Página 12 dos resultados de 1418 itens digitais encontrados em 0.004 segundos

Optimal takeover contests with toeholds

Loyola, Gino
Fonte: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid Publicador: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper; info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /02/2008 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.94%
This paper characterizes how a target firm should be sold when the possible buyers (bidders) have prior stakes in its ownership (toeholds). We find that the optimal mechanism needs to be implemented by a non-standard auction which imposes a bias against bidders with high toeholds. This discriminatory procedure is such that the target´s average sale price is increasing in both the size of the common toehold and the degree of asymmetry in these stakes. It is also shown that a simple mechanism of sequential negotiation replicates the main properties of the optimal procedure and yields a higher average selling price than the standard auctions commonly used in takeover battles.

Analysis of Ausubel auctions by means of evolutionary computation

Mochón, Asunción; Quintana, David; Sáez, Yago; Isasi, Pedro
Fonte: IEEE Publicador: IEEE
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject; info:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /09/2005 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.94%
The increasing use of auctions has led to a growing interest in the subject. A recent method used for carrying out examinations on auctions has been the design of computational simulations. The aim of this paper is to develop a genetic algorithm to find bidders' optimal strategies for a specific dynamic multi-unit auction. The algorithm provides the bidding strategy (defined as the action to be taken under different auction conditions) that maximizes the bidder's payoff. The algorithm is tested under several experimental environments, number of bidders and quantity of lots auctioned. The results suggest that the approach leads to strategies that outperform canonical strategies.; IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation. Edimburgo, 2-5 September 2005

Asymmetric Price-Benefit Auctions

Frutos, María Ángeles de
Fonte: Elsevier Publicador: Elsevier
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica Formato: text/plain; application/pdf
Publicado em //2000 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.94%
This paper studies the performance of two auction procedures for allocating the assets of a dissolving partnership when partners' valuations for the assets are independent and asymmetrically distributed, with one partner reputed to be more interested in the assets to be divided. We provide results on existence, and uniqueness of the equilibrium induced by these auctions. Comparative statics are developed, especially the differences between relative efficiency and revenue from the two auctions.

Testing BOI and BOB algorithms for solving the Winner Determination

Sáez, Yago; Mochón, Asunción; Gómez-Barroso, J.L.; Isasi, Pedro
Fonte: IEEE Publicador: IEEE
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject; info:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em /09/2008 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.94%
Combinatorial auctions are a promising auction format for allocating radio spectrum, as well as other goods. An important handicap of combinatorial auctions is determining the winner bids among many options, that is, solving the winner determination problem (WDP). This paper tackles this computational problem using two approaches in a combinatorial first-price sealed bid auction. The first one, is an A* based on items (BOI). The second one, is an A* based on bids (BOB). These two techniques are tested in several scenarios for allocating radio spectrum licenses. The results obtained reveal that the search algorithm A* with the BOB formulation outperforms the other and always finds the optimal solution very quickly.; Eighth International Conference on Hybrid Intelligent Systems, 2008. HIS '08. Barcelona, 10-12 September 2008

Successful uninformed bidding

Hernando-Veciana, Ángel
Fonte: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid Publicador: Universidade Carlos III de Madrid
Tipo: Trabalho em Andamento Formato: application/pdf
Publicado em //2000 ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.94%
This paper studies multiunit common value auctions with informed and less informed bidders. In these auctions, we show that bidders with less information can bid very aggressively and do surprisingly well. We also show that the degree of aggressiveness and success of bidders with less information is positively related to the number of units for sale. We explain these phenomena in terms of the balance of the winner's curse and the loser's curse and their di erential e ect on bidders with di erent quality of information.

Analysis of bidding behaviors in non-monetary incentivized, real-time uniform auctions

Tiley, Joshua H.
Fonte: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School Publicador: Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Formato: xvi, 73 p. : ill.; 28 cm.
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.94%
MBA Professional Report; The Navy continually fights economic surge and recession, budget constraints, and natural personnel turnover to maintain personnel levels at desired "end-strength." Forecasting retention bonus levels based on these socio-economic factors is extremely difficult. Current forecasting techniques are less precise than retention auctions because auctions provide the market clearing price to retain the desired end strength. This research examines bidding strategies adopted within a retention auction incorporating monetary and non-monetary retention incentives in a competitive bidding environment. This research compared user inputs across several subjects and determined which subjects to retain. Previous experiments compared participants' bids to computer simulated "optimal" bids; it was hard to say how or if bidding strategies would change if competing with other live players. There are two issues when dealing with optimal bidding strategies. The first is correct choosing non-monetary incentives. We found that 70% of these choices were made correctly. The second involves the salary requested after choosing non-monetary incentives. The salary requests were above the optimal bids. Coupled with the fact that non-monetary incentives were generally chosen correctly...

Testing the initial endowment effect in experimental auctions

Loureiro, M.; Umberger, W.; Hine, S.
Fonte: Routledge Taylor & Francis Ltd Publicador: Routledge Taylor & Francis Ltd
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em //2003 EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.94%
In experimental auctions, participants are asually given an initial endowment or cash compensation that will cover the costs associated with their bids in the experiment as well as their participation time. This study analyses participants' bids in a randomly binding second-price auction to test the effect of the initial endowment on partici-pants' willingness-to-pay estimates. Three different endowments: $2, $4, and $6 are used to compensate participants in an experimental auction. It is found that parti-cipants receiving $4 or $6 as an initial endowment, bid statistically higher than those receiving only $2. Thus, willingness-to-pay estimates are sensitive to the initial endowment. Based on the results obtained in this experiment, it is concluded that endowments that are closer to the value of the auctioned good may be a more appropriate way to compensate auction participants in order to reveal their true willingness to pay for a private good, and to reduce overbidding, Additionally, the findings illustrate that an initial compensation closer to the participants' value of time may inflate their bids, and consequently may not be a correct compensation mechanism to elicit true willingness-to-pay for private goods. New ways of compen-sating participants in experimental auctions should be investigated.; http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=9738714&site=ehost-live&scope=site; Maria L. Loureiro...

The usefulness of experimental auctions in determining consumers' willingness-to-pay for quality-differentiated products

Umberger, W.; Feuz, D.
Fonte: Amer Agricultural Economics Assoc Publicador: Amer Agricultural Economics Assoc
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em //2004 EN
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.94%
The validity and effectiveness of using experimental auctions to elicit consumers' willingness-to-pay for closely related, quality-differentiated products is examined. The effect of panelists' demographics on bid values and auction winners, and the impact of experimental procedures on auction prices are analyzed. Demographic variables are poor predictors of bids and auction winners. Experimental procedures such as panel size and initial endowment influence market price level. Relative bid differences for paired samples are primarily influenced by relative differences in taste panel ratings. Relative willingness-to-pay values elicited through experimental auctions appear valid, while actual willingness-to-pay values are influenced by experimental design.; Wendy J. Umberger, Dillon M. Feuz

How to Accelerate Corporate and Financial Sector Restructuring in East Asia

Claessens, Stijn; Djankov, Simeon; Klingebiel, Daniela
Fonte: World Bank, Washington, DC Publicador: World Bank, Washington, DC
Tipo: Publications & Research :: Viewpoint; Publications & Research
ENGLISH
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.94%
Resolving systemic banking and corporate distress is not easy. The large scale of the East Asian financial crisis has made the task even more daunting in Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. Two years into the process, bank and corporate restructuring is still a work in progress. Governments should act to accelerate it. Besides adopting common policy prescriptions - improving financial regulation, corporate governance, and bankruptcy procedures and shoring up banks' capital positions - governments could take three additional steps: Set up competitive, privately managed specialized funds, to hold nonperforming loans and depoliticize restructuring. Allow auctions as an alternative to negotiations, to speed debt restructuring. And allow employee ownership participation schemes, to reduce workers' resistance to changes in ownership.

Profit-share bidding auctions: a theoretical approach

Souza, Clara Costellini de
Fonte: Fundação Getúlio Vargas Publicador: Fundação Getúlio Vargas
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.94%
Neste trabalho, estudamos o regime de partilha de produção brasileiro, instituí do pela Lei No 12.351, para exploração de petróleo através de uma abordagem te orica. Desenvolvemos um modelo de partilha de produção a fim de capturar algumas características do modelo de partilha brasileiro como, por exemplo, a participação obrigatória da Petrobras, assimetria de informação e a presença de participantes estratégicos. Através de solução numérica, fazemos uma análise das estratégias dos participantes e dos ganhos esperados. Além disso, desenvolvemos um modelo de custos heterogêneos para estudar as regras de conteúdo local.; In this paper, we study by means of a theoretical approach the Brazilian production sharing regime for oil exploration approved in Law No 12.351. We develop a model for production sharing to capture certain aspects of the Brazilian sharing model as compulsory participation of Petrobras, asymmetric information, and the presence of strategic participants. Using numerical solutions, we discuss the bidders’ strategies and their expected gains. Furthermore, we developed a model with heterogeneous costs to study the local content rules.

Leilões de valor quase comum e o regime de partilha de produção brasileiro: uma abordagem teórica

Souza, Clara Costellini de
Fonte: Fundação Getúlio Vargas Publicador: Fundação Getúlio Vargas
Tipo: Dissertação
PT_BR
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.94%
Neste trabalho, estudamos o regime de partilha de produção brasileiro, instituído pela Lei N$^o$ 12.351, para exploração de petróleo através de uma abordagem teórica. Alguns artigos da literatura de leilões de valor quase comum foram estudados aqui. Além disso, desenvolvemos um modelo de partilha de produção com informação assimétrica a fim de capturar algumas características do modelo de partilha brasileiro. Através de solução numérica, fazemos uma análise das estratégias dos participantes e dos ganhos esperados.; In this paper, we study by means of a theoretical approach the Brazilian production sharing regime for oil exploration approved in Law No 12.351. Some works in the almost common value auctions literature were also analysed. Furthermore, we develop a model for production sharing with asymmetric information to capture certain aspects of the Brazilian sharing model. Using numerical solutions, we discuss the bidders' strategies and their expected gains.

Bidder response to combinatorial auctions in truckload procurement

Plummer Clinton Lee, 1980-
Fonte: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Publicador: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: 81 p.; 4537523 bytes; 4546633 bytes; application/pdf; application/pdf
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.94%
This thesis explores how truckload carriers use conditional bids within the framework of a combinatorial auction to win more business and balance their existing networks. Because a considerable portion of a truckload carrier's cost of serving a given lane is associated with the probability of finding a follow-on load (i.e. economies of scope), bidding on a lane-by-lane basis may not accurately reflect a carrier's true cost of serving that lane. In a combinatorial auction, a truckload carrier can more accurately reflect its true cost of serving a given lane by offering package discounts, conditional on winning lanes that increase the probability of finding follow-on loads. Though a considerable amount has been written about the economics of truckload carrier's operations and the benefits of combinatorial auctions to shippers, few have studied conditional bidding from a bidder's (carrier's) perspective. This thesis makes three contributions. First, an explanation of why bidders do and don't submit conditional bids in combinatorial auctions is provided. Second, a model of carrier costs functions, including package discounts (a measure of economies of scope) is developed. Finally, this thesis examines regional pricing differences, and quantifies the amount by which carriers will change their prices in different regions of the US.; by Clinton Lee Plummer.; Thesis (M. Eng. in Logistics)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology...

Buyout prices in online auctions

Gupta, Shobhit
Fonte: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Publicador: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Tipo: Tese de Doutorado Formato: 154 p.
ENG
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.94%
Buyout options allow bidders to instantly purchase at a specified price an item listed for sale through an online auction. A temporary buyout option disappears once a regular bid above the reserve price is made, while a permanent option remains available until it is exercised or the auction ends. Buyout options are widely used in online auctions and have significant economic importance: nearly half of the auctions today are listed with a buyout price and the option is exercised in nearly one fourth of them. We formulate a game-theoretic model featuring time-sensitive bidders with independent private valuations and Poisson arrivals but endogenous bidding times in order to answer the following questions: How should buyout prices be set in order to maximize the seller's discounted revenue? What are the relative benefits of using each type of buyout option? While all existing buyout options we are aware of currently rely on a static buyout price (i.e. with a constant value), what is the potential benefit associated with using instead a dynamic buyout price that varies as the auction progresses?; (cont.) For all buyout option types we exhibit a Nash equilibrium in bidder strategies, argue that this equilibrium constitutes a plausible outcome prediction...

Disuasión de entrada, subastas repetidas y divisibilidad del objeto en venta; Entry deterrence, repeated auctions and divisibility of the object in sale

Fernández Aguirre, Gabriel; Peña Torres, Julio
Fonte: Universidad de Chile. Facultad de Economía y Negocios Publicador: Universidad de Chile. Facultad de Economía y Negocios
Tipo: Artículo de revista
ES
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.94%
Artículo de publicación ISI; This paper analyzes entry deterrence strategies at sequential multi-unit Englishtype repeated auctions, motivated by entry deterrence observed at a series of yearly auctions of fishing rights occurring since the early 1990s in the Chilean Sea Bass industrial fishery. It analyzes parametric configurations under which incumbent firms may have followed non-cooperative entry deterrence strategies or else may have colluded for that purpose. A two-stage competition model is developed. In the first stage there occurs sequential auctioning of multiple fishing rights; in the second stage, production rights are used to compete in a homogeneous-good Cournot market. The analysis focuses on the relationship between the number of incumbents, sources of competitive advantage for them (relative to potential entrants) and the number and productive size of the multiple production rights in sale. The core of the analysis lies in answering how does the divisibility of the object(s) in sale affect the possibilities of incumbent firms for deterring the entry of new rivals.

Preference Elicitation in Proxied Multiattribute Auctions

Sunderam, Aditya Vikram; Parkes, David C.
Fonte: Association for Computing Machinery Publicador: Association for Computing Machinery
Tipo: Conference Paper
EN_US
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.94%
We consider the problem of minimizing preference elicitation in efficient multiattribute auctions, that support dynamic negotiation over non-price based attributes such as quality, time-of-delivery, and processor speed. We introduce asynchronous price-based multiattribute auctions, with proxy bidding agents that sit between the auctioneer and the participants. Empirical results demonstrate the preference elicitation savings that are provided with minimal price spaces, asynchronous updates, and proxy agents.; Engineering and Applied Sciences

Welfare Maximization with Deferred Acceptance Auctions in Reallocation Problems

Kim, Anthony
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.94%
We design approximate weakly group strategy-proof mechanisms for resource reallocation problems using Milgrom and Segal's deferred acceptance auction framework: the radio spectrum and network bandwidth reallocation problems in the procurement auction setting and the cost minimization problem with set cover constraints in the selling auction setting. Our deferred acceptance auctions are derived from simple greedy algorithms for the underlying optimization problems and guarantee approximately optimal social welfare (cost) of the agents retaining their rights (contracts). In the reallocation problems, we design procurement auctions to purchase agents' broadcast/access rights to free up some of the resources such that the unpurchased rights can still be exercised with respect to the remaining resources. In the cost minimization problem, we design a selling auction to sell early termination rights to agents with existing contracts such that some minimal constraints are still satisfied with remaining contracts. In these problems, while the "allocated" agents transact, exchanging rights and payments, the objective and feasibility constraints are on the "rejected" agents.; Comment: A short version to appear in the 23rd European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2015)

Testing affiliation in private-values models of first-price auctions using grid distributions

de Castro, Luciano I.; Paarsch, Harry J.
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 07/01/2011
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.94%
Within the private-values paradigm, we construct a tractable empirical model of equilibrium behavior at first-price auctions when bidders' valuations are potentially dependent, but not necessarily affiliated. We develop a test of affiliation and apply our framework to data from low-price, sealed-bid auctions held by the Department of Transportation in the State of Michigan to procure road-resurfacing services: we do not reject the hypothesis of affiliation in cost signals.; Comment: Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/10-AOAS344 the Annals of Applied Statistics (http://www.imstat.org/aoas/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org)

Simultaneous auctions for complementary goods

Shin, Wiroy
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Publicado em 09/12/2013
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.94%
This paper studies an environment of simultaneous, separate, first-price auctions for complementary goods. Agents observe private values of each good before making bids, and the complementarity between goods is explicitly incorporated in their utility. For simplicity, a model is presented with two first-price auctions and two bidders. We show that a monotone pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium exists in the environment.

Learning Theory and Algorithms for Revenue Optimization in Second-Price Auctions with Reserve

Mohri, Mehryar; Medina, Andres Muñoz
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.94%
Second-price auctions with reserve play a critical role for modern search engine and popular online sites since the revenue of these companies often directly de- pends on the outcome of such auctions. The choice of the reserve price is the main mechanism through which the auction revenue can be influenced in these electronic markets. We cast the problem of selecting the reserve price to optimize revenue as a learning problem and present a full theoretical analysis dealing with the complex properties of the corresponding loss function. We further give novel algorithms for solving this problem and report the results of several experiments in both synthetic and real data demonstrating their effectiveness.; Comment: Accepted at ICML 2014

A MIP framework for non-convex uniform price day-ahead electricity auctions

Madani, Mehdi; Van Vyve, Mathieu
Fonte: Universidade Cornell Publicador: Universidade Cornell
Tipo: Artigo de Revista Científica
Relevância na Pesquisa
26.94%
It is well-known that a market equilibrium with uniform prices often does not exist in non-convex day-ahead electricity auctions. We consider the case of the non-convex, uniform-price Pan-European day-ahead electricity market "PCR" (Price Coupling of Regions), with non-convexities arising from so-called complex and block orders. Extending previous results, we propose a new primal-dual framework for these auctions, which has applications in both economic analysis and algorithm design. The contribution here is threefold. First, from the algorithmic point of view, we give a non-trivial exact (i.e. not approximate) linearization of a non-convex 'minimum income condition' that must hold for complex orders arising from the Spanish market, avoiding the introduction of any auxiliary variables, and allowing us to solve market clearing instances involving most of the bidding products proposed in PCR using off-the-shelf MIP solvers. Second, from the economic analysis point of view, we give the first MILP formulations of optimization problems such as the maximization of the traded volume, or the minimization of opportunity costs of paradoxically rejected block bids. We first show on a toy example that these two objectives are distinct from maximizing welfare. We also recover directly a previously noted property of an alternative market model. Third...