Página 8 dos resultados de 1881 itens digitais encontrados em 0.004 segundos

A simple auction mechanism for the optimal allocation of the commons

Montero, Juan-Pablo
Fonte: MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research Publicador: MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: 33, [3] p
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.87%
Efficient regulation of the commons requires information about the regulated firms that is rarely available to regulators (e.g., cost of pollution abatement). Different mechanisms have been proposed for inducing firms to reveal their private information but for reasons I discuss in the paper, I find these mechanisms of limited use. I propose a much simpler mechanism that implements the first-best for any number of firms: a uniform price sealed-bid auction of an endogenous number of (transferable) licenses with a fraction of the auction revenues given back to firms. Paybacks, which decrease with the number of firms, are such that truth-telling is a dominant strategy regardless of whether firms behave non-cooperatively or collusively.

Vantagens e desvantagens do preg??o na gest??o de compras no setor p??blico: o caso da Funasa/PB; Ventajas e desventajas del subasta revestida na gesti??n de compras en el sector publico ??? el caso del FUNASA/PB; The advantages and disadvantages in reverse auction: the case of FUNASA/PB

Nunes, Jacqueline; Lucena, Rosivaldo de Lima; Silva, Orlando Gomes da
Fonte: Escola Nacional de Administra????o P??blica (ENAP); Revista do Servi??o P??blico (RSP) Publicador: Escola Nacional de Administra????o P??blica (ENAP); Revista do Servi??o P??blico (RSP)
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
IDIOMA::PORTUGU??S:PORTUGU??S:PT
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.87%
O presente artigo ?? parte de um estudo explorat??rio cujo objetivo foi analisar as vantagens e desvantagens na aquisi????o de bens e servi??os por meio das modalidades de licita????o preg??o presencial e eletr??nico no servi??o p??blico. Para isso, foi realizado um estudo de caso na Funda????o Nacional de Sa??de da Para??ba. A parte da pesquisa divulgada neste artigo, al??m de uma s??ntese sobre o referencial te??rico, apresenta as caracter??sticas investigadas da modalidade de licita????o preg??o, comparando suas formas presencial e eletr??nica na institui????o estudada. Os resultados apontam aspectos relevantes quanto ??s quest??es: vantagens e desvantagens do preg??o eletr??nico em rela????o ao preg??o presencial e vice-versa; recursos para atendimento de despesas; planejamento anual da FUNASA/PB; economia de pre??o; economia e repasse de recursos para outras necessidades; prazos de fornecimento; treinamento e capacita????o de pessoal. Conclui a exposi????o destacando alguns pontos fortes e fracos do processo, sugerindo medidas a serem avaliadas no que tange a capacita????o de pessoal e planejamento anual na FUNASA/PB.; El actual art??culo es parte de un estudio explorat??rio cuyo objetivo es analizar las ventajas y las desventajas en la adquisici??n de bienes y servicios por medio de la modalidad de licitaci??n: subasta presencial o electr??nica ...

Broadside advertising a Real Estate Auction in the Village of Niagara Falls [New York], July, 1836.

Cameron, Chantal
Fonte: Brock University Publicador: Brock University
Tipo: Outros
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.87%
Benjamin Rathburn (1790-1873) was a builder, banker and hotel-keeper who was well-known for his work in the development and expansion of Buffalo in the 1830s. He also conducted business in the Village of Niagara Falls. He purchased large tracts of land (largely on credit) with the intent to sell the land at a profit. However, the sales did not meet his expectations and Rathburn found himself over-extended on credit, ultimately leading to his financial ruin.Jesse P. Haines (1793-1877) was an American cartographer who is credited with mapping the Villages of Lockport and Niagara Falls, New York.; A broadside advertising an “Extensive sale of Real Estate at Public Auction, in the Village of Niagara Falls”, [New York]. It is dated at Niagara Falls, July, 1836. The text reads “The proprietors offer for sale the whole of their Real Estate at Auction. Probably there is not in our country a more desirable location for most kinds of business. Sale to take place on the 2d of August, and continue from day to day, until the whole is disposed of”. A map of the property involved is also included, “made for the proprietor by J.P. Haines, Surveyor”. The proprietor is likely Benjamin Rathburn, a builder, banker and businessman who speculated in land in the Village of Niagara Falls in 1836.

An Econometric Analysis of 3G Auction Spectrum Valuations

BOHLIN, Erik; MADDEN, Gary; MOREY, Aaron
Fonte: Instituto Universitário Europeu Publicador: Instituto Universitário Europeu
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf; digital
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.87%
Scarce radio spectrum is assigned to mobile network operators (MNOs) by national regulatory authorities (NRAs). Spectrum is usually assigned by beauty contest or an auction. The process requires that winners make a payment to the government. MNOs seek scarce spectrum to enable the provision of wireless services for profit. While MNOs are imperfectly aware of their costs, NRAs rely solely on MNOs for this information. As such, NRAs set spectrum assignment conditions (including minimum bid price) largely ignorant of MNO operating conditions. This study examines the performance of 3G auction outcomes in terms of the prices paid by winners via an econometric analysis of a unique sample of national 3G spectrum auctions. These winning bids depend on national and mobile market conditions, spectrum package attributes, license process, and post-award operator requirements. Finally, model estimation accounts for the censored nature of these data.

The potential impact of an auction based retention bonus and other factors on the continuation rates of general dentists completing their initial obligation

Anderson, Robert L.
Fonte: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.87%
This thesis seeks to determine the impact of an auction based retention bonus on continuation rates for general dentists completing their initial obligation. An auction based retention bonus has the potential to improve retention rates. In lieu of actual bids from Navy general dentists, the difference between average civilian dentist salaries and Navy general dentist pay is used to represent theoretical opportunity costs. Inputting opportunity costs into a break-even formula allows approximation of the retention bonus amount needed for a one-year and/or five-year employment agreement with the Navy. A logistic regression retention model is also estimated using data for 516 Navy general dentists commissioned between 1998 and 2001. Model results indicate that accession source significantly affects the decision to continue military service. Officers commissioned as direct accessions and participants in the Dental Student Program are more likely to stay in the navy than participants in the Health Sciences Collegiate Program. Dentists commissioned in 2000-2001 are less likely to stay than those commissioned in 1998-1999. Those commissioned between the ages of 30 and 39 are more likely to continue service beyond their initial obligation than younger dentists. Race and gender do not significantly affect retention.

The sequential self-selection auction mechanism for selective reenlistment bonuses potential cost savings to the U.S. Marine Corps

Bock, Paul B.
Fonte: Monterey California. Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey California. Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.87%
This thesis explores the potential cost savings for the Marine Corps by replacing the current SRB program with one that uses the format of a Sequential Self-Selection Auction Mechanism (S3AM). The power of predicting behavior based upon opportunity costs is the theoretical underpinning of the Sequential Self-Selection Auction Mechanism (S3AM). The S3AM greatly reduces the payment of economic rent. The payment of economic rent is limited because the Marine Corps would only pay Marines a monetary sum that more closely corresponds to their active duty opportunity cost. In other words, the S3AM would allow the Marine Corps to capture more of the economic surplus, making the SRB process substantially more cost effective. If a S3AM were used in lieu of the current SRB program, the Marine Corps would potentially save money while still meeting endstrength requirements. For example, using the S3AM in FY 2006 would have potentially saved the Marine Corps 1 2,123,885, 6 90,471 and 1 18,390, respectively, for the three Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) analyzed, based on a four year multiple. This savings would have been realized, if the two and six year S3AM model were used to pay FY 2006 bonuses to the 0311s, 0621s and 5811s that reenlisted.

Distributed Auction Algorithms for the Assignment Problem with Partial Information

Park, Chulwoo; An, Woosun; Pattipati, Krishna R.; Kleinman, David L.
Fonte: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Article and Slide Presentation
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.87%
Task-asset assignment is a fundamental problem paradigm in a wide variety of applications. Typical problem setting involves a single decision maker (DM) who has complete knowledge of the weight (reward, benefit, accuracy) matrix and who can control any of the assets to execute the tasks. Motivated by planning problems arising in distributed organizations, this paper introduces a novel variation of the assignment problem, wherein there are multiple DMs and each DM knows only a part of the weight matrix and/or controls a subset of the assets. We extend the auction algorithm to such realistic settings with various partial information structures using a blackboard coordination structure. We show that by communicating the bid, the best and the second best profits among DMs and with a coordinator, the DMs can reconstruct the centralized assignment solution. The auction setup provides a nice analytical framework for formalizing how team members build internal models of other DMs and achieve team cohesiveness over time.

A genetic algorithm for solving the first price sealed bid auction in communication networks

Portilla Figueras, José Antonio; Salcedo Sanz, Sancho; García Díaz, Pilar; Hackbarth Planeta, Klaus Dietrich
Fonte: World Scientific and Engineering Academy and Society (WSEAS) Publicador: World Scientific and Engineering Academy and Society (WSEAS)
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject; publishedVersion
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.87%
This paper shows the first result obtained in the application of economic mechanisms for the efficient assignment of resources in communication networks. The final objective is to determine which Service Provider will carry their traffic over the network of a Network Provider, which will be the most profitable route and which price the ISPs will pay for it to the Network provider. As the price is a key driver a good approach to select the ISP may be an auction mechanism. The implementation of these kind of auction mechanisms becomes a NP complete problem which is solved in this paper using novel metaheuristics, specifically a genetic algorithm.

(SUB-)Optimal entry fees

Hernando-Veciana,Ángel
Fonte: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid Publicador: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em //2002 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.87%
We extend Myerson's (1981) model by allowing for uncertainty about the number of bidders. In such extension the Revenue Equivalence Theorem still holds and the optimal allocation rule remains the same. Hence, the optimal auction can be implemented with an appropriate reserve price. Nonetheless, we show that entry fees are sub-optimal. The reasons are heterogeneity in bidders' beliefs about the number of bidders, and auctioneer's uncertainty about the optimum entry fee, if any. Our result implies a reversal of the revenue ranking by Milgrom and Weber (1982) which is consistent with many real life situations: auction houses, internet auctions,...

Electronic reverse auctions in the federal government

Brown, Whitney E.; Ray, Lana D.
Fonte: Monterey, California, Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California, Naval Postgraduate School
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.87%
MBA Professional Report; Aproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.; In light of the limited recognition of electronic reverse auctions (e-RA) in the acquisition field, the purpose of this research paper is to further the use of e-RAs throughout the federal government and the Department of Defense (D0D). By exploring a multitude of auction types and designs that have been or are currently being used in the private sector, these practices set a basis for researching the auction types being used in the public sector. This paper further explores the regulations guiding the use of e-RAs and investigates the federal government's application of reverse auctions through studies, reports, and interviews with users of e-RAs. Details as to what attributes are prevalent in these e-RAs, what features are best suited for e-RAs, and what benefits have been derived from the use of e-RAs in the federal government are also included. Finally, the researchers found that e-RAs have increased transparency, cost savings, and efficiencies in the acquisition process. Although reverse auctions are being used effectively, the researchers found that there are still opportunities for improvement including incorporating a fully functional best-value tool into e-RA technology and developing more thorough federal guidance on e-RAs as an alternative pricing method.; US Air Force (USAF) authors

Analysis of bidding behaviors in non-monetary incentivized, real-time uniform auctions

Tiley, Joshua H.
Fonte: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Formato: xvi, 73 p. : ill.; 28 cm.
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.87%
MBA Professional Report; The Navy continually fights economic surge and recession, budget constraints, and natural personnel turnover to maintain personnel levels at desired "end-strength." Forecasting retention bonus levels based on these socio-economic factors is extremely difficult. Current forecasting techniques are less precise than retention auctions because auctions provide the market clearing price to retain the desired end strength. This research examines bidding strategies adopted within a retention auction incorporating monetary and non-monetary retention incentives in a competitive bidding environment. This research compared user inputs across several subjects and determined which subjects to retain. Previous experiments compared participants' bids to computer simulated "optimal" bids; it was hard to say how or if bidding strategies would change if competing with other live players. There are two issues when dealing with optimal bidding strategies. The first is correct choosing non-monetary incentives. We found that 70% of these choices were made correctly. The second involves the salary requested after choosing non-monetary incentives. The salary requests were above the optimal bids. Coupled with the fact that non-monetary incentives were generally chosen correctly...

A multiattribute sealed-bid procurement auction with multiple budgets for governments' vendor selection

Simon, Jay; Melese, Francois
Fonte: Escola de Pós-Graduação Naval Publicador: Escola de Pós-Graduação Naval
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.87%
This paper offers a new approach to government’s vendor selection decisions in major public procurements. A key challenge is for government purchasing agents to select vendors that deliver the best combination of desired non-price attributes at realistic funding levels. The mechanism proposed in this paper is a multiattribute first price, sealed bid procurement auction. It extends traditional price-only auctions to one in which competition takes place exclusively over attribute bundles. The model is a multiattribute auction in which a set of possible budget levels is specified. This model reveals the benefits of defining a procurement alternative in terms of its value to the buyer over a range of possible expenditures, rather than as a single point in budget-value space. This new approach leads to some interesting results. In particular, it suggests that in a fiscally constrained environment, the traditional approach of eliminating dominated alternatives could lead to sub-optimal decisions. Finally, an extension of the model explicitly examines the buyer’s decision problem under budget uncertainty by applying a utility function assessed over the value measure.

Slovak Republic : Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems

World Bank
Fonte: Washington, DC Publicador: Washington, DC
Tipo: Economic & Sector Work :: Insolvency Assessment (ROSC); Economic & Sector Work
ENGLISH; EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.87%
The assessment team interviewed a cross section of country stakeholders regarding the effectiveness of the legal infrastructure, and its implementation supporting debtor-creditor relationships, corporate insolvency and credit risk management, and resolution practices, including among others, members of the Inter-Agency Commission for the preparation of a new insolvency law, and members of the drafting team for the new collateral law; and, various professionals serving as trustees, executors, lawyers and accountants also provided their input. The conclusions in this assessment are based largely on the above interviews, a review of applicable legislation, data and information, various reports prepared by the Bank between 1999-2001, and other reports or analyses pertaining to the areas assessed, including the project on the new collateral legislation, and registration system for pledges (charges). Some laws unavailable in English at the time were discussed in a number of meetings with institutions, and professionals in the public...

Auctions with Endogenous Participation and Quality Thresholds : Evidence from ODA Infrastructure Procurement

Estache, Antonio; Iimi, Atsushi
Fonte: Banco Mundial Publicador: Banco Mundial
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
ENGLISH
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.87%
Infrastructure projects are often technically complicated and highly customized. Therefore, procurement competition tends to be limited. Competition is the single most important factor toward auction efficiency and anti-corruption. However, the degree of competition realized is closely related to bidders' entry decision and the auctioneer's decision on how to assess technical attributes in the bid evaluation process. This paper estimates the interactive effects among quality, entry, and competition. With data on procurement auctions for electricity projects in developing countries, it is found that large electricity works are by nature costly and can attract only a few participants. The limited competition would raise government procurement costs. In addition, high technical requirements are likely to be imposed for these large-scale projects, which will in turn add extra costs for the better quality of works and further limit bidder participation. The evidence suggests that quality is of particular importance in large infrastructure projects and auctioneers cannot easily substitute price for quality.

Integrating Border Regions : Connectivity and Competitiveness in South Asia

Cali, Massimiliano; Farole, Thomas; Kunaka, Charles; Wagle, Swarnim
Fonte: World Bank Group, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank Group, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper; Publications & Research
ENGLISH; EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.87%
Deeper regional integration can be beneficial especially for regions along international borders. It can open up new markets on opposite sides of borders and give consumers wider access to cheaper goods. This paper uses data from five contiguous districts of India, Nepal, and Bangladesh in the northeast of the subcontinent to measure the degrees of trade complementarity between districts. The paper illustrates that the regions are underexploiting the potential of intraregional commerce. Price wedges of up to 90 percent in some important consumption products along with measures of complementarity between households' production and consumption suggest the potential for relatively large gains from deeper trade integration. Furthermore, an examination of a specific supply chain of tea highlights factors that help industries scale up, aided by institutions such as an organized auction and decent physical and legal infrastructure. However, districts alike in geography but located across international boundaries face different development prospects...

Paving the Way for a Transformational Future : Lessons from Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission Phase I

World Bank
Fonte: Washington, DC Publicador: Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: ESMAP Paper; Publications & Research
ENGLISH; EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.87%
Renewable energy, especially solar power, has been garnering a lot of interest from governments, international development organizations, civil society, and the private sector for the last few years. There has been a huge surge in the popularity of this important energy source from various stakeholders in India as well. On the other hand, solar power presents a formidable option for addressing pertinent issues being faced in international geopolitical and national macroeconomic arenas for the Government of India (GoI). Though the World Bank, India considers all market segments of solar power to be important; this report specifically looks at the utility-scale grid-connected segment of solar power in India. As one of the eight missions under India's National Action Plan for Climate Change (NAPCC), the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM) was launched in January 2010 with the aim of accelerating India's march toward grid parity in solar power. JNNSM envisages the achievement of grid parity through long-term and predictable policy...

Broadside advertising a Real Estate Auction in the Village of Niagara Falls [New York], July, 1836.

Rathburn, Benjamin
Fonte: Brock University Publicador: Brock University
Tipo: Outros
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.87%
Benjamin Rathburn (1790-1873) was a builder, banker and hotel-keeper who was well-known for his work in the development and expansion of Buffalo in the 1830s. He also conducted business in the Village of Niagara Falls. He purchased large tracts of land (largely on credit) with the intent to sell the land at a profit. However, the sales did not meet his expectations and Rathburn found himself over-extended on credit, ultimately leading to his financial ruin. Jesse P. Haines (1793-1877) was an American cartographer who is credited with mapping the Villages of Lockport and Niagara Falls, New York.; A broadside advertising an 'Extensive sale of Real Estate at Public Auction, in the Village of Niagara Falls', [New York]. It is dated at Niagara Falls, July, 1836. The text reads 'The proprietors offer for sale the whole of their Real Estate at Auction. Probably there is not in our country a more desirable location for most kinds of business. Sale to take place on the 2d of August, and continue from day to day, until the whole is disposed of'. A map of the property involved is also included, 'made for the proprietor by J.P. Haines, Surveyor'. The proprietor is likely Benjamin Rathburn, a builder, banker and businessman who speculated in land in the Village of Niagara Falls in 1836.

Leilão combinatório : estudo de abordagens computáveis para o Setor Elétrico Brasileiro; Combinatorial auction : study of computable approaches to the brazilian electric sector

Elisa Bastos Silva
Fonte: Biblioteca Digital da Unicamp Publicador: Biblioteca Digital da Unicamp
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em 23/02/2015 PT
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.87%
Leilões de novos empreendimentos de energia envolvem o compromisso de construí-los e o direito de explorá-los por meio de contratos de outorga. O leiloeiro, cujo objetivo é minimizar o pagamento pela energia contratada, buscando a redução de seu preço para os consumidores finais, fornece o direito de outorga da usina para o vencedor. O licitante é um investidor, e.g., uma empresa de geração que procura maximizar seu benefício com a venda de energia proveniente do empreendimento. Quando a natureza desses empreendimentos é complementar, torna-se possível proporcionar maiores benefícios aos licitantes, e maior eficiência ao leilão, caso sejam negociados em conjunto. Atualmente, o projeto de leilão instituído é composto por uma abordagem híbrida, sequencial e simultânea, que não permite a extração das sinergias entre empreendimentos. Esta tese examina duas metodologias híbridas de leilões reversos, considerando-se o ponto de vista do leiloeiro. O primeiro modelo, centralizado, é composto por duas fases: uma simultânea de lance aberto e outra combinatória de lance fechado. A fase simultânea incentiva a revelação do preço da energia, enquanto a fase combinatória oferece oportunidade aos licitantes de submeterem ofertas mais agressivas através de pacotes de empreendimentos complementares. O modelo centralizado é formulado como um problema de otimização inteiro e combinatório. A função-objetivo consiste em minimizar o pagamento...

Bidding Lower with Higher Values in Multi-Object Auction

McAdams, David
Fonte: MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology Publicador: MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Formato: 335064 bytes; application/pdf
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.87%
Multi-object auctions differ in an important way from single-object auctions. When bidders have multi-object demand, equilibria can exist in which bids decrease as values increase! Consider a model with n bidders who receive affiliated one-dimensional types t and whose marginal values are non-decreasing in t and strictly increasing in own type ti. In the first-price auction of a single object, all equilibria are monotone (over the range of types that win with positive probability) in that each bidder's equilibrium bid is non-decreasing in type. On the other hand, some or all equilibria may be non-monotone in many multi-object auctions. In particular, examples are provided for the as-bid and uniform-price auctions of identical objects in which (i) some bidder reduces his bids on all units as his type increases in all equilibria and (ii) symmetric bidders all reduce their bids on some units in all equilibria, and for the as-bid auction of non-identical objects in which (iii) bidders have independent types and some bidder reduces his bids on some packages in all equilibria. Fundamentally, this difference in the structure of equilibria is due to the fact that payoffs fail to satisfy strategic complementarity and/or modularity in these multi-object auctions.

Temporary and Permanent Buyout Prices in Online Auctions

Gupta, Shobhit; Gallien, Jérémie
Fonte: MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology Publicador: MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: 251636 bytes; application/pdf
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.87%
Increasingly used in online auctions, buyout prices allow bidders to instantly purchase the item listed. We distinguish two types: a temporary buyout option disappears if a bid above the reserve price is made; a permanent one remains throughout the auction or until it is exercised. In a model featuring time-sensitive bidders with uniform valuations and Poisson arrivals but endogenous bidding times, we focus on finding temporary and permanent buyout prices maximizing the seller's discounted revenue, and examine the relative benefit of using each type of option in various environments. We characterize equilibrium bidder strategies in both cases and then solve the problem of maximizing seller's utility by simulation. Our numerical experiments suggest that buyout options may significantly increase a seller’s revenue. Additionally, while a temporary buyout option promotes early bidding, a permanent option gives an incentive to the bidders to bid late, thus leading to concentrated bids near the end of the auction.; Singapore-MIT Alliance (SMA)