the Ausubel auction although the differences are not statistically significant. Comparison of our results with previous experimental studies on the same auction mechanism, although under very different conditions, indicate no relevant differences exist on the Ausubel auction performance, which is an important policy indication when decisions are being taken on the implementation of several auctions for multiple units, namely in the context of the EU-ETS.; Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT); We thank FCT for research support under grant POCTI/ECO/45435/02. Financial support from NIMA is also appretiated.

A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand

Sotomayor,Marilda
Fonte: Fundação Getúlio Vargas Publicador: Fundação Getúlio Vargas
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: text/html
Publicado em 01/09/2002 EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.22%
This paper proposes a new descending bid method for auctioning multiple objects. The auctioneer announces a current price, bidders indicate their demands at that price, and the auctioneer lowers the prices until every object can be allocated to a buyer who demands it and no buyer receives more than one item. The features of this mechanism lie on the facts that: the objects are sold simultaneously at prices that clear the market; every two similar objects are sold at the same price; the mechanism always produces the same final price, namely, the maximum competitive equilibrium price. In addition, the auctioneer can choose an efficient allocation.

Testing a Purportedly More Learnable Auction Mechanism

Parkes, David; Tumer, Kagan; Barron, Greg; Burns, James; Milkman, Katherine L.
Fonte: Berkeley Mathemarketics Group Publicador: Berkeley Mathemarketics Group
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.69%
We describe an auction mechanism in the class of Groves mechanisms that has received attention in the computer science literature because of its theoretical property of being more “learnable” than the standard second price auction mechanism. We bring this mechanism, which we refer to as the “clamped second price auction mechanism,” into the laboratory to determine whether it helps human subjects learn to play their optimal strategy faster than the standard second price auction mechanism. Contrary to earlier results within computer science using simulated reinforcement learning agents, we find that both in settings where subjects are given complete information about auction payoff rules and in settings where they are given no information about auction payoff rules,subjects converge on playing their optimal strategy significantly faster in sequential auctions conducted with a standard second price auction mechanism than with a clamped second price auction mechanism. We conclude that while it is important for mechanism designers to think more about creating learnable mechanisms, the clamped second price auction mechanism in fact produces slower learning in human subjects than the standard second price auction mechanism. Our results also serve to highlight differences in behavior between simulated agents and human bidders that mechanism designers should take into account before placing too much faith in simulations to test the performance of mechanisms intended for human use.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

Handling Interdependent Values in an Auction Mechanism for Bandwidth Allocation in Tactical Data Networks

Klein, Mark; Moreno, Gabriel A.; Parkes, David C.; Plakosh, Daniel; Seuken, Sven; Wallnau, Kurt C.
Fonte: Association for Computing Machinery Publicador: Association for Computing Machinery
Tipo: Monograph or Book
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.04%
We consider a tactical data network with limited bandwidth, in which each agent is tracking objects and may have value for receiving data from other agents. The agents are self-interested and would prefer to receive data than share data. Each agent has private information about the quality of its data and can misreport this quality and degrade or otherwise decline to share its data. The problem is one of interdependent value mechanism design because the value to one agent for the broadcast of data on an object depends on the quality of the data, which is privately known to the sender. A recent two-stage mechanism due to Mezzetti (2004) can be modified to our setting. Our mechanism achieves efficient bandwidth allocation and provides incentive compatibility by conditioning payments on the realized value for data shared between agents.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

The sequential self-selection auction mechanism for selective reenlistment bonuses potential cost savings to the U.S. Marine Corps

Bock, Paul B.
Fonte: Monterey California. Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey California. Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.33%
This thesis explores the potential cost savings for the Marine Corps by replacing the current SRB program with one that uses the format of a Sequential Self-Selection Auction Mechanism (S3AM). The power of predicting behavior based upon opportunity costs is the theoretical underpinning of the Sequential Self-Selection Auction Mechanism (S3AM). The S3AM greatly reduces the payment of economic rent. The payment of economic rent is limited because the Marine Corps would only pay Marines a monetary sum that more closely corresponds to their active duty opportunity cost. In other words, the S3AM would allow the Marine Corps to capture more of the economic surplus, making the SRB process substantially more cost effective. If a S3AM were used in lieu of the current SRB program, the Marine Corps would potentially save money while still meeting endstrength requirements. For example, using the S3AM in FY 2006 would have potentially saved the Marine Corps 1 2,123,885, 6 90,471 and 1 18,390, respectively, for the three Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) analyzed, based on a four year multiple. This savings would have been realized, if the two and six year S3AM model were used to pay FY 2006 bonuses to the 0311s, 0621s and 5811s that reenlisted.

Integrating monetary and non-monetary reenlistment incentives utilizing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM)

Zimmerman, Brooke Maura
Fonte: Monterey California. Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey California. Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.36%
This research addressed the potential retention and cost impacts of providing an optimal individualized portfolio of non-monetary and monetary incentives to influence reenlistment and retention behavior in enlisted Sailors by exploring three mechanisms for administrating enlisted retention: a purely monetary auction, a Universal Incentive Package (UIP) auction, and the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM). The mechanisms were simulated, their outcomes compared and their respective strengths and weaknesses were explored. CRAM clearly outperformed the monetary and UIP auctions. Cost savings to the Navy ranged from 25 to 80% over monetary incentives alone. Additionally, this research addressed the force-diversifying potential of CRAM. It was shown, for the sample used, that offering certain non-monetary incentives changed the demographic mix of Sailors retained. By allowing Sailors to choose only those benefits, which suit them, the Navy can eliminate the waste associated with unwanted benefits while at the same time empowering its members.

Applying the combinatorial retention auction mechanism (CRAM) to a cost-benefit analysis of the post 9/11 era GI Bill transferability benefit

Lay, Richard H.
Fonte: Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.36%
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited; This research determined the costs, benefits and efficiency of the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill Transferability benefit by simulating four different retention mechanisms and comparing the cost of each to provide desired retention levels among a population of sailors who valued the Transferability benefit more than or less than the Cost of the mechanisms investigated were a purely monetary auction, a Universal Incentive Package (UIP) Auction, and the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM). All three mechanisms were simulated, data were analyzed and results were compared. The CRAM clearly showed it was the most efficient method for meeting retention objectives while constraining Costs to the Navy as much as possible. Cost savings to the Navy ranged from 27% to 51% over Cash Only Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRB). Furthermore, this report confirms that an across-the-board benefit such as GI Bill Transferability significantly reduces the positive surplus when sailors who have a Value of Transferability less than the Cost of Transferability nonetheless exploit this benefit. Maintaining the status quo SRB policy combined with the estimated negative retention effects of the GI Bill Transferability benefit only magnifies the cost ineffectiveness of the Post 9/11 Era GI Bill.

Variability of valuation of non-monetary incentives motivating and implementing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism

Ellis, Jason Blake
Fonte: Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.17%
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited; This thesis explores the concept of preference variability relative to non-monetary and monetary incentives in the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM). CRAM offers a mix of monetary and non-monetary incentives to encourage retention behavior. Recent research demonstrated the utility of non-monetary incentives as part of a military retention program. While CRAM was shown to cost effectively motivate retention, variability in valuation of non-monetary incentives as part of CRAM introduces complexity in eliciting preferences to implement the model. Making certain complexity decreasing assumptions regarding the personal valuation of incentives potentially affects the model cost and retention outcomes. These assumptions could potentially increase costs and retain the "wrong" sailors. This thesis examines an operational version of the CRAM, which assumes additive personal preferences across combinations of nonmonetary incentives to decrease complexity of the model. The outcomes of this "simplified" model are compared to the "more complex" previous research findings. The simplified CRAM model continues to produce cost saving, with no significant changes to the mix of personnel retained. Overall...

Integrating monetary and non-monetary retention incentives for the U.S. Navy Dental Corps officers utilizing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM)

Kumar, Sandeep
Fonte: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.36%
This research focused on the Navy Dental Corps community because of the retention challenges encountered, especially at the senior Lieutenant and Lieutenant Commander Ranks. The Dental Corps has retention goals by accession cohort and specialty mix to support the correct number of specialty trained officers to meet billet requirements in support of Navy and Marine Corps Dental Readiness. The requirement is to retain a healthy number of Dental Officers by specialty and pay grade to meet both clinical needs, and maintain senior leadership capability in the future. This research used the Universal Incentive Package (UIP) auction and Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) to identify the cost savings opportunities for the Navy, while retaining the optimal number of Dental Corps officers. Additionally, this research summarized the importance of creating a balance between monetary and non-monetary incentives. The Oracle Crystal Ball Monte Carlo simulation indicated that CRAM outperformed monetary only and universal auction mechanisms with an average savings between 24 and 30 percent. This research concluded that 61 percent retention level could be achieved by offering CRAM with an average savings of 24 percent over monetary only and UIP. The research concludes that CRAM provides an opportunity to individualize benefits that are not only valued by Dental Corps officers...

The uniform price quality adjusted discount auction for aviation continuation pay : potential benefits to the U.S. Marine Corps

White, Christopher S.
Fonte: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.52%
This objective of this thesis is to explore the potential benefits realized by the Marine Corps if the current Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) system is replaced with an auction mechanism that utilizes Quality Adjusted Discount (QUAD) methodology. The Uniform Price Quality Adjusted Discount Auction is designed to reduce the total cost of ACP while simultaneously increasing the overall quality of the aviators being retained. The goal of this study was to evaluate the existing ACP system and through experimentation, coupled with economical analyses, determine the feasibility of replacing the current system of assigning the aviator retention bonus with one that incorporates QUAD methodology. The QUAD auction mechanism caters to a wide range of individual reservation values resulting from various economic conditions. An ACP auction would reflect changing economic conditions, because aviators would reveal their true reservation values when bidding. Although an auction mechanism may not always result in a cost savings, it will ensure that the bonus amounts are set at the correct levels. If a QUAD auction were used in lieu of the current ACP system, Marine Corps manpower planners would have the flexibility to more cost effectively retain higher quality aviators while achieving Marine Corps aviator retention goals.

The combinatorial retention auction mechanism (CRAM): integrating monetary and non-monetary reenlistment incentives

Coughlan, Peter J.; Gates, William R.; Zimmerman, Brooke M.
Fonte: Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Relatório
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
56.41%
This research addresses the potential retention and cost impacts of providing an optimal individualized portfolio of non-monetary and monetary incentives to influence reenlistment and retention behavioral in enlisted Sailors. Specifically, it explores three mechanisms for administrating enlisted retention: a purely monetary auction, a Universal Incentive Package (UIP) auction, and the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM). In this text, the mechanisms are simulated, their outcomes compared and their respective strengths and weaknesses explored. The findings of this research confirm that CRAM clearly outperformed the monetary and UIP auctions. Cost savings to the Navy reanged from 25 to 80% over monetary incentives alone. Additionally, this research addresses the force-diversfying potential of CRAM. It is shown, for the sample used, that offering certain non-monetary incetives changed the demographic mix of Sailors retained. By allowing Sailors to choose only those benefits which suit them, the Navy can eliminate the waste associated with unwanted benefits, while at the same time empowering its members.

The Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM)

Coughlan, Peter; Gates, William; Myung, Noah
Fonte: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Relatório
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
56.44%
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.; Revised version; We propose a reverse uniform price auction called Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) that integrates both monetary and non-monetary incentives (NMIs). CRAM computes the cash bonus and NMIs to a single cost parameter, retains the lowest cost employees and provides them with compensation equal to the cost of the first excluded employee. CRAM is dominant strategy incentive compatible. We provide optimal bidding strategy, and show that there is cost saving compared to a benchmark auction (monetary retention auction). Because CRAM and the benchmark may retain different employees, we provide for whom and under what conditions the utility may increase or decrease by CRAM. Finally, we show that there is an increase in the total social welfare by utilizing CRAM to the benchmark.

Simulating the effectiveness of an alternative salary auction mechanism

Tan, Pei Yin
Fonte: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: xiv, 55 p.
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.6%
This research simulates the effectiveness of an alternative auction mechanism for Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) that has the potential for reducing the U.S. Department of Defense's (DoD's) cost. A recent student thesis studying the application of salary auctions and matching an an assignment setting determined that there arer two major complications in an assignment auction which affect the incentive of bidders to submit a truthful valuation of the jobs. An alternative auction mechanism that combined elements of both auction theory and matching was proposed to overcome these complications. This study further defines this alternative auction mechanism and presents a simulation setup for testing the effectiveness of the mechanism. Simulation is carried out and the mechanism evaluated based on defined operational performance and efficiency measures. The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the benefits of the alternate auction mechanism to DoD.

Between Forced Resumption and Voluntary Sale: A Mechanism For The Collective Sale Or Transfer Of Irrigation Water

Pincus, J.; Shapiro, P.
Fonte: Economic Society of Australia Publicador: Economic Society of Australia
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em //2008 EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.57%
Currently, the legitimate transfer of ownership of an asset occurs either through voluntary means--gift, bequest, sale--or through the use of state power--compulsory acquisition, resumption, eminent domain, court order. In Australia and elsewhere, compulsory acquisition of private property is followed by the payment of compensation, which may be too little or too great. This paper outlines an auction mechanism that is intermediate between the forced resumption of water entitlements and their voluntary sale. To be effective, the mechanism requires there to be competitive bidders in the auction; so the mechanism would work best if there were an end to collusion between public agencies in the water market. The seller would be an irrigation district, which would be compelled by government to engage in the auction. The proceeds of any auction sale would be distributed to the individual irrigators, according to fixed and known fractional shares. However, in contrast with the use of forced resumption, under the Shapiro--Pincus mechanism no sale would be made unless each individual irrigator receives at least what he or she has nominated as a minimum required payment. This guarantee would be secured through the use of a secret reserve for the auction of the district's water entitlements. The combination of a secret reserve...

Continuous Double Auction Mechanism and Bidding Strategies in Cloud Computing Markets

Shi, Xuelin; Xu, Ke; Liu, JiangChuan; Wang, Yong
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 23/07/2013
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.57%
Cloud computing has been an emerging model which aims at allowing customers to utilize computing resources hosted by Cloud Service Providers (CSPs). More and more consumers rely on CSPs to supply computing and storage service on the one hand, and CSPs try to attract consumers on favorable terms on the other. In such competitive cloud computing markets, pricing policies are critical to market efficiency. While CSPs often publish their prices and charge users according to the amount of resources they consume, auction mechanism is rarely applied. In fact a feasible auction mechanism is the most effective method for allocation of resources, especially double auction is more efficient and flexible for it enables buyers and sellers to enter bids and offers simultaneously. In this paper we bring up an electronic auction platform for cloud, and a cloud Continuous Double Auction (CDA) mechanism is formulated to match orders and facilitate trading based on the platform. Some evaluating criteria are defined to analyze the efficiency of markets and strategies. Furthermore, the selection of bidding strategies for the auction plays a very important role for each player to maximize its own profit, so we developed a novel bidding strategy for cloud CDA...

An Investigation Report on Auction Mechanism Design

Niu, Jinzhong; Parsons, Simon
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.41%
Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used in solving real-world optimization problems, and in structuring stock or futures exchanges. Auctions also provide a very valuable testing-ground for economic theory, and they play an important role in computer-based control systems. Auction mechanism design aims to manipulate the rules of an auction in order to achieve specific goals. Economists traditionally use mathematical methods, mainly game theory, to analyze auctions and design new auction forms. However, due to the high complexity of auctions, the mathematical models are typically simplified to obtain results, and this makes it difficult to apply results derived from such models to market environments in the real world. As a result, researchers are turning to empirical approaches. This report aims to survey the theoretical and empirical approaches to designing auction mechanisms and trading strategies with more weights on empirical ones, and build the foundation for further research in the field.

Optimal Auction Design with Quantized Bids

Cao, Nianxia; Brahma, Swastik; Varshney, Pramod K.
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 28/09/2015
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.54%
This letter considers the design of an auction mechanism to sell the object of a seller when the buyers quantize their private value estimates regarding the object prior to communicating them to the seller. The designed auction mechanism maximizes the utility of the seller (i.e., the auction is optimal), prevents buyers from communicating falsified quantized bids (i.e., the auction is incentive-compatible), and ensures that buyers will participate in the auction (i.e., the auction is individually-rational). The letter also investigates the design of the optimal quantization thresholds using which buyers quantize their private value estimates. Numerical results provide insights regarding the influence of the quantization thresholds on the auction mechanism.; Comment: 6 pages, 3 figures, TSP letter

An Auction Mechanism for Resource Allocation in Mobile Cloud Computing Systems

Zhang, Yang; Niyato, Dusit; Wang, Ping
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 23/04/2013
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.44%
A mobile cloud computing system is composed of heterogeneous services and resources to be allocated by the cloud service provider to mobile cloud users. On one hand, some of these resources are substitutable (e.g., users can use storage from different places) that they have similar functions to the users. On the other hand, some resources are complementary that the user will need them as a bundle (e.g., users need both wireless connection and storage for online photo posting). In this paper, we first model the resource allocation process of a mobile cloud computing system as an auction mechanism with premium and discount factors. The premium and discount factors indicate complementary and substitutable relations among cloud resources provided by the service provider. Then, we analyze the individual rationality and incentive compatibility (truthfulness) properties of the users in the proposed auction mechanism. The optimal solutions of the resource allocation and cost charging schemes in the auction mechanism is discussed afterwards.

Auctions as an Alternative to Book Building in the IPO Process: An Examination of Underpricing for Large Firms in France

Mekjian, John
Fonte: Universidade Duke Publicador: Universidade Duke
Publicado em 16/04/2012 EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.6%
A relevant factor in determining the quality of an initial public offering (IPO) mechanism is the level and variability of underpricing that occurs. The percentage difference between the IPO price and the closing price after one day of trading is a common way to define the “underpricing” of the stock. Although companies may value a small amount of positive underpricing, they certainly want this to be controlled. Both extreme positive and extreme negative underpricing are undesirable for a company. Building off of a paper that found a lower mean and variability of underpricing for firms that use the auction IPO mechanism as opposed to the book building IPO mechanism, this paper argues that auctions are not disadvantaged when only large firms are considered. Although this paper finds that the book building mechanism controls underpricing better than the auction mechanism, the advantage disappears when considering only large firms. This analysis is relevant because, aside from two companies, only small companies have used the auction IPO mechanism in the United States. Due to the lack of auction IPOs in the United States, this paper uses French data in its analysis. By showing that large firms using the auction mechanism are not disadvantaged when compared to large firms using the book building mechanism...

Online Auction Markets

Yao, Song
Fonte: Universidade Duke Publicador: Universidade Duke
Tipo: Dissertação Formato: 1538884 bytes; application/pdf
Publicado em //2009 EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.58%

Central to the explosive growth of the Internet has been the desire

of dispersed buyers and sellers to interact readily and in a manner

hitherto impossible. Underpinning these interactions, auction

pricing mechanisms have enabled Internet transactions in novel ways.

Despite this massive growth and new medium, empirical work in

marketing and economics on auction use in Internet contexts remains

relatively nascent. Accordingly, this dissertation investigates the

role of online auctions; it is composed of three essays.

The first essay, ``Online Auction Demand,'' investigates seller and

buyer interactions via online auction websites, such as eBay. Such

auction sites are among the earliest prominent transaction sites on

the Internet (eBay started in 1995, the same year Internet Explorer

was released) and helped pave the way for e-commerce. Hence, online

auction demand is the first topic considered in my dissertation. The

second essay, ``A Dynamic Model of Sponsored Search Advertising,''

investigates sponsored search advertising auctions, a novel approach

that allocates premium advertising space to advertisers at popular

websites, such as search engines. Because sponsored search

advertising targets buyers in active purchase states...