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Proposta de aperfeiçoamento da metodologia dos leilões de comercialização de energia elétrica no ambiente regulado: aspectos conceituais, metodológicos e suas aplicações; Proposal for Improving Methodology of Regulated Electricity Procurement Auction: Concepts, Methodologies, and Their Applications

Rego, Erik Eduardo
Fonte: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP Publicador: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 05/11/2012 PT
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.49%
Este trabalho analisou os leilões de comercialização de energia elétrica no ambiente de contratação regulada no Brasil, realizados entre 2005 e 2011, com o objetivo de propor aperfeiçoamentos em sua metodologia. Para tanto, foram estudadas três linhas de pesquisa: teoria de leilões, internalização (adicionais) de custos não privados (externalidades) e organização de mercados de capacidade. Após a análise dos 21 leilões de novos empreendimentos realizados no período, conclui-se que o desenho do leilão com fase discriminatória final é adequado aos objetivos de modicidade tarifária, mas que também permite melhoras. As fraquezas da sistemática atual identificadas foram: metodologia de contratação termelétrica por disponibilidade, com viés das fontes de maior custo variável unitário, adoção de preço-teto nem sempre adequado, dificuldade em mitigar o exercício de poder de mercado da Eletrobras nos leilões de energia existente e licitação pelo custo econômico privado. De forma a aprimorar os leilões, as seguintes ações foram sugeridas: realização de uma etapa adicional e prévia ao desenho de leilão híbrido atual visando contornar a problemática de estabelecimento de preço-teto adequado; utilização de adicionais ao lance do leilão para internalizar os custos de transmissão não recolhidos pelo gerador; substituição do mecanismo de contratação termelétrica pelo modelo Colombiano de opções; condução de leilões de energia nova e existente em conjunto...

What really matters in auction design

Klemperer, Paul
Fonte: Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV Publicador: Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
Tipo: Relatório
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.49%
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems, and the Anglo-Dutch auction a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions may often perform better. Effective anti-trust policy is also critical. However, everything depends on the details of the context; the circum- stances of the recent U.K. mobile-phone license auction made an ascending format ideal, but this author (and others) correctly predicted the same for- mat would fail in the Netherlands and elsewhere. Auction design is not one size Þts all . We also discuss the 3G spectrum auctions in Germany, Italy, Austria and Switzerland, and football TV-rights, TV franchise and other radiospectrum auctions, electricity markets, and takeover battles.

An Expressive Auction Design for Online Display Advertising

Lahaie, Sébastien; Parkes, David C.; Pennock, David
Fonte: AAAI Press Publicador: AAAI Press
Tipo: Monograph or Book
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.28%
We propose an expressive auction design that allows advertisers to specify the kinds of demographics and websites they wish to target within an advertising network. The design allows the network to differentiate impressions according to relevant attributes (e.g., geographic location of the user, topic of the webpage). Advertisers can place bids for different kinds of impressions according to their attributes, and can also specify volume constraints to control exposure. The novelty of the design is a bidding language that admits scalable allocation and pricing algorithms. We discuss the incentive properties of different pricing approaches. We also propose a bidder feedback mechanism to mitigate the complexity of expressive bidding.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

Accounting for Cognitive Costs in On-Line Auction Design

Parkes, David C.; Ungar, Lyle H.; Foster, Dean P.
Fonte: Springer Verlag Publicador: Springer Verlag
Tipo: Monograph or Book
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.39%
Many auction mechanisms, including first and second price ascending and sealed bid auctions, have been proposed and analyzed in the economics literature. We compare the usefulness of different mechanisms for on-line auctions, focusing on the cognitive costs placed on users (e.g. the cost of determining the value of a good), the possibilities for agent mediation, and the trust properties of the auction. Different auction formats prove to be attractive for agent mediated on-line auctions than for traditional off-line auctions. For example, second price sealed bid auctions are attractive in traditional auctions because they avoid the communication cost of multiple bids in first price ascending auctions, and the “gaming” required to estimate the second highest bid in first price sealed bid auctions. However, when bidding agents are cheap, communication costs cease to be important, and a progressive auction mechanism is preferred over a closed bid auction mechanism, since users with semi-autonomous agents can avoid the cognitive cost of placing an accurate value on a good. As another example, when an on-line auction is being conducted by an untrusted auctioneer (e.g. the auctioneer is selling its own items), rational participants will build bidding agents that transform second price auctions into first price auctions.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems

Parkes, David C.
Fonte: Springer-Verlag Publicador: Springer-Verlag
Tipo: Monograph or Book
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
56.55%
As traditional commerce moves on-line more business transactions will be mediated by software agents, and the ability of agent-mediated electronic marketplaces to efficiently allocate resources will be highly dependent on the complexity of the decision problems that agents face; determined in part by the structure of the marketplace, resource characteristics, and the nature of agents’ local problems. We compare auction performance for agents that have hard local problems, and uncertain values for goods. Perhaps an agent must solve a hard optimization problem to value a good, or interact with a busy and expensive human expert. Although auction design cannot simplify the valuation problem itself, we show that good auction design can simplify meta-deliberation - providing incentives for the “right” agents to deliberate for the “right” amount of time. Empirical results for a particular cost-benefit model of deliberation show that an ascending-price auction will often support higher revenue and efficiency than other auction designs. The price provides agents with useful information about the value that other agents hold for the good.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

Procurement Efficiency for Infrastructure Development and Financial Needs Reassessed

Estache, Antonio; Iimi, Atsushi
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Relevância na Pesquisa
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Infrastructure is the engine for economic growth. The international donor community has spent about 70-100 billion U.S. dollars on infrastructure development in developing countries every year. However, it is arguable whether these financial resources are used efficiently, particularly whether the current infrastructure procurement prices are appropriate. Without doubt a key is competition to curb public procurement costs. This paper analyzes procurement data from multi and bilateral official development projects in three infrastructure sectors: roads, electricity, and water and sanitation. The findings show that the competition effect is underutilized. To take full advantage of competition, at least seven bidders are needed in the road and water sectors, while three may be enough in the power sector. The paper also shows that not only competition, but also auction design, especially lot division, is crucial for reducing unit costs of infrastructure. Based on the estimated efficient unit costs, the annual financial needs are estimated at approximately 360 billion U.S. dollars. By promoting competition...

From Uniform Auction to Discriminatory Auction: Assessment of the Restructuring Proposal for the Italian Electricity Day-Ahead Market

GUERCI, Eric; RASTEGAR, Mohammad Ali
Fonte: Instituto Universitário Europeu Publicador: Instituto Universitário Europeu
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf; digital
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
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In the context of the 2009 debate on reforming the Italian market, a realistic agent-based computational model of the day-ahead market session of the Italian wholesale electricity market is simulated to compare market performances between uniform-price and pay-as-bid clearing mechanisms. An empirical validation of computational results at a macro-level is performed to test for accuracy of simulated outcomes with historical ones. The level of prices are accurately reproduced except for few peak hours. As far as concerns pay-as-bid auction, the computational experiments point out that it results in higher market prices than the uniform-price auction. In the pay-as-bid mechanism, sellers’ endeavours to maximize their profits are more costly thus leading to higher price levels.

Investment incentives and auction design in electricity markets

Fabra, Natalia; Fehr, Nils-Henrik M von der; Frutos, María Ángeles de
Fonte: Centre for Economic Policy Research Publicador: Centre for Economic Policy Research
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /01/2008 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.47%
Motivated by the regulatory debate in electricity markets, we seek to understand how market design affects market performance through its impact on investment incentives. For this purpose, we study a two-stage game in which firms choose their capacities under demand uncertainty prior to bidding into the spot market. We analyse a number of different market design elements, including (i) two commonly used auction formats, the uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, (ii) price-caps and (iii) bid duration. We find that, although the discriminatory auction tends to lower prices, this does not imply that investment incentives at the margin are poorer; indeed, under reasonable assumptions on the shape of the demand distribution, the discriminatory auction induces (weakly) stronger investment incentives than the uniform-price format.

Design of Auctions for Short-Term Allocation in Gas Markets Based on Virtual Hubs

VAZQUEZ, Miguel; HALLACK, Michelle
Fonte: Instituto Universitário Europeu Publicador: Instituto Universitário Europeu
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.49%
Gas markets based on virtual hubs has been the preferred EU design. Such market designs are based on socializing network flexibility services. Nonetheless, shippers have different preferences about the network flexibility, which are not reflected in current allocation models. We propose the introduction of auction mechanisms to deal with network service allocation in the short term. The auction aims to represent simultaneously the diversity of players' preferences and the trade-offs implied by network constraints. Two sealed-bid auctions are proposed. On the one hand, an auction with one product allocates network services through the minimization of gas price differences. On the other, a multi-product (gas and line-pack storage) auction is designed to facilitate the revelation of preferences on line-pack storage.

Need and design of short-term auctions in the EU gas markets

VAZQUEZ, Miguel; HALLACK, Michelle
Fonte: Elsevier Sci Ltd Publicador: Elsevier Sci Ltd
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.44%
In the EU, gas markets are based on socializing network flexibility services. However, shippers have different preferences on network flexibility, which are not reflected in current allocation models. We propose the introduction of auction mechanisms to allocate network services in the short run. The auction aims to represent simultaneously the diversity of players' preferences and the trade-offs implied by network constraints. Two sealed-bid auctions are proposed: (a) an auction based on bids for gas, which allocates network services through the minimization of gas price differences; (b) an auction with explicit bids for line-pack, which allows shippers' valuation of line-pack storage.

Design and Performance of Policy Instruments to Promote the Development of Renewable Energy : Emerging Experience in Selected Developing Countries

Elizondo Azuela, Gabriela; Barroso, Luiz Augusto
Fonte: Washington, DC: World Bank Publicador: Washington, DC: World Bank
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Publication; Publications & Research :: Publication
ENGLISH; EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
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This report summarizes the results of a recent review of the emerging experience with the design and implementation of policy instruments to promote the development of renewable energy (RE) in a sample of six representative developing countries and transition economies ('developing countries') (World Bank 2010). The review focused mainly on price- and quantity-setting policies, but it also covered fiscal and financial incentives, as well as relevant market facilitation measures. The lessons learned were taken from the rapidly growing literature and reports that analyze and discuss RE policy instruments in the context of different types of power market structures. The analysis considered all types of grid-connected RE options except large hydropower: wind (on-shore and off-shore), solar (photovoltaic and concentrated solar power), small hydropower (SHP) (with capacities below 30 megawatts), biomass, bioelectricity (cogeneration), landfill gas, and geothermal. The six countries selected for the review included Brazil...

Performance of Renewable Energy Auctions : Experience in Brazil, China and India

Elizondo Azuela, Gabriela; Barroso, Luiz; Khanna, Ashish; Wang, Xiaodong; Wu, Yun; Cunha, Gabriel
Fonte: World Bank Group, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank Group, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper; Publications & Research
ENGLISH; EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.55%
This paper considers the design and performance of auction mechanisms used to deploy renewable energy in three emerging economies: Brazil, China, and India. The analysis focuses on the countries' experience in various dimensions, including price reductions, bidding dynamics, coordination with transmission planning, risk allocation strategies, and the issue of domestic content. Several countries have turned to public competitive bidding as a mechanism for developing the renewable generation sector in recent years, with the number of countries implementing some sort of auction procedure rising from nine in 2009 to 36 by the end of 2011 and about 43 in 2013. In general, the use of auctions makes sense when the contracting authority expects a large volume of potentially suitable bids, so that the gains from competition can offset the costs of implementation. A study of the successes and failures of the particular auction design schemes described in this paper can be instrumental in informing future policy making.

Essais sur la gestion des ressources forestières

Tatoutchoup, Francis Didier
Fonte: Université de Montréal Publicador: Université de Montréal
Tipo: Thèse ou Mémoire numérique / Electronic Thesis or Dissertation
FR
Relevância na Pesquisa
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Cette thèse est composée de trois essais en économie forestière. Les deux premiers s'intéressent à la fixation de la redevance optimale à laquelle fait face le propriétaire d'une ressource forestière dans un contexte d'information asymétrique. Le troisième analyse l'impact à long terme du recyclage sur la surface de terre affectée à la forêt. La gestion des ressources forestières implique souvent la délégation des droits de coupe par le propriétaire forestier à une entreprise exploitante. Cette délégation prend la forme d'un contrat de concession par lequel le propriétaire forestier octroie les droits d'exploitation aux compagnies forestières, en contrepartie d'une redevance (transfert monétaire). L'octroie des droits d'exploitation s'effectue généralement sous plusieurs modes, dont les plus répandus sont les appels d'offres publics et les contrats de gré à gré, où le propriétaire forestier et la firme exploitante spécifient entre autres la redevance dans les clauses d'exploitation de la forêt. Pour déterminer le mécanisme optimal (choix de la firme, âge de coupe et redevance), le propriétaire forestier a idéalement besoin de connaître les coûts de coupe et de reboisement. Or en réalité...

Pre-bid network analysis for transportation procurement auction under stochastic demand

Wang, Qian
Fonte: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Publicador: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: 68 p.
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.25%
Transportation procurement is one of the most critical sourcing decisions to be made in many companies. This thesis addresses a real-life industrial problem of creating package bids for a company's transportation procurement auction. The purpose of offering package bids is to increase the carriers' capacity and to improve the reliability of services. In this thesis, we investigate the possibility of forming packages using the company's own distribution network. Effective distribution of packages requires balanced cycles. A balanced cycle is a cycle containing no more than 3 nodes with equal loads (or volume of package) on every link in the cycle. We develop mixed-integer programs to find the maximum amount of network volume that can be covered by well-balanced cycles. These models are deterministic models that provide a rough guide on the optimal way of package formation when loads are known in advance. Since demand is random in real life, we perform a stochastic analysis of the problem using various techniques including simulation, probabilistic analysis and stochastic programming. Results from the stochastic analysis show that the effectiveness of package distribution depends on how we allocate the volumes on the lanes to create balanced cycles. If we always assign a fixed proportion of the lanes' volumes to the cycles...

Assignment of exclusive spectrum licenses in Japan : use of an auction for the licensee selection process

Matsunaga, Hironori
Fonte: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Publicador: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: 159 p.; 7651233 bytes; 7657900 bytes; application/pdf; application/pdf
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.62%
The demand for spectrum resources has increased in the past decade due to the flourishing wireless industry worldwide. This change requires Japan's Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) to establish a transparent, fair and efficient spectrum allocation process that will enable it to select an optimal set of licensees to realize efficient spectrum use. This thesis proposes an auction system that assigns exclusive spectrum licenses to firms competing in the Japanese wireless industry. MIC currently uses a comparative examination system, which unfortunately lacks certain features the Ministry is required to address. An auction system is an alternative, already employed by many countries to allocate spectrum resources optimally, to secure a transparent and fair decision-making process, and to raise revenue for national coffers. The Diet's approval of legislation authorizing MIC to use auctions is one obstacle because it requires much time and effort to persuade political parties, incumbents, and newcomers of the value of the auction system over the current system. Another challenge to the effectiveness of the auction system is its design, which must be built-to-order based on the goals of each government and specific market conditions.; (cont.) This research covers four areas: (1) The development and transition of the Japanese mobile industry; (2) Analysis of stakeholders' attitudes toward the introduction of the auction system; (3) A proposed strategy for developing an auction design based on an analysis of English...

Optimal Auction Design with Quantized Bids

Cao, Nianxia; Brahma, Swastik; Varshney, Pramod K.
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 28/09/2015
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.57%
This letter considers the design of an auction mechanism to sell the object of a seller when the buyers quantize their private value estimates regarding the object prior to communicating them to the seller. The designed auction mechanism maximizes the utility of the seller (i.e., the auction is optimal), prevents buyers from communicating falsified quantized bids (i.e., the auction is incentive-compatible), and ensures that buyers will participate in the auction (i.e., the auction is individually-rational). The letter also investigates the design of the optimal quantization thresholds using which buyers quantize their private value estimates. Numerical results provide insights regarding the influence of the quantization thresholds on the auction mechanism.; Comment: 6 pages, 3 figures, TSP letter

Modeling On-Line Art Auction Dynamics Using Functional Data Analysis

Reddy, Srinivas K.; Dass, Mayukh
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 11/09/2006
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.62%
In this paper, we examine the price dynamics of on-line art auctions of modern Indian art using functional data analysis. The purpose here is not just to understand what determines the final prices of art objects, but also the price movement during the entire auction. We identify several factors, such as artist characteristics (established or emerging artist; prior sales history), art characteristics (size; painting medium--canvas or paper), competition characteristics (current number of bidders; current number of bids) and auction design characteristics (opening bid; position of the lot in the auction), that explain the dynamics of price movement in an on-line art auction. We find that the effects on price vary over the duration of the auction, with some of these effects being stronger at the beginning of the auction (such as the opening bid and historical prices realized). In some cases, the rate of change in prices (velocity) increases at the end of the auction (for canvas paintings and paintings by established artists). Our analysis suggests that the opening bid is positively related to on-line auction price levels of art at the beginning of the auction, but its effect declines toward the end of the auction. The order in which the lots appear in an art auction is negatively related to the current price level...

Mechanism Design in the Case of Two Objects with the Possibility for Complementarities

Varma, Avtar
Fonte: Universidade Duke Publicador: Universidade Duke
Publicado em 18/04/2011 EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.47%
This research builds upon existing studies in that it investigates the possibility of expanding the mathematical and theoretical models of FPSB auctions, along with a slightly altered versions of this auction format, into a linear program in order to solve it with numerical techniques. The output generated from the linear optimization model suggests that the auction mechanisms being used today for the sale of multiple objects with complementarities may well be inefficient in maximizing seller’s revenue. The results further establish a basis for comparison of equilibrium surplus from the seller’s perspective in the case of an auction with two complementary objects. Moreover, the analytical and numerical results herein serve as a building block for future research examining different mechanism designs that will maximize seller revenue in a given auction.; Honors Thesis

Online Auction Markets

Yao, Song
Fonte: Universidade Duke Publicador: Universidade Duke
Tipo: Dissertação Formato: 1538884 bytes; application/pdf
Publicado em //2009 EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.7%

Central to the explosive growth of the Internet has been the desire

of dispersed buyers and sellers to interact readily and in a manner

hitherto impossible. Underpinning these interactions, auction

pricing mechanisms have enabled Internet transactions in novel ways.

Despite this massive growth and new medium, empirical work in

marketing and economics on auction use in Internet contexts remains

relatively nascent. Accordingly, this dissertation investigates the

role of online auctions; it is composed of three essays.

The first essay, ``Online Auction Demand,'' investigates seller and

buyer interactions via online auction websites, such as eBay. Such

auction sites are among the earliest prominent transaction sites on

the Internet (eBay started in 1995, the same year Internet Explorer

was released) and helped pave the way for e-commerce. Hence, online

auction demand is the first topic considered in my dissertation. The

second essay, ``A Dynamic Model of Sponsored Search Advertising,''

investigates sponsored search advertising auctions, a novel approach

that allocates premium advertising space to advertisers at popular

websites, such as search engines. Because sponsored search

advertising targets buyers in active purchase states...

Network Extenality and Mechanism Design

Xu, Xiaoming
Fonte: Universidade Duke Publicador: Universidade Duke
Tipo: Dissertação
Publicado em //2015
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.53%

\abstract

{\em Mechanism design} studies optimization problems taking into accounts of the selfish agents. {\em Network externality} is the effect a consumer receives from other consumers of the same good. This effect can be negative or positive. We first consider several mechanism design problems under the network externality assumption. The externality model used in this dissertation is more general than the widely used cardinality based model. In particular the network we consider in this dissertation is a graph, which is not necessarily complete. Our goal is to design {\em truthful} mechanisms to maximize the seller's revenue. Our main results under the network externality utility model are several optimal or near optimal mechanisms for {\em digital goods auctions}. To do so we invent several novel approximation schemes as well as applying results from the {\em approximation algorithm} literature. In particular when the agents exhibit negative network externality, we first model the problem as a two staged {\em pricing game}. We then show that the pricing game is an exact {\em potential game} which always admits a pure {\em Nash Equilibrium}. We then study the {\em best} and {\em worst} Nash Equilibrium in this game in terms of the revenue. We show two positive results. For the best Nash Equilibrium we show a $2$-approximation to the maximum revenue on bipartite graphs. For the worst Nash Equilibrium we use the notion of a {\em $\delta$-relaxed} equilibrium. In the sense that the prices for the same type of agents are within $\delta$ factor of each other. We accompany our positive results with matching hardness results. On the other hand...