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Governança corporativa e estrutura de propriedade: determinantes e relação com o desempenho das empresas no Brasil ; Corporate governance and ownership structure: determinants and association with firm value in Brazil

Silveira, Alexandre di Miceli da
Fonte: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP Publicador: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 30/11/2004 PT
Relevância na Pesquisa
35.88%
Governança corporativa pode ser entendida como o conjunto de mecanismos de incentivo e controle, internos e externos, que visam a minimizar os custos decorrentes do problema de agência. O tema é importante por ser bem difundida a hipótese de que as práticas de governança afetam o desempenho das empresas. Esta tese tem como objetivo avaliar se os mecanismos de governança são exógenos e se exercem influência sobre o valor de mercado e a rentabilidade das companhias abertas no Brasil. A pesquisa foi dividida em três partes inter-relacionadas. A primeira parte investigou os determinantes da qualidade da governança corporativa, isto é, os fatores que fazem com que algumas empresas apresentem um nível de governança maior do que outras submetidas a um mesmo ambiente contratual. Como aproximação para a qualidade da governança corporativa, construiu-se um índice de governança para as 161 companhias componentes da amostra. O resultado principal desta primeira parte sugere que a estrutura de propriedade influencia a qualidade da governança corporativa. Especificamente, encontrou-se uma relação negativa significante entre o excesso de direito de voto em posse do acionista controlador e a qualidade da governança. Os resultados também indicaram que as empresas maiores...

O uso do lucro econômico na formulação de contratos de incentivo contingentes ao desempenho e o problema do horizonte: uma análise experimental; The use of the economic profit in performance-contingent incentive contracts and the horizon problem: an experimetal analysis

Santos, Luis Paulo Guimarães dos
Fonte: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP Publicador: Biblioteca Digitais de Teses e Dissertações da USP
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 06/12/2012 PT
Relevância na Pesquisa
35.91%
O presente estudo investigou se o uso do lucro econômico em contratos de incentivo contingentes ao desempenho motiva os indivíduos a agir de forma mais consistente com os objetivos de longo prazo da empresa quando existe o problema do horizonte. Para tanto, foi utilizado um experimento de fator único entre sujeitos, pré-pós tratamento com grupo de controle, cuja única tarefa dos participantes era investir recursos em ações de longo prazo visando maximizar o fluxo de caixa futuro de uma loja de prestação de serviço. O estudo envolveu a participação de 76 estudantes de graduação, divididos em três grupos, e documentou que, em comparação ao grupo de controle (recompensado com base numa remuneração fixa) e a um segundo grupo de tratamento (recompensado com base numa remuneração variável vinculada ao lucro contábil contemporâneo), os participantes submetidos ao contrato que recompensava com base no lucro econômico agiram de forma mais congruente em relação ao objetivo estabelecido, dedicando mais esforço na realização da tarefa e melhorando o desempenho nas suas decisões de investimentos. Consistente com as predições da teoria da agência, o principal resultado dessa investigação sugere que o lucro econômico ajuda a mitigar o problema de miopia gerencial...

Funding social sector activity in Brazil : a case study analysis of agency risk incidence and mitigation

Dragon, Katharina Agnes
Fonte: Fundação Getúlio Vargas Publicador: Fundação Getúlio Vargas
Tipo: Dissertação
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.02%
Empresas e organizações sociais têm um papel cada vez mais importante no mercado brasileiro. Essas organizações - sejam elas com ou sem fins lucrativos –têm como objetivocausar um profundo e positivo impacto social.Ambas enfrentamtambém o mesmo desafio: financiar as suas operações. Recentemente, dois modelos inovadores de financiamento, o fundo de venture capitalVox Capital e o fundo de empréstimo social SITAWI, entraram no mercado brasileiro para solucionar esse desafio. Este estudo analisa ambos os fundos,associando o problema do financiamento de empresas e organizações sociais às teorias tradicionais de negócio. Mais especificamente, por meio de um estudo de caso,é avaliado se o risco de agência (agency risk) explica as práticas e o designcontratual utilizados pelos fundos. A pesquisa é baseada num estudo de Alemany e Scarlata (2010) sobre a estruturação dos negócios de fundos filantrópicos de capital empreendedor (PhVC, na sigla em inglês) na América do Norte e na Europa. Uma definição chave desse estudo é que organizações sem fins lucrativos, ao contrário daquelas com fins lucrativos, estão sujeitas a uma restrição de distribuição de lucros. Embora Alemany e Scarlata (2010) tivessem descobertoque parceria (stewardship)...

Undervaluation through Foreign Reserve Accumulation : Static Losses, Dynamic Gains

Korinek, Anton; Servén, Luis
Fonte: Washington, DC: World Bank Publicador: Washington, DC: World Bank
Relevância na Pesquisa
35.98%
This paper shows that real exchange rate undervaluation through the accumulation of foreign reserves may improve welfare in economies with learning-by-investing externalities that arise disproportionately from the tradable sector. In the presence of targeting problems or when policy choices are restricted by multilateral agreements, first-best policies such as subsidies to capital accumulation, or subsidies to tradable production are not feasible. A neo-mercantilist policy of foreign reserve accumulation "outsources" the targeting problem or overcomes the multilateral restrictions by providing loans to foreigners that can only be used to buy up domestic tradable goods. This raises the relative price of tradable versus non-tradable goods (i.e. undervalues the real exchange rate) at the static cost of temporarily reducing tradable absorption in the domestic economy. However, since the tradable sector generates greater learning-by-investing externalities, it leads to dynamic gains in the form of higher growth. The net welfare effects of reserve accumulation depend on the balance between the static losses from lower tradable absorption versus the dynamic gains from higher growth.

Regulatory Reform : Integrating Paradigms

de la Torre, Augusto; Ize, Alain
Fonte: Banco Mundial Publicador: Banco Mundial
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.03%
The Subprime crisis largely resulted from failures to internalize systemic risk evenly across financial intermediaries and recognize the implications of Knightian uncertainty and mood swings. A successful reform of prudential regulation will need to integrate more harmoniously the three paradigms of moral hazard, externalities, and uncertainty. This is a tall order because each paradigm leads to different and often inconsistent regulatory implications. Moreover, efforts to address the central problem under one paradigm can make the problems under the others worse. To avoid regulatory arbitrage and ensure that externalities are uniformly internalized, all prudentially regulated intermediaries should be subjected to the same capital adequacy requirements, and unregulated intermediaries should be financed only by regulated intermediaries. Reflecting the importance of uncertainty, the new regulatory architecture will also need to rely less on markets and more on "holistic" supervision, and incorporate countercyclical norms that can be adjusted in light of changing circumstances.

Banking and Regulation in Emerging Markets : The Role of External Discipline

Vives, Xavier
Fonte: Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank Publicador: Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.15%
This article reviews the main issues of regulating and supervising banks in emerging markets with a view toward evaluating the long-run options. Particular attention is paid to Latin America and East Asia. These economies face a severe policy commitment problem that leads to excessive bailouts and potential devaluation of claims of foreign investors. This exacerbates moral hazard and makes a case for importing external discipline (for example, acquiring foreign short-term debt). However, external discipline may come at the cost of excessive liquidation of entrepreneurial projects. The article reviews the tradeoffs imposed by external discipline and examines various arrangements, such as narrow banking, foreign banks and foreign regulation, and the potential role for an international agency or international lender of last resort.

Economic Solubility of the Agency Problem with State-Contingent Production

Quiggin, John
Fonte: Universidade Nacional da Austrália Publicador: Universidade Nacional da Austrália
Tipo: Working/Technical Paper Formato: 288865 bytes; application/pdf
EN_AU
Relevância na Pesquisa
45.98%
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Delegation of Power and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics

DA CONCEICAO-HELDT, Eugenia
Fonte: Instituto Universitário Europeu Publicador: Instituto Universitário Europeu
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf; digital
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.14%
This paper addresses the problem of agency losses (agency shirking and agency slippage) in the process of power delegation in EU trade policy. The central question is whether a conflictual situation exists between the interests of the member states and those of the European Commission (agency shirking), or whether the structure of delegation in itself stimulates the agent to adopt a different position from the principals (agency slippage). Drawing on the principal-agent approach, I argue that agency losses are due to the structure of delegation and that the existence of multiple principals with diverging preferences facilitates agency. I find empirical evidence that the Council-Commission relationship on trade politics has different dynamics depending on the negotiating stage. In the initial negotiating stage, when defining the negotiating mandate of the Commission, the relationship is cooperative. Conflict between the Commission and the Council only breaks out in a latter stage of negotiations, when the Commission makes concessions at the international level.; EU Trade Politics; agency losses; principal-agent approach; Council-Commission relationship; agricultural trade liberalization

Essays in structural parametric and semiparametric estimation of auction and agency models

Gonzalez, Raul Sergio
Fonte: Universidade Rice Publicador: Universidade Rice
Tipo: Thesis; Text Formato: 144 p.; application/pdf
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.02%
An analysis of strategic behavior and consumer surplus in eBay auctions. This essay presents structural estimates of bidding behavior in eBay computer monitor auctions. The entry of bidders is taken as exogenous and treated as another parameter in the estimation. The source of our data is the eBay website. We verify that private values have a log normal distribution, and use our estimates to reject the use of Jump Bidding or "Snipe or War" bidding and construct structural estimates of consumer surplus. Ex-ante bidding rules, entry and private value estimation in eBay auctions. This essay measures the relation between the ex-ante bidding rules set by the seller and the bidders' entry process. With the assumption of endogenous entry we study sellers' optimal choices of bidding rules such as reserve price, use of secret reserve price, auction length and the decision to make public the characteristics of the monitors. We model the entry of bidders as a Poisson process. We keep the assumptions of independent private values and identical risk neutral bidders. Modeling entry as endogenous in the SNLLS methodology improves the estimation of the private valuation. However the difference in the coefficients' magnitude as well as in the minimized objective function value is minimal if compared with the estimation assuming exogenous entry. The use of reserve price is an effective mechanism to deter entry. Shorter auctions have fewer bidders. "Dividends and the agency cost of free cash flows" . This essay analyzes the existence of incomplete contracts (agency problem) as an alternative explanation for the documented positive relationship between dividend increase and firm value. A leading explanation for the positive market reaction surrounding the announcement of dividend increases is that dividend payments mitigate the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. One implication of this theory is that those firms whose managers are less (more) entrenched should experience a stronger (weaker) market reaction around the announcement of dividend increases. Consistent with these predictions...

Investigating Corruption

Prendergast, Canice
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper; Publications & Research
ENGLISH; EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.06%
Agency theory has had little to say about the control of bureaucratic corruption, perhaps the greatest agency problem that exists. The author considers the role of incentive contracting in reducing corruption through the use of independent investigations-a common way to monitor corruption. In simple settings, bureaucratic corruption can be suppressed by rewarding and penalizing bureaucrats, depending on the independent investigators' findings. But the author shows that incentive contracts can change behavior in both undesirable and beneficial ways. He analyzes three possible harmful behavioral responses to investigations. 1) Many investigations are (officially) instigated by customer complaints. Bureaucrats could become overinterested in "keeping the customer happy," even when it is not efficient to do so. 2) Bureaucrats often have private information on how cases should be handled, information that is hard for investigators to verify. The author shows that investigations can give bureaucrats excessive incentives to "do things by the book...

Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets : Why It Matters to Investors—and What They Can Do About It

Ararat, Melsa; Dallas, George
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Brief; Publications & Research
ENGLISH
Relevância na Pesquisa
35.98%
What should investors do when scholarly research on corporate governance in emerging markets does not provide conclusive evidence on which aspects of governance matter most across all the emerging markets and how they affect firm performance? A researcher and a practitioner team up to offer guidelines and recommendations that focus on board independence and business group affiliation. Every day, institutional investors in emerging markets must make practical decisions on the basis of incomplete and at times conflicting information. So, it is critically important that they make the best use of this imperfect knowledge. Moreover, investors too often enter emerging markets with misguided perceptions of the underlying realities. And worse, they may cling to a conceptual framework of governance that does not allow them even to consider the searching questions they should be asking. This Private Sector Opinion, by the authors, explicitly highlights this problem. The authors identify a serious gap in research on emerging markets between high-level cross-country studies...

Financial paradigms

Torre, Augusto de la; Ize, Alain
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Brief; Publications & Research
ENGLISH
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.02%
What market and regulatory issues led to the subprime crisis? How should prudential regulation be fixed? The answers depend on the interpretative lenses or 'paradigms' through which one sees finance. The agency paradigm, which has dominated recent regulatory policy, seems to be influencing much of the emerging reform agenda. But collective welfare failures particularly externalities and collective cognition failures particularly mood swings were at least as important in driving the crisis. All three paradigms should therefore be integrated into a more balanced policy agenda. But doing so will be difficult because they often have inconsistent policy implications.

The Agency Problem in Non-Profit Corporations: a Comparative Law and Economics Study of US and Italian Systems

TAMBURRINI, GIOVANNI
Fonte: La Sapienza Universidade de Roma Publicador: La Sapienza Universidade de Roma
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.12%
It is not a simple task to establish which role is currently played by the non-profit sector. Mainstream economics tend to explain the American burgeoning of non-profit structures on the basis of a market failure theory. In Italy, the non-profit sector seems to be better explained on the basis of a government failure theory. The understanding of the role of the non-profit sector is extremely important to find out which are or which should be the legal interests involved in the activity of these firms. In order to pursue this goal, the discussion is developed through the comparative law method, which basically imposes two perspectives of analysis: a historical analysis and an analysis of the current legislations. The first implies the comparison of the different legal disciplines that have dealt with a certain institute in a given country. Thus, the comparison of the US legal disciplines that have applied to non-profit organizations takes necessarily into account the Old-Country legislations. Similarly, the comparison of the Italian disciplines concerned with non-profit organizations takes necessarily into account the Roman and the Canon Law. The historical comparison is nothing but the most genial way to prepare the legal and economic background where the comparative lawyers can study and discuss the differences of the current legislations in order to suggest better or fairer solutions. Therefore...

On common agency with informed principals

Lima, Rafael Coutinho Costa
Fonte: Fundação Getúlio Vargas Publicador: Fundação Getúlio Vargas
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.08%
This thesis consists of three chapters that have as unifying subject the frame-work of common agency with informed principals. The first two chapters analyze the economic effects of privately informed lobbying applied to tariff protection (Chapter 1) and to customs unions agreements (Chapter 2). The third chapter investigates the choice of retailing strutures when principals (the producers) are privately informed about their production costs. Chapter 1 analyzes how lobbying affects economic policy when the interest groups have private information. I assume that the competitiveness of producers are lobbies private information in a Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobby game. This allows us to analyze the e¤ects of information transmission within their model. I show that the information transmission generates two informational asymmetry problems in the political game. One refers to the cost of signaling the lobby's competitiveness to the policy maker and the other to the cost of screening the rival lobby's competitiveness from the policy maker. As an important consequence information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of harmful lobbying activity. Chapter 2 uses the framework of chapter 1 to study a customs union agreement when governments are subject to the pressure of special interest groups that have better information about the competitiveness of the industries they represent. I focus on the agreement's effect on the structure of political influence. When join a customs union...

The problem of causality in corporate governance research: The case of governance indexes and firm valuation

Saravia, Jimmy A.; Saravia, Silvia
Fonte: Universidad EAFIT; Escuela de Econom??a y Finanzas Publicador: Universidad EAFIT; Escuela de Econom??a y Finanzas
Tipo: workingPaper; Documento de trabajo de investigaci??n; draf
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
35.91%
In recent years the problem of the determination of causality has become an increasingly important question in the field of corporate governance. This paper reviews contemporary literature on the topic and finds that the current approach is to attempt to determine causality empirically and that the problem remains unresolved. After explaining the reasons why it is not possible to attempt to determine causality using real world data without falling prey to a logical fallacy, this paper discusses an approach to deal with the problem. In particular, the paper argues that the appropriate approach for the problem is to build theories, with causality featuring as a part of those theories, and then to test those theories both for logical and empirical consistency.

On Solving The Findspace Problem, or How to Find Out Where Things Aren't ....

Pfister, Gregory F.
Fonte: MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory Publicador: MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
35.98%
This report describes research done at the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Support for the laboratory's artificial intelligence research is provided in part by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense under Office of Naval Research contract NOOO14-70-A-0362-0006.; MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

The Fiduciary Obligations of Financial Advisors Under the Law of Agency

Sitkoff, Robert H
Fonte: Financial Planning Association Publicador: Financial Planning Association
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.12%
This paper considers how agency fiduciary law might be applied to a financial advisor with discretionary trading authority over a client's account. It (i) surveys the agency problem to which the fiduciary obligation is directed; (ii) examines the legal context by considering how the fiduciary obligation undertakes to mitigate this problem; and (iii) examines several potential applications of agency fiduciary law to financial advisors, including principal trades and the role of informed consent by the client, organizing the discussion under the great fiduciary rubrics of loyalty and care. This paper was sponsored by Federated Investors, Inc.

The Y2K Problem in Delaware: Public Attitudes and Perceptions

Ratledge, Edward C.
Fonte: Center for Applied Demography & Survey Research Publicador: Center for Applied Demography & Survey Research
Tipo: Relatório
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.03%
The Delaware emergency management agency is concerned with public reaction to events surrounding the year 2000. To plan for possible disruptions and to identify public actions to mitigate the problem a survey of 900 individuals was completed in July 1999.; Delaware Emergency Management Agency

Implications of Principal-Agent Problem on the Transfer Pricing Theory; Implicações da Caracterização Principal-Agente nas Abordagens de Preços de Transferência

Cosenza, José Paulo; Universidade Federal Fluminense - UFF; Zardoya Alegría, Ana Isabel; Universidad de Zaragoza - UNIZAR; Laurencel, Luiz da Costa; UFF
Fonte: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais - Departamento de Ciências Contábeis Publicador: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais - Departamento de Ciências Contábeis
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion; Artigo Avaliado pelos Pares; Pesquisa Teórica; Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 30/11/2011 POR
Relevância na Pesquisa
46.18%
This paper analyzes the implications transfer pricing mechanisms have on benefit measurement and management evaluation performance when agency problems (asymmetry information, moral hazard and adverse selection) and its consequences are incorporated. The aim of this paper is to show the relationship between transfer price policy and the agency problems and if it influenced those benefit compensations that graded managerial performance. This study relate correlation between motivation, independence, incentive and punishment schemes and agency costs with managerial performance and transfer prices, in particular. But provide that agency problem isn’t formalized in the academic literature, the study proposes a reference framework, characteristic of the agency relationship adding two components: performance measure and benefit levels.; O artigo discute as implicações que as práticas de preços de transferência podem ter sobre a mensuração do resultado e a avaliação do desempenho, quando se incorporam os problemas de agência (assimetria de informação, risco moral e seleção adversa) e suas consequências no processo de controle gerencial. O objetivo do trabalho foi verificar a relação mantida pelos preços de transferência com a questão de agência e as maneiras como eles podem afetar o mecanismo de compensação da atuação gerencial. O estudo contribuiu para o reconhecimento da importância que assuntos como conflitos...

Relação entre Eficiência de Mercado e o Problema de Agência em Fundos de Investimentos; Relação entre Eficiência de Mercado e o Problema de Agência em Fundos de Investimentos

Neto, Jayme Wanderley da Fonte; Carmona, Charles Ulisses De Montreuil
Fonte: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais - Departamento de Ciências Contábeis Publicador: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais - Departamento de Ciências Contábeis
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion; Artigo Avaliado pelos Pares; ; Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 08/05/2009 POR
Relevância na Pesquisa
45.98%
    O artigo realizou uma discussão sobre a eficiência de mercado, comparando objetivos almejados pelos investidores e os efetivos interesses das administrações de fundos de investimentos. Objetivou-se investigar a existência ou não de uma harmonia de interesses entre estas partes. Analisada a questão, o trabalho apresentou entre suas conclusões a existência de um problema de agência e que, nos primeiros dez anos do Plano Real, houve excessivos ganhos para os gestores responsáveis. Foi concluído também que quanto mais ineficiente e volátil for o mercado, maior poderá ser a receita para a administração de fundos de investimentos.;    The article is a discussion about market efficiency, comparing realized objectives for investors and the effective profits from an administration of investment funds. The purpose is to investigate if harmony of interests exists between the two. After analyzing the question, the work presented as conclusions the existence of an agency problem. Furthermore, the first ten years of Plano Real had an excessive earning for the responsible management. It was also concluded that if the market is inefficient and volatile, so it is possible that of investment funds administration could be even more.