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Um modelo de leilões com conteúdo local: análise e modelagem dos leilões de concessão de blocos exploratórios de petróleo e gás promovidos pela ANP no Brasil

Francisco, Bruno Mattiello
Fonte: Fundação Getúlio Vargas Publicador: Fundação Getúlio Vargas
Tipo: Dissertação
PT_BR
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.36%
Os leilões para concessão de blocos de petróleo no Brasil utilizam uma equação para formar a pontuação que define o vencedor. Cada participante deve submeter ao leiloeiro um lance composto por três atributos: Bônus de Assinatura (BA), Programa Exploratório Mínimo (PEM) e Conteúdo Local (CL). Cada atributo possui um peso na equação e a nota final de cada participante também depende dos lances ofertados pelos outros participantes. Apesar de leilões de petróleo serem muito estudados na economia, o leilão multi-atributos, do tipo máxima pontuação, ainda é pouco analisado, principalmente como mecanismo de alocação de direitos minerários. Este trabalho destaca a inserção do CL como atributo que transforma a estrutura, do que poderia ser um leilão simples de primeiro preço, em um leilão multi-atributos de máxima pontuação. Demonstra-se como o CL, através da curva de custos do projeto, está relacionado também ao Bônus de Assinatura, outro importante atributo da equação. Para compreender o impacto do fenômeno da inserção do CL, foram criados três casos de leilões hipotéticos, onde, dentre outras simplificações, o programa exploratório mínimo foi fixado para todas as empresas envolvidas. No caso base (Sem CL)...

Evolutionary Dynamics of Biological Auctions

Chatterjee, Krishnendu; Reiter, Johannes G.; Nowak, Martin A.
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.45%
Many scenarios in the living world, where individual organisms compete for winning positions (or resources), have properties of auctions. Here we study the evolution of bids in biological auctions. For each auction n individuals are drawn at random from a population of size N. Each individual makes a bid which entails a cost. The winner obtains a benefit of a certain value. Costs and benefits are translated into reproductive success (fitness). Therefore, successful bidding strategies spread in the population. We compare two types of auctions. In “biological all-pay auctions” the costs are the bid for every participating individual. In “biological second price all-pay auctions” the cost for everyone other than the winner is the bid, but the cost for the winner is the second highest bid. Second price all-pay auctions are generalizations of the “war of attrition” introduced by Maynard Smith. We study evolutionary dynamics in both types of auctions. We calculate pairwise invasion plots and evolutionarily stable distributions over the continuous strategy space. We find that the average bid in second price all-pay auctions is higher than in all-pay auctions, but the average cost for the winner is similar in both auctions. In both cases the average bid is a declining function of the number of participants...

Accounting for Cognitive Costs in On-Line Auction Design

Parkes, David C.; Ungar, Lyle H.; Foster, Dean P.
Fonte: Springer Verlag Publicador: Springer Verlag
Tipo: Monograph or Book
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.45%
Many auction mechanisms, including first and second price ascending and sealed bid auctions, have been proposed and analyzed in the economics literature. We compare the usefulness of different mechanisms for on-line auctions, focusing on the cognitive costs placed on users (e.g. the cost of determining the value of a good), the possibilities for agent mediation, and the trust properties of the auction. Different auction formats prove to be attractive for agent mediated on-line auctions than for traditional off-line auctions. For example, second price sealed bid auctions are attractive in traditional auctions because they avoid the communication cost of multiple bids in first price ascending auctions, and the “gaming” required to estimate the second highest bid in first price sealed bid auctions. However, when bidding agents are cheap, communication costs cease to be important, and a progressive auction mechanism is preferred over a closed bid auction mechanism, since users with semi-autonomous agents can avoid the cognitive cost of placing an accurate value on a good. As another example, when an on-line auction is being conducted by an untrusted auctioneer (e.g. the auctioneer is selling its own items), rational participants will build bidding agents that transform second price auctions into first price auctions.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

Bidding behavior in competing auctions: Evidence from eBay

Anwar, Sajid; McMillan, Robert; Zheng, Mingli
Fonte: Elsevier Science BV Publicador: Elsevier Science BV
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.4%
Much of the existing auction literature treats auctions as running independently of one another, with each bidder choosing to participate in only one auction. However, in many online auctions, a number of substitutable goods are auctioned concurrently and bidders can bid on several auctions at the same time. Recent theoretical research shows how bidders can gain from the existence of competing auctions, the current paper providing the first empirical evidence in support of competing auctions theory using online auctions data from eBay. Our results indicate that a significant proportion of bidders do bid across competing auctions and that bidders tend to submit bids on auctions with the lowest standing bid, as the theory predicts. The paper also shows that winning bidders who cross-bid pay lower prices on average than winning bidders who do not.; Sajid Anwara, Robert McMillan and Mingli Zheng; Available online 30 November 2004

Late bidding, sellers' reputation and competing auctions: Empirical essays oneBay auctions

Ruiz M., Alexander A.
Tipo: Thesis; Text Formato: 89 p.; application/pdf
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.53%
Sellers' reputation and bidding behavior on eBay auctions for brand new and used commodities. Using an original dataset of eBay auctions for brand new and used video games, this article shows that sellers of used commodities charge reputation premiums. Reputation, however, have no effect on the price of relatively inexpensive brand new commodities. Reputation did not have significant effects on the probability of making sales or bidding late. Timing of the bids on eBay auctions for brand new goods. The existing literature on online auctions has pointed out an empirical regularity with respect to the timing of the bids: Most of the bidding activity is concentrated at the end of the auctions. Roth & Ockenfels (2002) argued that bidders wait until the end to avoid falling into bidding wars. I used a unique dataset on auctions for a Playstation II game to provide an empirical assessment of the sniping theory. I do not find empirical support for this theory. Effects of competing and sequential auctions on bidders' behavior on eBay auctions. In most of the economic literature, online auctions are studied in isolation from each other. We study the effects of competing auctions that end at different times on Bidders' behavior. We use an original dataset of video games auctioned on eBay. Our main result shows that bidding activity tend to stop closer to the end of an auction when the difference between the closing times of that auction and the previous one is small. We also found that bidders facing competing auctions tend to bid in the first closing auction. These results suggest that late bidding in auctions with a hard stop time may not be equivalent to bidders waiting until the end of the auction to send their bids. We also found support for the idea that when facing competing auctions that end at similar times...

Does Publicity Affect Competition? Evidence from Discontinuities in Public Procurement Auctions

COVIELLO, Decio; MARINIELLO, Mario
Fonte: European University Institute Publicador: European University Institute
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf
EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.94%
Calls for tenders are the natural devices to inform bidders, thus to enlarge the pool of potential participants. We exploit discontinuities generated by the Italian Law on tender's publicity to identify the effect of enlarging the pool of potential participants on competition in public procurement auctions. We show that most of the effects of publicity are at regional and European level. Increasing tenders' publicity from local to regional determines an increase in the number of bidders by 50% and an extra reduction of 5% in the price paid by the contracting authority; increasing publicity from national to European has no effect on the number of bidders but it determines an extra reduction of 10% in the price paid by the contracting authority. No effect is observed when publicity is increased from regional to national. Finally, we relate measures of competition to ex-post duration of the works finding a negative correlation between duration and the number of bidders or the winning rebate.

Corruption and Auctions

Menezes, Flavio; Monteiro, Paulo K
Tipo: Working/Technical Paper Formato: 221755 bytes; application/pdf
EN_AU
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.94%
We investigate the outcome of an auction where the auctioneer approaches one of the two existing bidders and offers an opportunity for him to match his opponent's bid in exchange for a bribe. In particular, we examine two types of corruption arrangements. In the first case, the auctioneer approaches the winner to offer the possibility of a reduction in his bid to match the loser's bid in exchange for a bribe. In the second arrangement, the auctioneer approaches the loser and offers him the possibility of matching the winner's bid in exchange for a bribe. While oral auctions are corruption free under the two arrangements, corruption affects both bidding behavior, efficiency and the seller's expected revenue in a first­price auction.; no

Auctions with Endogenous Participation and Quality Thresholds : Evidence from ODA Infrastructure Procurement

Estache, Antonio; Iimi, Atsushi
Fonte: Banco Mundial Publicador: Banco Mundial
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
ENGLISH
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.94%
Infrastructure projects are often technically complicated and highly customized. Therefore, procurement competition tends to be limited. Competition is the single most important factor toward auction efficiency and anti-corruption. However, the degree of competition realized is closely related to bidders' entry decision and the auctioneer's decision on how to assess technical attributes in the bid evaluation process. This paper estimates the interactive effects among quality, entry, and competition. With data on procurement auctions for electricity projects in developing countries, it is found that large electricity works are by nature costly and can attract only a few participants. The limited competition would raise government procurement costs. In addition, high technical requirements are likely to be imposed for these large-scale projects, which will in turn add extra costs for the better quality of works and further limit bidder participation. The evidence suggests that quality is of particular importance in large infrastructure projects and auctioneers cannot easily substitute price for quality.

Promoting Renewable Energy through Auctions : The Case of India

Khana, Ashish; Barroso, Luiz
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Journal Article; Publications & Research :: Brief; Publications & Research
ENGLISH; EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.47%
This knowledge note singles out auctions as an important mechanism that has been implemented in a growing number of countries in recent decades. It features a case study of auctions designed to promote the generation of electricity from renewable sources in India. The country's national- and state-level experience with auctions of solar energy products both large and small attests to the flexibility and adaptability of auction mechanisms. Under the National Solar Mission, auctions have been implemented with good results in a variety of settings. Lessons include the importance of clear ideas about key goals and objectives, and about areas where sacrifices can be made. Experience in several states has also underlined the importance of regulatory stability. This case study is interesting, because India's National Solar Mission led to concurrent implementations of renewable auction schemes. Both national- and state-level auctions have led to successful projects. The Indian central government's experience with auction implementations can be split into three main segments. Phase 1 auctions concern centralized auctions for procuring utility-scale solar plants. Rooftop auctions concern central government conducted auctions for rooftop solar generation in specific cities. No centralized auctions for large-scale solar generation were conducted in 2012 or 2013...

Performance of Renewable Energy Auctions : Experience in Brazil, China and India

Elizondo Azuela, Gabriela; Barroso, Luiz; Khanna, Ashish; Wang, Xiaodong; Wu, Yun; Cunha, Gabriel
Fonte: World Bank Group, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank Group, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper; Publications & Research
ENGLISH; EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.94%
This paper considers the design and performance of auction mechanisms used to deploy renewable energy in three emerging economies: Brazil, China, and India. The analysis focuses on the countries' experience in various dimensions, including price reductions, bidding dynamics, coordination with transmission planning, risk allocation strategies, and the issue of domestic content. Several countries have turned to public competitive bidding as a mechanism for developing the renewable generation sector in recent years, with the number of countries implementing some sort of auction procedure rising from nine in 2009 to 36 by the end of 2011 and about 43 in 2013. In general, the use of auctions makes sense when the contracting authority expects a large volume of potentially suitable bids, so that the gains from competition can offset the costs of implementation. A study of the successes and failures of the particular auction design schemes described in this paper can be instrumental in informing future policy making.

Self-Correcting Sampling-Based Dynamic Multi-Unit Auctions

Constantin, Florin; Parkes, David C.
Fonte: Association for Computing Machinery Publicador: Association for Computing Machinery
Tipo: Monograph or Book
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.94%
We exploit methods of sample-based stochastic optimization for the purpose of strategyproof dynamic, multi-unit auctions. There are no analytic characterizations of optimal policies for this domain and thus a heuristic approach, such as that proposed here, seems necessary in practice. Following the suggestion of Parkes and Duong [17], we perform sensitivity analysis on the allocation decisions of an online algorithm for stochastic optimization, and correct the decisions to enable a strategyproof auction. In applying this approach to the allocation of non-expiring goods, the technical problem that we must address is related to achieving strategyproofness for reports of departure. This cannot be achieved through self-correction without canceling many allocation decisions, and must instead be achieved by first modifying the underlying algorithm. We introduce the NowWait method for this purpose, prove its successful interfacing with sensitivity analysis and demonstrate good empirical performance. Our method is quite general, requiring a technical property of uncertainty independence, and that values are not too positively correlated with agent patience. We also show how to incorporate "virtual valuations" in order to increase the seller's revenue.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

Online Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values

Constantin, Florin; Ito, Takayuki; Parkes, David C.
Fonte: Association for Computing Machinery Publicador: Association for Computing Machinery
Tipo: Monograph or Book
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.94%
Interdependent values (IDV) is a valuation model allowing bidders in an auction to express their value for the item(s) to sell as a function of the other bidders' information. We investigate the incentive compatibility (IC) of single-item auctions for IDV bidders in dynamic environments. We provide a necessary and sufficient characterization for IC in this setting. We show that if bidders can misreport departure times and private signals, no reasonable auction can be IC. We present a reasonable IC auction for the case where bidders cannot misreport departures.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

Tight Bounds for the Price of Anarchy of Simultaneous First Price Auctions

Christodoulou, George; Kovács, Annamária; Sgouritsa, Alkmini; Tang, Bo
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.4%
We study the Price of Anarchy of simultaneous first-price auctions for buyers with submodular and subadditive valuations. The current best upper bounds for the Bayesian Price of Anarchy of these auctions are e/(e-1) [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013] and 2 [Feldman et al. 2013], respectively. We provide matching lower bounds for both cases even for the case of full information and for mixed Nash equilibria via an explicit construction. We present an alternative proof of the upper bound of e/(e-1) for first-price auctions with fractionally subadditive valuations which reveals the worst-case price distribution, that is used as a building block for the matching lower bound construction. We generalize our results to a general class of item bidding auctions that we call bid-dependent auctions (including first-price auctions and all-pay auctions) where the winner is always the highest bidder and each bidder's payment depends only on his own bid. Finally, we apply our techniques to discriminatory price multi-unit auctions. We complement the results of [de Keijzer et al. 2013] for the case of subadditive valuations, by providing a matching lower bound of 2. For the case of submodular valuations, we provide a lower bound of 1.109. For the same class of valuations...

Bayesian Sequential Auctions

Syrgkanis, Vasilis; Tardos, Eva
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
27.4%
In many natural settings agents participate in multiple different auctions that are not simultaneous. In such auctions, future opportunities affect strategic considerations of the players. The goal of this paper is to develop a quantitative understanding of outcomes of such sequential auctions. In earlier work (Paes Leme et al. 2012) we initiated the study of the price of anarchy in sequential auctions. We considered sequential first price auctions in the full information model, where players are aware of all future opportunities, as well as the valuation of all players. In this paper, we study efficiency in sequential auctions in the Bayesian environment, relaxing the informational assumption on the players. We focus on two environments, both studied in the full information model in Paes Leme et al. 2012, matching markets and matroid auctions. In the full information environment, a sequential first price cut auction for matroid settings is efficient. In Bayesian environments this is no longer the case, as we show using a simple example with three players. Our main result is a bound of $1+\frac{e}{e-1}\approx 2.58$ on the price of anarchy in both matroid auctions and single-value matching markets (even with correlated types) and a bound of $2\frac{e}{e-1}\approx 3.16$ for general matching markets with independent types. To bound the price of anarchy we need to consider possible deviations at an equilibrium. In a sequential Bayesian environment the effect of deviations is more complex than in one-shot games; early bids allow others to infer information about the player's value. We create effective deviations despite the presence of this difficulty by introducing a bluffing technique of independent interest.

Bidding at Sequential First-Price Auctions with(out) Supply Uncertainty: A Laboratory Analysis

Neugebauer, Tibor; Pezanis-Christou, Paul
Fonte: Conselho Superior de Investigações Científicas Publicador: Conselho Superior de Investigações Científicas
Tipo: Documento de trabajo
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.94%
We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). Although we observe a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain and an important overbidding, the data qualitatively support our price trend predictions and the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model of bidding for the last stage of a sequence, whether supply is certain or not. Our study shows that behavior in these markets changes significantly with the presence of an uncertain supply, and that it can be explained by assuming that bidders formulate pessimistic beliefs about the occurrence of another stage.; Financial support from the University of Valencia (project GV98_08/2960) and from a EU-TMR ENDEAR Network Grant (FMRX-CT98-0238) is gratefully acknowledged.

Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions

Fonte: Conselho Superior de Investigações Científicas Publicador: Conselho Superior de Investigações Científicas
Tipo: Documento de trabajo
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.94%
We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders. To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders' complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the experiment. In the aggregate, behavior is consistent with the basic equilibrium predictions for risk neutral or homogenous risk averse bidders (extent of bid shading, average seller's revenues and deviations from equilibrium). However, when we look at the extent of best reply behavior and the shape of bid functions, we find that individual behavior is not in line with the received equilibrium models, although it exhibits strategic sophistication.; This research benefited from financial support from the European Commission through a TMR-ENDEAR Network Grant (FMRX-CT98-0238) and a Marie Curie Fellowship (Sadrieh: HPMF-CT-199-00312) and from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB 303.

A Emenda Constitucional dos Precatórios: Histórico, Incentivos e Leilões de Deságio; The Court-Ordered Debt Payments' Brazilian Constitutional Amendment: History, Incentives and Abatement Auctions

Bugarin, Maurício; Meneguin, Fernando
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion; ; Formato: application/pdf
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.94%
Court-ordered debt payments have become a national problem in Brazil. On one hand, states and municipalities refused paying this debt, claiming limited revenue. On the other, creditors demanded the nation to secure their judicial right. A new constitutional amendment passed in 2009 establishes a fixed yearly budget for debt payment and debt-reduction auctions to decide who should first receive payment. This article presents an economic analysis of the bill and shows that it satisfies states and municipalities participation constraints. Moreover, it proposes and analyzes a generalized-Vickrey debt-reduction auction that satisfies creditors’ participation constraints, reduces debt and the time needed for total debt payment.; A questão dos precatórios se transformou em problema de magnitude nacional, comprometendo bom funcionamento das instituições republicanas. Por um lado, estados e municípios se recusavam a pagá-los, argumentando insuficiência de verbas. Por outro lado, os credores exigiam o respeito a um direito legal. Uma nova legislação, a Emenda Constitucional nº 62, aprovada em 2009, estabeleceu um orçamento anual reservado ao pagamento de precatórios, bem como o uso de mecanismos de redução da dívida para ordenação de parte desse pagamento. Este artigo desenvolve uma análise econômica da Emenda Constitucional...

Auctions, Equilibria, and Budgets

Bhattacharya, Sayan
Tipo: Dissertação
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.94%

We design algorithms for markets consisting of multiple items, and agents with budget constraints on the maximum amount of money they can afford to spend. This problem can be considered under two broad frameworks. (a) From the standpoint of Auction Theory, the agents valuation functions over the items are private knowledge. Here, a "truthful auction" computes the subset of items received by every agent and her payment, and ensures that no agent can manipulate the scheme to her advantage by misreporting her valuation function. The question is to design a truthful auction whose outcome can be computed in polynomial time. (b) A different, but equally

important, question is to investigate if and when the market is in "equilibrium",

meaning that every item is assigned a price, every agent gets her utility-maximizing subset of items under the current prices, and every unallocated item is priced at zero.

First, we consider the setting of multiple heterogeneous items and present approximation algorithms for revenue-optimal truthful auctions. When the items are homogeneous, we give an efficient algorithm whose outcome defines a truthful and Pareto-optimal auction. Finally, we focus on the notion of "competitive equilibrium"...

Auctions with synergies and asymetric buyers

Menezes, Flavio; Monteiro, Paulo K
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.94%
In this paper we consider sequential auctions with synergies where one player wants two objects and the remaining players want one object each. We show that expected prices may not necessarily decrease as predicted by Branco [Econ. Lett. 54 (1997) 159]. Indeed we show that expected prices can actually increase.

Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions

Menezes, Flavio; Monteiro, Paulo K
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
36.94%
In this paper we consider sequential second-price auctions where an individual's value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative synergy). We show that the existence of positive synergies implies declining expected prices. When synergies are negative, expected prices are increasing. There are several corollaries. First, the seller is indifferent between selling the objects simultaneously as a bundle or sequentially when synergies are positive. Second, when synergies are negative, the expected revenue generated by the simultaneous auction can be larger or smaller than the expected revenue generated by the sequential auction. In addition, in the presence of positive synergies, an option to buy the additional object at the price of the first object is never exercised in the symmetric equilibrium and the seller's revenue is unchanged. Under negative synergies, in contrast, if there is an equilibrium where the option is never exercised, then equilibrium prices may either increase or decrease and, therefore, the net effect on the seller's revenue of the introduction of an option is ambiguous. Finally, we examine a special case with asymmetric players who have distinct synergies. In this example...